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This thesis explores Vietnam’s trade policymaking to generate insights into the factors 
driving the country’s process of trade liberalization since the 1980s. Vietnam provides an 
important case for the study of the politics of trade policy, as its rapid transformation from 
isolation to active trade player has been one of the most dramatic of any country. As a 
developing country, such trade agreements require costly and highly politically sensitive 
policy reforms. Moreover, as a country with a one-party socialist political system, its 
capacity to engage with the capitalist global and regional trade regimes is less than for 
many of its peers. This situation raises questions about how and why Vietnam has so 
rapidly adopted a strategy of aggressive trade liberalization through bilateral, regional and 
global trade agreements? 
Previous scholarly research on Vietnam’s trade policy reforms tends to emphasize 
economic rationales, such as expanding exports and/or attracting inward foreign 
investment. While these factors are certainly pertinent, they ignore a wider range of 
transformations within Vietnam that have reconfigured how it engages with the global 
economy. This study goes beyond economic factors to explore how changes in the actors, 
interests, ideas, and institutions of Vietnam’s trade policymaking have led to its distinctive 
type of trade reforms.  
Using case study and interview methods, the thesis examines Vietnam’s domestic trade 
reforms and participation in key international trade agreements. The study argues that the 
Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and the state took the lead role to advocate for 
international trade agreements. Underlying these reforms were transformation within the 
CPV and state, through which a new diplomatic and economic reform mindset and arose 
over groups opposing trade policy on the ground of potential economic and political risks. 
Such transformations were facilitated through more pluralistic and inclusive processes 
within the CPV, and the relations between the party-state and interest groups, contributing 
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1.1 The research topic 
Since the end of the Cold War, Vietnam has engaged in a rapid trade liberalization process 
by participating in bilateral, multilateral, and regional trade agreements. This process has 
radically transformed Vietnam’s approach to international trade, which prior to this time 
was protectionist and focused on trade relations only with its peers in the socialist bloc. 
Domestically, the participation in various trade agreements has contributed to the country’s 
economic reform process, which sought to transform Vietnam’s economy from central 
planning to a market-based economic system. Externally, these trade agreements have also 
facilitated Vietnam’s transformation into an engaged player, actively participating in the 
process of reshaping the global and regional trade architecture.   
During this period, Vietnam has sought membership in an impressive number of 
international trade agreements. Following membership of the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1995, it joined the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA). It 
then played a role in the ‘ASEAN Plus One’ FTAs made with China in 2002, Japan in 
2003, India in 2010, South Korea in 2006, and Australia and New Zealand in 2010. 
Vietnam joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2007, for the first time becoming 
a fully-fledged member of the global trade system. Vietnam has since negotiated FTAs with 
extra-regional trade partners such as the European Union, and the Customs Union of 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. Finally, Vietnam surprised observers by becoming one of 
the very few developing economies to announce that it would participate in negotiations for 
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement in 2010.1 After decades of Cold War 
isolation, Vietnam has quickly become one of the most active trade players in the global 
economy. 
                                                
1 The TPP was suspended in February 2017 due to the US’s withdrawal. It was replaced by the 
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This dramatic transformation in Vietnam’s engagement with the global trade system raises 
a number of questions. First, its path towards trade liberalization has been varied: slow and 
comparatively cautious in the first decade of its economic reforms before becoming 
significantly more ambitious in the 2000s. This step-wise change in trade policy requires 
explanation. Second, Vietnam provides an instructive case study for exploring the politics 
of trade policymaking in a developing country transitioning from a socialist to a market-
based economic system. Why, given these barriers, did it emerge as such as active 
participant in a trading system dominated by developed, Western, and capitalist economies? 
Third, in comparison with other major players in the global trade system – such as the EU, 
United States or China – there are comparatively few scholarly studies regarding the 
domestic political economy of Vietnam’s trade reforms. How have its unique political, 
economic, and institutional attributes shaped the way it engages in trade policymaking? In 
answering this question, this study will enrich the current literature on trade policymaking, 
which is dominated by conceptual and theoretical approaches built on the experience of 
Western liberal democracies. 
Thus, this thesis seeks to explain Vietnam’s trade policy choices relating to its participation 
in international trade agreements. Like other countries, the recent evolution of Vietnam’s 
trade policy reflects a compromise and balance between domestic and international 
imperatives. Understanding the dynamics that motivated, enabled, and constrained the 
process of trade liberalization is fundamental to understanding this evolution. The thesis 
argues that the path of Vietnam’s trade liberalization was primarily determined by how the 
CPV and the state transformed their world-views and refining their interests supporting for 
joining international trade agreements, overcoming constraints against trade agreements. 
Changes toward more pluralistic and inclusive political and social processes and relations 
within the CPV and between the party-state and various interests have enabled the 
country’s transformation into an active trade policy player. The study seeks to enrich the 
literature relating to trade policymaking by contributing an analysis of the Vietnamese case, 
exploring the processes through which Vietnam’s trade decisions were made and 




1.2 Explaining Vietnam’s trade policy choices 
Participation in bilateral and regional FTAs is a strategy used by many developing 
economies to promote economic growth and development. However, making the right 
choice of which partners to negotiate with, at what time, and with what liberalization 
commitments, is a complicated and difficult task. Various considerations – not all economic 
– often weigh upon governments’ decisions to launch and conclude negotiations on trade 
agreements. For example, diplomatic and geopolitical considerations may be the basis for a 
decision to launch negotiations with a particular partner, yet successfully concluding and 
implementing them might require the presence of more economic rationales such as market 
access, economic stimulus, and improving competitiveness (World Economic Forum 2014). 
For this reason, trade negotiations often take many years and considerable diplomatic effort 
to complete, and some often fail entirely.  
For developing and transitional economies like Vietnam, the process of participating in 
trade negotiations is even more challenging. Given its comparatively lower level of 
economic development, Vietnam must make major concessions when negotiating with 
developed economies. It has been required to comply with increasingly complicated trade 
policy standards, such as the extensive conditions required for access to the WTO, or the 
high-standard liberalization commitments demanded by the US in the TPP. In addition, 
trade policymaking has become more complicated with its inclusion of ‘non-trade’ issues 
such as labor standards, environmental protection, and government procurement. Managing 
these issues necessitates brokering consensus among a wider range of domestic actors than 
tariff reductions alone would require. As a result, Vietnam’s decisions on how to participate 
in its recent trade agreements have been far from straightforward. They have involved long 
processes of negotiation amongst domestic interest groups and a diverse range of 
international trading partners.  
This thesis seeks to answer the question: What explains Vietnam’s trade policy choices 
in relation to its participation in international trade agreements? Subsidiary research 
questions include: 




2. How and why have the institutions (mechanisms, procedures, and processes) of 
trade policymaking developed as Vietnam has participated in an increasing number 
of international trade agreements?  
3. How have institutions, interests, and ideas interacted, and in what ways do they 
explain Vietnam’s trade policy decisions? 
Vietnam’s recent emergence as an active player in the global and regional trading systems 
has attracted the attention of both the scholarly and policy communities. Typically, these 
analyses identify a range of conventional economic motives – such as integration into the 
world economy, supporting domestic reforms, increased market access and foreign 
investment, and trade promotion – as the key drivers of Vietnam’s trade reforms. However, 
this thesis argues that a wider range of political-economy drivers is relevant to an 
explanation of recent changes in Vietnamese trade policy. This is because the process of 
making choices is not static but dynamic, and is influenced by a range of political ‘pull’ and 
‘push’ factors. Therefore, the study argues that a broad set of complex political economy 
factors, including the country’s changing internal and external political, economic, and 
social contexts, drives trade policymaking in Vietnam. There is a harmonization of different 
interests and ideas, which results in great changes in terms of institutional, economic, and 
political aspects.   
1.3 Theorizing the trade policymaking process 
The existing scholarly literature on trade policymaking provides various theories and 
approaches to explain the factors that structure government’s trade strategies. This literature 
consists of four distinct, but inter-connected, theoretical approaches: state-based, societal, 
ideational, and institutional approaches.  
The state-based approach to trade policymaking considers the state – an organization 
comprised of executives, which make national policies - as a unitary and rational actor. It 
assumes that states aim to maximize their power (realist theory) and/or wealth and 
efficiency (neoliberal institutionalist theory). This approach has some explanatory utility in 
the case of state-socialist Vietnam as it presumes that the state is relatively free of the 
influence of domestic society and instead calibrates its trade policy to address international 
 
 5 
conditions and considerations. However, as will be demonstrated in the Vietnamese case, 
this approach arguably over-emphasizes the extent of state autonomy even in a single party 
system and thus fails sufficiently to consider the influence of societal, and domestic 
political and economic pressures. 
The societal approach looks instead at domestic dimensions. While it also focuses on the 
role of the state in trade policymaking, it drops the assumption that the state is a unitary 
actor. It explains trade policy decisions as the result of competition amongst different 
societal groups with divergent interests. One example is the Heckscher-Ohlin model of 
trade liberalization, which predicts that the owners of abundant factors of production prefer 
trade liberalization (typically labour in developing economies, capital in developed 
economies), while the owners of scarce factors of production favour protection instead. The 
Ricardo-Viner model offers an alternative explanation, with the assumption that the import-
competing industries prefer protection, while the export-oriented industries favor 
liberalization. Depending on the relative political power of these societal groups (in terms 
of access to and influence over the state), they are able to shape national trade policy in 
favour of these underlying interests. This approach is applicable to Vietnam’s trade 
policymaking given the increasing role of the private sector as an important actor. 
However, an overemphasis on societal actors fails to capture the nature of Vietnam’s 
domestic political system, which has been predominantly controlled by the CPV with 
limited space for the articulation of independent societal interests. 
The institutional approach argues that domestic actors have competing trade policy 
preferences, but focuses on the effects of the domestic institutional setting as the 
explanatory variable. This approach emphasizes the importance of the structures, rules, 
procedures, and organizations that frame power and the interaction between the state and 
the society. For example, an institutional approach has been used to explain differences in 
trade policy between the United States and European Union (EU), attributing them to 
domestic institutional differences where the US Congress imposes far more constraints on 
the executive than those faced by their EU counterparts (Bievre and Dur 2005, Leeg 2018). 
However, the institutional approach can overemphasize the role of processes and 
procedures while underplaying the agency of actors in articulating their preferences into 
policy. Thus, relying solely on an institutional perspective may fail to fully explain trade 
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policy in Vietnam, where other factors such as socialist ideologies also shape policy 
outcomes.  
Finally, the ideational approach explains trade policy in terms of economic ideas and 
ideologies. It argues that ideas about economic policy are a fundamental determinant of 
trade policy preferences as they determine what policies key actors consider normatively 
appropriate. Examples of such ideas are the theories of the ‘developmental state’ and 
doctrines of ‘infant industry protection’ as well as neoliberal arguments relating to the 
benefits of free markets to unlock comparative advantage. The ideational approach is, 
therefore, relevant for explaining Vietnam’s trade policymaking as it connects the beliefs of 
key actors to their interests in and attitudes towards trade liberalization. However, by 
ignoring the power configurations that allow actors to express these ideas and the political 
institutions that shape their interaction, it also provides an arguably incomplete account of 
the trade policymaking process. 
This thesis argues that using the state-centred approach provides the greatest explanation 
power in accounting for trade reform in Vietnam. This is because it emphasizes particular 
variables, namely state actors, and their unique and changing political objectives, which 
have been especially prominent drivers of Vietnam’s trade policymaking in recent decades. 
Therefore, with the aim of exploring Vietnam’s trade reforms, this study seeks to 
understand the role of various actors and their preferences as well as their interaction in 
Vietnam’s political and economic context and institutional setting, and in the fast changing 
regional and global context. The choice to adopt the state-centered approach is informed by 
the specifics of the case itself.  In Vietnam, trade policymaking is a result of the interplay of 
various institutions within and beyond the state and their interests and ideas. This 
application of the state-centered approach does not mean that the institutions, ideas, and 
societal actors do not have influence on trade policymaking. However, they are less 
prominent in Vietnam, and when they do find expression tend to be channeled through and 
shaped by the role of state elites with mediate them into the policy-making process.   
The framework first considers the internal institutional settings of the state. The institutions 
help to explain the rules of policymaking and the role of the different players that influence 
trade preferences through agenda-setting, channeling information and making final 
decisions. Secondly, the framework considers the role of key actors within the state and 
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society. Although the leading forces in trade policymaking within the state are the central 
bureaucracy and the Communist Party of Vietnam, a policy is effective only when it gains 
the support from, and achieves consensus amongst, the wider range of societal actors 
engaged in trade activities. Thirdly, the framework takes into account the beliefs, 
worldviews and economic ideologies of these key actors. By joining external trade 
agreements, new economic ideas have been introduced into the Vietnamese political 
system, which has had to be made compatible with the maintenance of a socialist political 
system in which the party plays a pre-eminent role.  
1.4 Methodology 
1.4.1 Data collection and analysis 
The thesis aims to explain the factors that influenced the preferences of Vietnamese 
policymakers with respect to participating in international trade agreements by employing a 
qualitative methodology. Primary research material was derived from data collected from 
in-depth, one-on-one semi-structured interviews and telephone interviews between 2014 
and 2018. The interviewees were drawn from the public sector, i.e. middle to high-ranking 
officials of the government (former deputy prime minister, vice ministers, deputy director 
generals, officials, government’s experts) who had participated in the policymaking or trade 
agreement negotiation process. Other interviewees were non-state actors such as members 
of business associations, academics, and university, staffs of state-owned enterprises, and 
international experts. These respondents were identified and contacted through various 
means such as Facebook, email, phone calls, websites and personal contacts. The collected 
information from interviewees was subsequently triangulated and crosschecked with 
secondary resources. The list of interviewees and forms of interviewees is in the Appendix.  
Interviews were designed to elicit answers to the following questions:  
1. What principles, agendas and interests informed Vietnam’s decisions to join 
international trade agreements? 
2. What procedures were involved in decision-making on participation in particular 
trade agreements and what approaches were adopted during the negotiations?  
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3. What was the role, interests, ideas of different actors – including the communist 
party, state, i.e. policy makers and central bureaucracy, National Assembly and 
key societal stakeholders – in trade policymaking, and how did they interact? 
4. Given this interaction, how was the final position of the government reached on 
key issues in the various negotiations (for example, agricultural trade 
liberalization and SOEss reform)?  
As international trade agreements are treaty negotiations, they are by their nature closed 
and secretive processes. There is no publicly available documentation on the internal 
dynamics of these negotiations from any of the involved parties. For this reason, the 
conduct of interviews with key participants provided an invaluable source of information to 
process-trace the trade policymaking process both domestically and internationally. The 
interviews conducted with key policymakers were based on personal trust and 
recommendations from high-ranking people, and thus revealed views that have not been 
recorded before. However, as the interviewees normally know their ‘own story’ - i.e. one 
aspect of the whole complex trade policymaking mechanism, their individual views - do not 
necessarily reflect a complete picture. Therefore, this limit is supplemented by general 
literature about movements and characteristics of policymaking in Vietnam. The 
information and materials collected through interviews and other primary or secondary 
resources are analyzed to create the main policymaking themes in line with key variables.  
The data are supplemented by analysis of other primary sources (such as leaders’ speeches, 
government documents, and statistics), as well as secondary sources drawn from the 
scholarly and policy literature on Vietnam’s trade reforms. Various types of documents are 
analysed, including the formal documents issued by the CPV; government resolutions, 
policies, plans, decisions, and circulars; speeches, press releases, and radio and television 
program scripts of government officials; organizational and institutional reports; newspaper 
archives; and various public records. These documents are used to explore the contextual 
factors, ideas, and practices relating to trade policymaking.   
Secondary sources of documents are also utilized, including journal articles, and research 
and studies of different ministries. The data from the document analysis as primary 
resources and secondary sources are reviewed, analyzed and used as excerpts or as 
quotations. This material supports and provides sources of evidence for the main ideas of 
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the study. In addition, the documents are also used to explore the contextual factors, ideas, 
and practices relating to trade policymaking. 
1.4.2 Case study  
Vietnam is an important and illustrative case study of the reconfiguration of relationships 
amongst trade policy actors. The bulk of the trade policymaking literature focuses on the 
experience of Western countries (i.e., developed, liberal democracies), while the process in 
transitional economies and non-liberal democracies (of which Vietnam is both) has not 
been given adequate attention. For example, the Western-focused literature often treats the 
state as a unitary actor that makes national trade policy (Krasner 1976, Hansen and Park 
1995) and views the interaction of competing societal groups for influence over state 
decisions as the mechanism that explains differential (e.g. more of less protectionist) policy 
outcomes (Bhagwati 1988, Baldwin 1993, Meyerson 2003). This explanatory approach 
might be successful in Western country contexts where business groups have the capacity 
to influence trade decisions and policymaking institutions are designed to facilitate their 
involvement. However, in non-Western contexts where the constellation of actors and 
institutions is different, we might expect different policymaking processes to occur. 
Therefore, it is beneficial to develop case studies of trade policymaking in non-Western 
countries with different political and economic settings in order to examine how these lead 
to an understanding of different processes and outcomes. Vietnam is an ideal case to test 
these analytical tools because of a number of specific features. First, Vietnam is a 
developing economy at a much lower level of development compared with other key 
players in the global trade system. Secondly, the state socialism that characterizes Vietnam 
is different from that of the Western countries, which are generally characterized by multi-
party political regimes. Thirdly, it has been demonstrated to be a very aggressive trade 
liberalizer, making it somewhat unique amongst developing countries. The processes 
revealed in Vietnam’s trade policy transformation can meaningfully contribute to the 
international trade policymaking literature through their addition of a non-Western country. 
A case study approach is used to temporally organise the empirical research on trade 
policymaking in Vietnam. Accordingly, the thesis analyses the trade policymaking debate 
with detailed case studies of two of Vietnam’s most important external trade agreements: 
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the WTO and TPP. These cases are salient for the following reasons. First, these cases 
together reflect a historical process, with negotiation of Vietnam’s WTO accession lasting 
from 1996-2007 and of the TPP from 2010 to 2016. The WTO accession reflects Vietnam’s 
efforts to enlarge its trade relationships at the global level. Meanwhile, the TPP agreement 
marked an important change in Vietnam’s trade policy towards intensive trade 
liberalization.  
Second, these cases were selected due to the variety and interactions of new ideas, interests 
and institutions that emerge due to high requirements from the WTO or the TPP. The WTO 
changed the nature of trade policymaking substantively, as it involved complex 
negotiations with different trade partners. In addition, the WTO accession required tariff 
reductions for all tariff lines and for Vietnam to open previously closed areas such as 
telecommunications, and banking and finance for the first time. Although Vietnam had 
previously made concessions in the AFTA and ASEAN-centred FTAs, WTO accession 
cemented these changes at the global level, making trade policy more liberalization-
oriented. Similarly, the TPP eliminated both tariff and non-tariff barriers, and reform in 
new areas such as government procurement, labour standards and financial services. 
Geopolitically, the TTP reflected Vietnam’s ambitious goals to participate in the process of 
reshaping the political, economic, and trade architecture of the Asia Pacific by setting new 
global trade rules. Given such strategic political and economic importance, the TPP marked 
a transition in Vietnam’s trade strategy toward expanding trade policymaking to cover 
security and foreign policy interests.  
Third, these cases were selected due to the accessibility to relevant documents and rich 
information adequate for the analysis, though the trade policymaking is still a black box. 
For the WTO, it is possible to approach the witnesses, i.e. those directly involve in the trade 
negotiations and policymakers. Meanwhile, large and updated information about the TPP is 
available in the mass media, because it attracts special interests and expectations from the 
public as well as relevant stakeholders. Thus, both WTO and TPP cases were selected due 
to the availability of information, data, and diversity of the variables of ideas, interests and 
institutions for exploration of the interaction among them that drive the policy change.  
The study of Vietnam’s WTO accession and TPP contributes to answering the primary 
question of the thesis by confirming the key explanatory factors identified in the 
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synthesizing approach: interests, ideas, institutions, and actors. Both the WTO and TPP 
cases confirmed that the reasons for joining these trade agreements could not be explained 
exclusively by consideration of economic interests alone. In this respect, the cases 
contribute to answering the primary question of the thesis about how Vietnam makes trade 
policy. First, they help to clarify the most important actors in trade policymaking as well as 
their interests and ideas in the WTO and the TPP. Secondly, the findings in the WTO and 
TPP case studies show that to meet the high requirements of the WTO and TPP, Vietnam’s 
trade policymaking greatly changed in terms of ideas, interests, and institutions in favour of 
liberalization, against a background of a transitional and low-level developing economy. 
Based on these case studies, the thesis argues that Vietnam’s trade policymaking is 
characterized by internal consensus, compromise and concession to reach a harmonization 
of diverse interests even though it is a single party regime. The case studies reveal the 
flexibility of state – the policymakers and central bureaucracies - in integrating new ideas 
and its adaptability to both internal and external demands, which facilitated significant 
international trade policy choices. 
The author makes all translations of original Vietnamese language sources unless stated 
otherwise. 
1.5 Scholarly contribution 
This thesis makes two major contributions to the literature on trade policymaking. First, it 
is one of few studies that focus on the domestic policymaking of Vietnam’s participation in 
the global trade system. The empirical case studies on Vietnam’s WTO accession and 
involvement in the TPP negotiations illustrate the changing dynamics of the country’s trade 
policymaking process. Specifically, the thesis argues that while the pre-eminent role of the 
state – both as an array of institutions and as decision-making structure - persists despite 
recent liberalizing reforms in Vietnam, its approach to trade policy is increasingly 
influenced by input from, and the interests of, private societal actors. Second, the thesis 
contributes to broader scholarly debates on the political determinants of trade policy 
decisions. Most existing scholarship in this area focuses on the experience of developed 
Western liberal democracies, which this thesis complements by analyzing a developing 
transitional economy. The case study of Vietnam reveals that the determinants of trade 
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policymaking are quite different to those found in its Western counterparts. For example, 
the transformation of the state’s ideas regarding the role of liberalization in economic 
development played an especially prominent role. Security and geo-economic factors were 
also salient in a way not often seen in developed countries. For example in the case of 
Japan, an advanced economy that participated in the TPP, Japan wished to strengthen ties 
with the United States and coping with China, balancing the two giants given their 
competition in defining the global and regional economic order (Davis 2017, Katada 2018). 
To meet this end, the study develops an analytical framework that considers how the ideas, 
interests and institutional environment of key trade policy actors shape their interactions 
with each other and ultimately determines policy outcomes. Despite the centralization of 
trade policymaking, the state is considered as an array of different actors that compete to 
influence the final policy outcomes in their favor. Hence, the study will identify how the 
relevant stakeholders shaped their trade policy positions and what accounted for their 
particular policy choices. The study will pay special attention to the underlying interests, 
ideas, and institutions that provided stakeholders with power to influence trade 
policymaking. Also moving beyond the state, the study looks deeper into the interactions 
between the state and society to understand how the state responded to diverse interests 
within society in order to reach a balanced outcome that provoked no demonstrations or 
political opposition. Thus, the state-centered and institutional, ideational, and societal 
approaches are all incorporated into this analytical framework.  
In addition, this study aims to make a substantial and original contribution to knowledge 
about trade policy decision-making in Vietnam. How can a country with a state-socialist 
political regime and lower level of development overcome the challenges of integrating 
itself into the global economy? What factors have driven Vietnam to emerge as a new 
player that participates in the process of reshaping the political, economic, security and 
trade architecture of the Asia Pacific? The current literature does not provide a 
comprehensive understanding of the motivations underlying policy decisions relating to 
participation in trade agreements by non-Western countries. Therefore, the thesis positions 
itself as one of the few studies that provides an in-depth understanding of how these 
dynamics played out in this specific context.  
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1.6 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis adopts the following structure to analyze Vietnam’s trade policymaking process. 
Chapter 2 lays out the analytical framework for studying Vietnam’s international trade 
policymaking. It first provides a literature review of existing theories and approaches in 
order to provide theoretical background, followed by a review of the Vietnamese trade 
policymaking literature. The chapter then proposes the state-centered approach for 
analysing trade policymaking, providing an explanation of the role of individual variables. 
The chapter argues that the study of trade policymaking should consider key actors, 
interests, ideas, and institutions in a given historical context, political regime, and 
development level.  
Chapter 3 discusses the historical and policy context of Vietnam’s participation in various 
regional free trade agreements and its accession to the WTO, including the process of 
transition from a centrally planned economy to a socialist-oriented market economy, its 
trade regime and trade patterns, trade policy reforms, and trade strategy focussing on both 
export orientation and import-substitution. The chapter also discusses the international 
economic and political context of Vietnam’s international and regional trade integration 
and external pressures from other trading partners such as the United States. It argues that 
Vietnam’s trade liberalization policy did not comprise a singular decision. Rather the policy 
was an outcome of the transformation of key actors, most prominently the CPV and central 
bureaucracies, in terms of their ideas, interests, and institutional settings. This was a 
response to the changing global and regional political economy and pressing domestic 
economic demands.  
Chapters 4 and 5 provide an in-depth examination of Vietnam’s international trade 
policymaking processes and the role of state and society institutions within it. Chapter 4 
focuses on state actors, studying the role of the political leadership in making international 
trade policy and the struggle to transform their ideas in regard to participating in a regional 
and world trading system, and the role of bureaucratic actors. Chapter 5 examines the role 
of societal actors -- principally, though not exclusively, the business community -- to 
determine the extent of their influence on trade policymaking. The chapter also discusses 
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how interaction between the state and society influenced international trade policy 
decisions.  
Chapters 6 and 7 provide case studies of Vietnam’s WTO accession and membership of the 
TPP. The case studies of the WTO and TPP illustrate the prior analysis of policymaking 
processes in concrete cases of trade agreement negotiation. The leadership of the CPV was 
decisive in making the decisions in favour of international economic integration and trade 
liberalization. The transformation of the CPV’s ideas in terms of international economic 
integration and domestic demands for economic development were key to reshaping 
institutions. The WTO accession saw the adoption of more participatory policymaking 
processes and the TPP negotiations saw this trajectory extended with greater engagement 
between state and societal actors.  
The conclusion provides a discussion on the findings of the two case studies and 
summarises the answers to the research questions of the thesis. It argues that the drivers of 
Vietnam’s process towards becoming a more active trade player and its participation in 
regional and international trade agreements were multi-fold. First, the CPV leadership was 
critical in setting a clear and long-term vision for international economic integration. This 
integration process began with unilateral reforms and proceeded through increasingly more 
ambitious efforts in bilateral and regional FTAs before culminating in Vietnam’s WTO 
accession and participation in the TPP. Second, the dominant interests reflected in this 
process were the overall long-term strategic interests of the leadership in (a) integrating 
Vietnam with the world and (b) promoting national economic development. Third, this 
ambitious vision was realised by instituting a new and more flexible trade policymaking 
structure, albeit still under the leadership of the CPV. These processes were made possible 
as national interests, ideas, and institutions were reshaped as part of the learning process of 





Chapter 2: Theories of trade policymaking and 




2.1 Introduction  
This chapter contributes to the overall thesis by providing a literature review of relevant 
studies on the politics of trade policy, and uses this to build an analytical framework for 
understanding the politics of Vietnam’s trade policymaking. It reviews the four scholarly 
approaches to trade policy formation – comprising the state-, society-, ideas- and 
institutions-centered accounts – each of which provides an explanation for the domestic 
sources of a country’s trade policy decision. The chapter argues that among these four 
approaches, the state-centered approach is more compelling than others for explaining 
contemporary Vietnamese trade policymaking. As the state has played a crucial shaping 
role over Vietnam’s trade policy making, the thesis therefore applies the state-centered 
approach for understanding Vietnam’s trade policymaking.  
The chapter proceeds as follows: Firstly, it reviews the key features of the existing trade 
policy literature, outlining the state-, society-, ideas- and institutions-based theories. These 
approaches each identify a distinct set of political factors that influence trade policymaking. 
Secondly, it reviews the literature on Vietnam’s trade policymaking, connecting it to the 
broader literature of which it is a part. Finally, the chapter attempts to show how the state-
centered approach can be applied to explain Vietnam’s trade policymaking.  
2.2 Theoretical explanations of trade policymaking 
This section examines the literature on factors that influence international trade policy 
preferences. There is a rich literature in the general field of foreign policymaking that 
addresses how international trade policy is made and which factors play the most important 
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role. This literature is dominated by four distinct conceptual frameworks: a state-centred 
approach, a societal approach, an ideas-based approach, and an institution-focused 
approach. Each of these approaches provides a different explanation of trade policy 
outcomes by identifying the principal drivers of governments’ trade policy decisions. 
2.2.1 The state-centred approach 
The state-centred approach argues that the state is the primary unit that influences the trade 
policymaking goals of national decision makers. The interests of states are varied but the 
principal state interests “affected by the structure of international trade [are]…the aggregate 
of national income, social stability, political power, and economic growth” (Krasner 1976). 
Different national agendas are identified: while realist international relations (IR) theories 
focus on states’ maximizing power capabilities, neoliberal institutionalists emphasize state 
interests in increasing wealth and efficiency (Capling and Low 2010) and neoclassical trade 
theory pays attention to states’ aggregating economic utility (Krasner 1976). In addition, 
states deal with national concerns such as the trade deficit and other countries’ protectionist 
policies (Hansen and Park 1995). In some cases, the state can intervene for the sake of the 
development of strategically important industrial sectors (Oatley 2014).  
The main assumptions of the state-centred approach focus on the roles of the state and the 
relationship between political institutions and societal interests. The first assumption is that 
states promote the national interest through trade instruments such as tariffs, protection and 
subsides rather than the interests of particular interest groups. The second assumption is 
that governments make trade policy decisions in a way that is largely independent of the 
demands of interest groups.  
Accordingly, the state is conceptualised as the central actor shaping and making trade 
policy. This does not mean that the state is the only important actor but that state officials, 
politicians, and administrators are the central actors setting trade policy directions 
(Goldstein 1988). The state-centred approach argues that trade policy reflects the goals of 
these state officials who pursue autonomous goals (Meyerson 2003).  
The state is also seen as an organizational structure staffed by executive officials who shape 
strategic policy (Ikenberry 1986). As Goldstein argues, the state-centred approach “focuses 
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on institutional structures of the state and the capacities of political and administrative 
officials who occupy positions within it” (Goldstein 1988). This approach argues that the 
trade policy responses of countries are different because of differences in the domestic 
structures of foreign economic policymaking: the instruments used by state officials, the 
extent to which states and societies are centralized, and the autonomy of the state from 
society (Katzenstein 1977).  
Neorealist IR theory considers trade policy as a component of overall foreign policy. 
Structuralists argue that the relative power of the nation in the international context 
determines whether it follows liberalization or protectionism. Nations with preponderant 
power are likely to pursue liberal or open trade: for instance the United States created the 
liberal trade regime after the World War II. Meanwhile, less powerful nations may resort to 
protectionism. For example, when US hegemonic power declines, it resorts to 
protectionism (Krasner 1976, David 1988).  
In this way, the state’s ability to determine trade policy outcomes is a function of its 
capacity, autonomy, power, and resources to define national goals and tasks, and shape 
political behaviour and decision-making free of societal pressures. The state’s strength 
relating to trade policymaking is defined as the degree to which national policymakers are 
insulated from domestic interest groups.  It is thus on the basis of the states’ relative power 
vis-à-vis societal forces that the state decides its stance on trade. In addition, domestic 
institutional relationships and the capacity of political and administrative officials also 
contribute to the state’s influence on foreign economic policy (Goldstein 1988).  
2.2.2 The society-centred approach  
A society-centred approach views trade policy as the product of competition amongst 
societal forces – economic structures, social classes, or key economic interest groups 
(Meyerson 2003). The society-centred approach argues that governments have no 
intrinsically independent trade policy objectives and thus it is interest groups that use the 
lobbying process to set policy objectives (Bhagwati 1988). Trade policy outcomes are 
explained as the result of the competitive interplay between organized societal interests and 
political institutions. As all trade policy decisions have distributional consequences for 
economic interest groups, the winners and losers from different policy choices compete to 
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advance and defend their economic interests (Baldwin 1993). For example, it is argued that 
governments join preferential trade agreement on the basis of key interest groups’ fear of 
‘trade diversion’ resulting from the agreements of other countries (Baldwin 1993). 
Similarly, tariff policy is explained as a result of the political influence of interest groups, 
with more politically-powerful industries being able to seek tariff protection from the 
government (Hansen and Park 1995).     
The society-centred approach deploys economic models to identify distinct types of 
interests groups and classifies each as having distinct (and competing) trade policy 
preferences. The factor model, so-called the Heckscher-Ohlin model, argues that trade 
policy is influenced by those who own factors of production: i.e., labour and capital, which 
prefer low tariffs and trade liberalization. In contrast, those with scarce factors of 
production, who would be under serious competition from imports, support trade 
protection. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which focuses on factor price equalization, 
argues that “an increase in the relative price of a commodity will bring about a more than 
proportionate increase in the price of the corresponding intensive factor” (Chipman 1969). 
This theorem predicts that actors who are the abundant ‘factor’ in an economy prefer liberal 
trade policies while scarce ‘factors’ prefer protectionist trade policies (Oatley 2014).  
Instead of focussing on factors, an alternative Ricardo-Viner model emphasizes the 
importance of whether industries are export-oriented or import-competing. The model 
posits that import-competing industries prefer to organize themselves to delay or oppose 
trade liberalization to prevent income losses. Yet, export-oriented industries drive the 
government towards an open market because their income will increase. The literature also 
incorporates not only industry but also firm levels. The preferences of industries can shift 
depending on the benefits they get from trade policy. For instance, firms support 
liberalization if they have international connections (Milner 1988), access to technology 
(Yeaple 2005), while the least productive firms tend to be import-competing (Melitz 2003). 
These arguments are mainly drawn from the US case (Aklin, Arias et al. 2015). 
The society-centred approach is largely influenced by a form of ‘elite theory’, which argues 
that policy reflects the preferences of the dominant group or class in society (Goldstein 
1988). This argument suggests that it is the preferences of powerful social interests that are 
 
 19 
carried into effect by public officials and agencies, and thus determine public policy. 
Economic reforms may be driven by economic conditions, but their success or failure will 
depend on the power balance of pro and anti-groups, such as vested interested groups, 
public interest groups, or corporate lobby groups (Trowbridge 2001).  
2.2.3 The ideas-focused approach 
The ideas-focused approach shifts the explanatory emphasis from interests (whether those 
of the state or key societal groups) to the realm of ideas. It identifies how ideas, as causal 
connections between interests and policies, influence trade policymaking (Benjamin J. 
Cohen and Lipson 1999). Here, ideas are understood generally as culture, worldviews, and 
shared belief systems including normative and causal beliefs (Goldstein 1988, Keohane and 
Goldstein 1993). These ideational constructs affect politics by acting as roadmaps towards 
objectives and for change, suggesting how to address or challenge problems (Beland and 
Cox 2011).  
In addition, ideas also act as a guide for coordination in strategic interactions. Once 
integrated into institutions, ideas can constrain policy choices (Goldstein 1988). For 
example, to meet the objectives of enhancing competitiveness and welfare, policymakers 
can choose between either offering protection to help firms restructure or competition to 
improve firms’ performance, defend infant industries, and protect domestic labour (Borrus 
and Goldstein 1987, Benjamin J. Cohen and Lipson 1999). Various ideas are found to be 
important to trade: for example, protection, liberalization (Meyerson 2003), the 
developmental state, protection of infant industries, the worldview of policymakers, or new 
ideas such as human welfare (Capling and Low 2010). The ideas emerge as important when 
outcomes and interests are vague to be identified (Blyth 2002). 
The ideas-focused approach can impact on trade outcomes in three ways. First, ideas help 
to shape the most pressing issues that turn into problems to be addressed during the agenda-
setting phase of trade policymaking. Secondly, ideas can be in the form of economic 
assumptions that legitimize or challenge current policies dealing with economic challenges 
over time (Hall 1993). For example, ideas such as mercantilism influenced the European 
economic system in the 19th century. In addition, ideas of specialization and trade-based 
comparative advantage were the core of the economic liberal theory advanced by Adam 
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Smith and David Ricardo and therefore influenced the trade regime in the post-war period 
(Woods 1995). Ideas again played a role when the neoliberal paradigm became dominant in 
the world’s political and economic systems in the 20th century (Lieberman 2002). Thirdly, 
ideas can be a tool for agents to challenge existing institutional arrangements and patterns 
of distribution (Blyth 2002).  
The process of policy paradigm change depends on “significant shifts in the locus of 
authority of policy” (Hall 1993). This is because the policy paradigm is institutionally 
embedded, and hence changing ideas could risk changing the actors who are institutionally 
privileged. Thus, ideational changes can be brought about by the formulation of a new 
political coalition, or by institutional changes (Hall 1993). In other ways, certain ideas are 
often promoted by advocacy groups who aim to achieve the objective of ‘doing good’ 
together with ‘doing well’ (Hardin 2004). Examples include non-government organizations 
(NGOs) in the fields of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) medicines, environmental 
causes, and human rights. Ideas can also originate from patterns of nationalism and national 
identities. Nationalism uses “national identity” to achieve social purposes even if economic 
benefits have to be sacrificed. Nationalism can be manifested in different forms such as 
national culture and tradition. These different forms are able to liberalize trade policy as 
was the case in the Northeast Asian countries following their industrialization strategies, or 
to be more protective of agriculture in Europe as a result of ‘cultural sovereignty’ 
(Helleiner and Pickel 2005).  
In short, ideas influence trade policymaking by shaping the evolution of policy over time, 
conditioning the action of leaders, building political and economic policy programs, and 
setting the rules of the game (Goldstein 1988). Ideas are successfully adopted in trade 
policymaking via networks’ abilities to create and make the most of political opportunities, 
constructing a problem, mobilizing a coalition and grafting agendas into the policy debate.  
2.2.4 The institutions-centred approach  
Finally, an institution-centred approach focuses on the relationship between institutions and 
trade policy. According to institutionalists, the role of institutions is important because they 
provide a mechanism for aggregating preferences in society and help to determine the 
influence that political actors exert on trade policy (March and Olsen 1989). Institutions at 
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the national level include formal rules of the game, including the polity, bureaucracy, 
judiciary, party systems, rules of electoral competition, parliaments, and constitutions (Bell 
and Head 1994, Fenna 1998). At the international level, institutions include regimes (such 
as the World Trade Organization) that influence trade policymaking by setting international 
rules, processes, and mechanisms (Myerson 1997), thereby allocating responsibilities and 
relationships shaping and influencing political actors’ behaviours, power and preferences 
(Hall 1986, Levi 1990).  
Cross-country variations in trade policy are attributed to the way in which different national 
political institutions aggregate these preferences in support of openness or protection. By 
focusing on formal organizational structures, trade policy preferences are attributed to the 
division of power within the government, for example, one branch prevailing over another, 
viz., congress over the executive or the bureaucracy that can protect sectors under its 
regulation. The mechanisms of policy influence can also operate through electoral systems, 
whose design often allows certain groups veto powers (McGillivray and Smith 1997) 
(Mansfield, Milner et al. 2007), which can delay the ratification and signing of the trade 
agreements (Frye and Mansfield 2003). Another institutional factor that influences trade 
policymaking is the combination of regime type and political fragmentation. Scholars argue 
that trade liberalization can occur in an autocracy with high fragmentation and in a 
democracy with low fragmentation (Frye and Mansfield 2003). 
The debate over the relationship between institutional inclusiveness and trade openness is at 
the centre of classical liberalism (Oneal and Russet 2001). Institutionalists argue that 
institutions can constrain or empower specific groups to influence trade policymaking by 
providing them with either more favourable access or by insulating them from 
policymakers (Baldwin 1985, Haggard 1988, Keohane and Goldstein 1993). For instance, 
liberalization in the 1980s and 1990s gave rise to the positive relationship between regime 
type and trade policy. Studies suggest that democratic political systems are more likely to 
engage in trade liberalization than authoritarian ones as the improvements to economic 
welfare it creates can be used by political elites as a vote-gathering strategy (Garrett 2000). 
Democratic countries also tend to rely less on tariffs and more on non-tariff barriers when 
they choose to protect industries, as complex non-tariff barriers are less easily challenged 
by opposing interest groups compared to high-visibility tariff measures (Kono 2000).  
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By contrast, this positive relationship is challenged by the case of China as simultaneously 
a global economic player and authoritarian political system. Thus, another argument 
emerges, claiming that institutions promote free trade if they insulate policymakers, who 
favour openness, from interest groups that favour protection. On the other hand, democracy 
can empower coalitions that oppose free trade. Another reason for this negative relationship 
between democracy and trade liberalization is the short-term disadvantages of liberalization  
(such as job losses) that impose political costs in democratic systems, while autocracies can 
accelerate liberalization for long-term benefit because they are not under vote pressures 
(Haggard and Webb 1994, Milner 1999).  
In addition to hard rules and procedures, the new institutionalism also emphasizes the role 
of informal conventions, for example codes, customs, norms, and traditions (North 1990, 
Williamson 2000). These informal institutions can influence trade policy by providing sets 
of shared meanings and cognitive frames (Fligstein 2001, Hall and Talyer 1996). In this 
way, informal institutions are used to make sense of certain situations, which in turn 
influence policy preferences. Hence, informal institutions shape how problems are 
perceived, and the solutions sought (Weber and Ann 2006).  
2.2.5 The limits of the theoretical debate  
The aforementioned literature is characterised by a debate over which factors have the most 
influence on trade policy decisions (Oatley 2014). The state-centred approach gives a 
predominant role to the state, while the society-centred approach attaches importance to 
interest groups. The ideas-based approach emphasizes the role of ideas in shaping the 
preferences of state and societal actors, while the institutional approach considers the 
organizational structures and rules that govern their interaction. 
The focus on different factors is a result of the key assumptions of these theories. The 
traditional state-centred approach assumes that national policymakers make policy largely 
independently of the narrow self-interests of domestic interest groups. Conversely, the 
society-centred approach assumes the opposite: that trade policy is a direct result of 
policymakers’ responses to interest group demands. The institutional approach, on the other 
hand, argues that trade policy choices are explained by the institutional contexts that shape 
the interests of, and structure of relationships between, the actors that influence policy 
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outcomes. Lastly, the ideas-based approach seeks to explain trade policy choices and 
preferences based on ideology, for example, the notion that either protectionism or market 
liberalization represents the optimal trade policy. 
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Each approach has its own weaknesses when explaining trade policy. This is a function of 
over-emphasizing a single explanatory variable. For instance, the state-centric approach is 
widely criticised for ignoring the role of the decision-making process, failing to explain 
domestic political pressures and interest group competition, and “neglecting state-society 
relations crucial to domestic trade preference formation” (Kunkel 1998). The state-centred 
approach is also criticized on the grounds of “divergences in state-society preferences”, 




The society-centred approach has attracted its own criticisms. First, it ignores the role of the 
state and political institutions that influence the extent of society’s influence over state 
decisions. For social forces to influence state decisions, some mechanisms for articulating 
interest group demands in the policymaking process must first exist (Oatley 2014). 
Secondly, for certain cases it is impossible to explain trade policy outcomes as the result of 
which and how a certain group gains power and wins (Oatley 2014). 
The ideas-focused approach fails to explain why the same economic ideas, such as 
neoliberalism, result in different policy outcomes in different countries (Hall 1993). It also 
fails to explain how systemic constraints or considerations are transformed into policy 
preferences (Capling and Low 2010). Pluralists and rational choice scholars see a limited 
role for ideas because to change an idea into policy, ideas must link up with politics, which 
involves the mobilisation of power.  
The institutional approach fails to explain why similar political systems produce different 
policies (Ehrlich 2007). Conversely, it cannot explain why presidential and parliamentary 
systems share the same trade policies and why in the same country there are differences in 
terms of protection across sectors (Walter, Sen et al. 2009). It also fails to explain 
substantive choices and how policymakers set the agenda (Beland 2005). In addition, the 
institutional approach ignores cause and effect relationships, and the goals and desires of 
actors and hence fails to identify how their interests change and evolve. This approach also 
obscures the links among institutions, policy formation processes, and outcomes.   
Despite their weaknesses, all these approaches still offer utility in explaining trade policy. 
Individually, each tends to focus on one specific aspect of trade policy rather than 
considering the different variables in relation to one another. To be sure, the theoretical 
debate does not entirely ignore relationships among ideas, interests, institutions, actors, and 
trade policy, but the literature is unclear about the role of each variable in relation to others. 
In particular, what is missing is any systematic consideration of the way that 
interrelationships among variables are mediated by specific historical, developmental, and 
political regime contexts. Such considerations are essential to understanding how and why 
relationships among different variables play out differently from country to country, 
especially if we want to develop a theoretical approach with universal application capable 
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of traversing radically different economic and political systems. Moreover, these theories 
all display a bias towards explaining the trade policymaking process in developed 
economies. The aforementioned scholarship is principally built on observations and case 
studies drawing on the United States, the European Union, and industrialized developed 
countries.  
• For example, the state-based approach was built to explain the shift from 
protectionism to liberal trade policies after the Second World War in the United 
States and Europe (Lake and Frieden 2000).  
• The society-centred approach emerged from the studies of the socio-economic and 
political changes with the emergence of the global corporations that strongly 
advocated trade liberalization in industrial capitalist nations during the same period 
(Bhagwati 1988, Meyerson 2003).  
• The institutional approach was developed to understand trade policymaking in 
liberal democratic countries, which are characterised by political competition within 
electoral systems and clearly defined bureaucratic structures for policymaking (Hall 
1986, Levi 1990, Bell and Head 1994, Fenna 1998) 
• Similarly, the ideational approach was promoted, as reflected by the emergence of 
neoliberalism - a purely Western idea for a capitalist economy - as a dominant 
factor in explaining trade policymaking (Lieberman 2002). 
In short, these theories face explanatory difficulties when deployed on their own. They 
focus on one set of factors by ignoring other relevant ones, and do not explore the ways in 
which different sets of factors may interact. Moreover, there is clearly a conceptual bias 
towards explaining trade policymaking in Western developed and democratic countries 
rather than on a global scale where a more diverse array of political and economic 
institutions comes into play. These explanatory limitations are brought into relief when the 
experience of trade policy reform in Vietnam is considered. 
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2.3 Scholarly accounts of Vietnam’s trade policymaking  
2.3.1 Vietnam’s trade policymaking – current research and debates  
The politics of Vietnam’s international trade policy has attracted scholarly attention and 
various explanations of its reform trajectory have been offered. Considerable attention has 
been devoted to analyzing the role of the state, with the focus on the role of the communist 
party and the state.  
Scholars have examined changes within the state in adapting to globalization and associated 
domestic demands for reform. Pre-reform state was characterized by a highly centralized 
decision making system controlled by a narrow political elite, limited consultation with the 
society. The state-society relationship was made through party-controlled mass 
organizations representing various social sectors such as farmers, women and youth. 
Thayer calls such a system in the 1990s as “mono-organizational socialism” (Carlyle 1995, 
p. 26). The post-reform state was instead characterized by a more scattered decision-
making. This balanced a plurality of interests - including new business interests, some of 
which loosely connected to the state - and diverse social interests demonstrated by diverse 
perspectives in the media, and those of non-government organizations and non-state 
individuals and groups (Gainsborough 2010). The state changed its form and operation 
towards reducing its “centralized control over the national economy” and controlled the 
speed of joining the globalisation rather than being influenced by external forces (Dixon 
and Kilgour 2002, p.601). 
The strategic, political, and economic regime security interests of the state have been 
considered the main driving force of Vietnam’s international economic integration policy. 
The most important objective has been facilitating the acquisition of capital, markets and 
technology from foreign trading partners. Some scholars have focused on the role of the 
CPV which is viewed as exercising power over state and society (L.Vuving 2006). For 
instance, internal conflict within the CPV was said to have caused the delay in the bilateral 
trade agreement with the United States (Thayer 2008). In addition, the reforms consequent 
upon WTO accession were influenced by the struggle between reformers and conservatives, 
and between pragmatists and conservatives (Sherman 2012). Thus, most scholars 
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researching Vietnam’s integration have paid attention to the significant role of the state, 
especially the CPV, in driving the Vietnam’s integration. 
Discussing the state-society relationship, scholars point out several new features. The first 
is the phenomenon of state corporatism or mobilization corporatism, i.e. societal 
organizations and institutions dominated by the state give no influence on the political 
system (Phong 2009, Pham 2013). Second, the government offices turn to enmesh political 
and economic interests, by managing and owning enterprises (Kerkvliet 2001). The 
international scholars note the emerging political and economic forces that shape the 
contemporary Vietnam (Thaveeporn 1996, p.43), i.e.  the SOEs, which share closely inter-
related interests with the state, act as a main player of the state economy to compete with 
multinational corporations and also serve as a political foundation for building a socialist-
oriented market economy. As a result, the state, through the SOEs, functions as a player 
within the economy, while at the same time its implements the state management functions 
of maintaining the macro-economic stability. Such a political and economic relationship 
has provided SOEs stronger political power and priority comparatively to workers in the 
policy-making mechanism (Beeson and Pham 2012). As one of the consequences of such 
relationship, Gainsborough (2010) also points out that newly emerging business elite 
representing new business interests emerge from the existing system, are related to the 
current political elite.  
While the state-centered approach dominates Vietnam’s literature of reforms, others have 
used an ideas-based lens to explain changes in policy. Specifically, these studies have 
looked to Vietnam’s ideological shift to liberate production forces according to the 6th 
Plenum of the 4th Party Central Committee, Directive 100-CT-TW of the Party Secretariat 
in 1981 (Vu 2014), and the need to recover from the economic recession during the reform 
period from a centrally planned economy to ‘socialist-oriented market economy’ to explain 
how its economic policy had changed. Because the conservatives hesitated to accelerate the 
partial reforms launched in 1986, protectionism was dominant before the Asian financial 
crisis of 1998. This was because of their concern that accelerating reform could result in 
internal instability and risk the agricultural sector’s failing in global competition (Beeson 
and Pham 2012).  
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Shifting from protectionism in the 1990s to liberalization in the 2000s can be attributed to 
the leaders’ changing ideas about global integration. The emergence of such ideas was 
facilitated by policymakers’ continued efforts to overcome the protracted crisis lasting from 
the economic shocks in the 1980s, the end of Cold War and the realization of the costs of 
delaying liberalization. For instance, the economy would face more stringent conditions 
gaining WTO accession if this were delayed. In addition, more benefits could be realised: 
for example, increased transparency, strengthening the legal framework, and creating a 
competitive market (Elliott 2012). Social goals that were beyond material interests also 
prevailed such as building socialism and maintaining political stability and legitimacy 
(Elliott 2012). However, there were few studies that analysed how such ideas transformed 
and impacted on trade policymaking to assist Vietnam’s negotiation of new trade 
agreements.  
The society-centred approach has also been used to make sense of the constellation of 
interest groups influencing Vietnamese trade policy. The interest groups typically found in 
Western parliamentary democracies, are not present in the Vietnamese context. Rather, 
groups in Vietnam encompassed party members, government officials, farmers, workers, 
and SOE managers and advisers who influenced policy in informal ways. They influenced 
policy by interacting with the economic context to produce political action (Fforde and 
Beresford 1997). More specifically, WTO accession was much resisted by both the 
government’s functional agencies and the SOEs, which relied heavily on the CPV for 
speeding up the negotiations (Fforde and Beresford 1997).  
While the general relationship between business associations and the state has been a topic 
of analysis (Pham 2013), very few studies focused on the state-society relationship with 
respect to participating in international trade agreements. A Vietnam Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (VCCI) study in 2010 was one of the first of its kind. Some of its 
findings revealed business associations’ limited participation in the trade policymaking 
process owing to their limited awareness of the significance of their participation and lack 
of exchange of information regarding the negotiations (Stromseth 2003, Dao, Nguyen et al. 
2013, Nguyen 2014). The VCCI also claimed that while firms participated in providing 
comments in regard to domestic policies, they had a limited role in and influence on 
international trade policymaking (VCCI 2010). However, the study does not explain why, if 
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firms had only a limited impact on international trade policymaking, international trade 
policy was made, and by whom, and what the driving factors were. In addition, the study 
was carried out in 2010 before Vietnam joined various new-generation FTAs, and hence the 
state-society relationship needed to be updated. In contrast, other analysts recognized the 
increasing role and influence of civic associations as intermediaries between the state and 
society as well as the new institutional dynamics resulting from trade liberalization and the 
state’s recognition of the private sector’s role (VCCI 2010).  
Finally, some analysts have adopted an institutional approach to explain the continued 
economic development in Vietnam. Scholars generally agree that because of the insulation 
of the state from society, particularly the companies and industrial sector, the state, 
especially the bureaucracy, can make policy without facing the opposition of capitalist 
groups (Nguyen 2014). The state was able to maintain autonomy in making policy despite 
strong linkages with business. On the other hand, some other scholars argue that the state 
favours business elites’ interests in making the law while small-scale entrepreneurs face 
more obstacles in making their voice heard (Masina 2006).  
Despite insulation of the state from the society, the state still had to make and was bound by 
new institutions, as new market economy needed institutions and formal rules to facilitate 
development. While the formal institutions for market development were not yet 
developed, informal institutions such as social norms, practices and behaviours were the 
guiding principles in the socio-economic relationships (Gillespie 2008). These informal 
rules were gradually constructed to be formal, which then serve as the basis for the 
executive, legislature, judiciary and bureaucracy and determines the level of economic 
activity. For Vietnam’s economic growth, there was not a systematic strategy for sustained 
growth or liberalization of markets. Instead, pieces of new law were established to 
encourage investment in human capital and technology such as Law on Investment in 2000, 
or Land Law for property rights in 1993 or Constitutions 1992, and Enterprise Law 2005 
laying the foundation for private sector development. These laws have together created a 
more predictable business environment, facilitating the private sector development as well 
as increased foreign investment. 
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In short, the previous research on Vietnam has predominantly focused on explaining the 
driving forces behind Vietnam’s economic reforms. In particular, the focus has been on 
changes in the state’s role (following a state-based approach and the rise of civic 
associations in response to trade liberalization in line with the societal approach). In the 
case of domestic trade, scholars have focused on the interaction between the various 
interests of groups in society within an evolving context, which has produced political 
change (Vo and Nguyen 2006). However, little attention has been given to the impact of 
other factors, particularly ideas and institutions, on international trade policymaking. In 
other words, the analysis of Vietnam’s trade policymaking by considering the role of the 
state, particularly the transformation of state’s ideas, interests in relative to the non-state 
actors and its impacts on the trade policy has not yet been explored.  
2.3.2 The limits of existing empirical studies  
As shown from the literature review above, Vietnam’s trade policymaking has been largely 
ignored in studies of trade politics and processes. Certainly, the politics of trade in Vietnam 
has not been deeply investigated. While the trade policymaking literature has established 
four clear approaches for analysing trade policymaking, to the extent that there has been 
any analysis of Vietnam, it has mainly been limited to assessing the impact of trade 
agreements rather than focusing on the trade policymaking process.  
Importantly, this omission may in part be a product of the limitations of the existing 
frameworks: namely, the state-centred approach, societal approach, and the ideas-based and 
institutional approaches. For example, the state-centred approach argues that the 
government functions as a unitary rational actor in achieving its objectives such as 
increasing national wealth, power, and economic efficiency (Fforde and Beresford 1997). 
This approach ignores the fact that the state can be comprised of different constituencies 
and interest groups, that can compete either to maintain the status quo or push for changes. 
Given Vietnam context, with the dominant power of the Communist Party of Vietnam and 
state agencies in the political system, the state-centred approach, then should be expanded 
to analyse the interaction among state’s constituencies that influence the trade 
policymaking. Here, the state is neither an autonomous nor a unitary actor. Conflict of 
interest within the most important organ of trade policymaking did exist and influenced 
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trade policy. In some extreme cases, it caused a delay in the signing of a trade agreement 
such as the BTA (Capling and Low 2010). Thus, even a one-party state can have a complex 
of dynamic interests that greatly impact on the path of trade policy.  
The societal approach equipped with the argument that trade policy is a result of 
competition amongst domestic economic actors – firms, producer groups, trade unions and 
consumers (CRS Report for Congress 2002) – could not be applied to Vietnam’s case. This 
was because the private sector in Vietnam, though it developed dramatically as a result of 
the opening of the economy, had not gained enough economic and political power to 
influence trade policy in its favour. The societal approach has been more effective in 
explaining trade policy in developed liberal democracies countries where the private sector 
has developed into a strong political force that can influence policy. Hence, the analysis of 
trade policy from the study of influence of societal actors could not provide a full 
understanding of Vietnam’s trade policymaking.     
Next, over-emphasising the role of ideas, as suggested by the ideas-focused approach, 
neglects the role of material interests. For instance, Vietnam emerged to be more pragmatic, 
giving more weight to economic and political interests that emerged in the context of 
Vietnam during the post-Cold War period. In addition, there was less chance for Western 
economic theories such as neoliberalism to drive trade policymaking increasingly in the 
direction of trade liberalization because this Western idea was not powerful enough in 
Vietnam’s political and cultural context (Capling and Low 2010). Moreover, the ideational 
approach also failed to explain how systemic constraints or considerations could be 
transformed into policy preferences (Gainsborough 2010). 
Lastly, the institutional approach argues that the organization of the political system 
influences the power of actors who shape policy outcomes (Capling and Low 2010). Trade 
policy changes in line with changes in the power of actors within the political system. For 
example, whether more power is given to the executive is influenced by the voting system. 
In Vietnam, the communist party and the state have maintained supreme power for decades, 
unchallenged either by votes or opposition parties, yet it has been able to transform trade 
policy to become an active trade player. Despite institutional inertia, the policy was 
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sufficiently flexible to adapt to changing circumstances. This odd relationship between 
institutions and trade policy in the Vietnamese case challenges the institutional approach.  
These approaches also fail to take into account Vietnam’s historical context, level of 
economic development, political institutions and political processes, which are significantly 
different from the case studies in the trade policymaking literature, which are based on 
Western political institutions such as pluralistic party systems separation of powers and 
constitutional governments with checks and balances. Moreover, in terms of economics, 
Vietnam’s level of economic development is comparatively lower than most of its trading 
partners, which generates fewer trade choices at the same time as requiring a finely-tuned 
balance between promoting economic development and avoiding economic instability and 
chaos. The historical context can thus be decisive as Vietnam is a transitional economy and 
a laggard in comparison with other countries in terms of trade liberalization, which 
provides a different set of trade choices.  
Similarly, in terms of economic setting, the nature of Vietnam’s transitional economy 
distinguishes it from Western countries on which the prevailing scholarly theorization of 
trade policy is fundamentally grounded. While developed liberal economies have strong 
private sectors, Vietnam’s economy is in transition from a centrally planned economy to a 
socialist-oriented market economy. The private sector, although it has developed, has not 
yet gained strong enough economic power to generate political power to influence trade 
policy on a par with that of its trading partners.  
Hence, based on the above observations, the thesis posits a need to review the way theories 
and approaches have been applied to explain trade policymaking. Because of theoretical 
and empirical gaps, there is a good reason to argue that it is necessary to reorient the 
direction of research by building an analytical and conceptual framework suitable for 
different circumstances. Such a framework should be universally applicable to different 
political and economic settings, regardless whether they are liberal market economies or 
socialist market economies. In addition, the framework should investigate the 
circumstances in which particular factors become dominant and how their interaction 
influences trade policy.  
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2.4 An approach to analyzing Vietnam’s trade policymaking  
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the central puzzle of the thesis is the speed of Vietnam’s trade 
policy, within which a radical shift in perspective and policy settings took place. Given 
Vietnam’s context, the state approach is the most compelling one to explain the case of 
Vietnam’s trade politics, as this approach highlights the prominent role of the state – both 
as an actor and organizational structure.  
The state approach is relevant to provide an understanding to the Vietnam’s trade politics 
because the statist accounts for and explains the changes of individuals and structures 
within the state, which are identified by other ideas and institutional approaches. The statist 
approach “emphasizes the explanation of institutional and organization factors, and/or the 
influence of changing outlooks, personnel and ideologies” (Capling and Low 2010). For the 
relevance in relation to the institutions, the political regime, as seen by the statists, acts a 
variable that convey the influence of the social and economic factors on the policy 
outcomes of states (Krasner 1982). Together with government officials, the state structures 
hence play an important role in shaping the trade policy. As such, under the overall state-
centered approach, the institutional, interests and ideational aspects should be considered 
due to their importance in feeding inputs into the state’s policy process.  
Meanwhile, other approaches may not provide sufficient account for Vietnam’s trade 
policymaking. For example, the societal approach may not provide full understanding of 
Vietnam trade policymaking as the social actors, in Vietnam society, such as academics, 
enterprises, non-government organizations have been relatively isolated from the 
policymaking system, despite their increased voice and engagement with the state. Societal 
actors have not built up sufficient leverage within the policymaking system to decisively 
shape decisions. The ideational approach seems not be able to applicable to explain 
Vietnam trade policymaking as the economic theories or ideologies of liberalization have 
not been comprehended by the policymakers or non-state actors. Similarly, the institutional 
approach, with the same CPV-controlled political system, could not explain sufficiently the 
changes in trade policy. 
Going further the state-centered approach, this thesis goes deeper to see the emerging 
external and internal political and economic forces that shape the state’s interests and ideas. 
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A focus on analysing the state contributes to understanding Vietnam’s trade policy in some 
respects. First, it illuminates the internal system of the state, i.e. the key institutions and 
organization structure within the state. Second, it also documents the external relationships 
of the state, particularly the institutional settings for interaction between the state and non-
state actors. These assumptions are built on the basis of the fact that although the state 
interacts with other stakeholders for input information and support, it is the state, within its 
independent capacity, who is the final decision makers. Thus the state holds the supreme 
authority, ownership and autonomy to make its policy. 
Ideas, interests and institutions within the state: As we assume the most important factor of 
the trade policymaking being the state, then how should we understand what drives the 
state’s behaviours and processes in framing and implementing trade policy? The foremost 
factor is the state’s changing perceptions and material interests, in other words: What does 
the state want? - in trade policymaking. A combination of material and non-material 
interests drive these policy preferences. For state actors, the key state’s ideas are those 
regarding worldviews, self-identification and image, norms, and culture, to economic/trade 
ideas such as protectionism, traditional mercantilism, and free trade. These mind-sets 
determine the state’s trade preferences with respect to trade policy. Proximate policymakers 
change policy perspectives as they became engaged in the process of negotiating complex 
trade deals. Then the question dig deeper by examination of when, how, and which ideas 
become significant enough to influence trade policy preferences. In answering these 
questions, the conditions and circumstances that maintain old ideas and give rise to new 
ideas are examined.  
Given the context of Vietnam during its reforms, the framework allows for analysis of how 
state actors transform their worldviews, the self-identification, and their approach to how 
socialism adapts to the changing context of trade policy. Thus, the study will consider the 
transformation of the ideas of domestic actors by locating and identifying prominent ideas 
in international trade policy, and analyze how these ideas are embedded in the 
policymaking process and its related elements. 
In addition to the ideational variables, material interests also drive actors. Yet, as these 
interests are rarely perfectly aligned amongst the involved groups, some kind of 
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harmonization between the competing interests of the state and societal actors is required 
through the policymaking process. State interests tend to be national concerns such as 
economic growth and maximizing political power, national income, and social stability. 
They may also include more political elements such as the popular legitimacy of political 
regimes (in both democracies and autocracies) or the protection of politically connected 
sectoral interests.  
The thesis also delves deeper by assessing the role of institutions within the state. This 
thesis does not adopt the view, common to some – but not all – state-centric analyses, that 
the state not as a unitary actor. Rather, it conceptualizes the state as an array of various 
institutions, and emphasizes the role of the institutional structure to explain the institutional 
reasons for the power of certain actors within this assemblage. The consideration of the 
institutions is in line with the state-centered approach emphasizing the institutional aspects, 
as it considers the state as both an agent and a structure for channeling access to the society 
and the “institutions of government” (Cotton 1991, p.8). The institutions, both as social 
factors and organization, domestic structures are essential for understanding trade 
policymaking as they shape the interaction among actors.  
The state, in the context of Vietnam’s trade policymaking, is comprised of key institutions. 
These are the central government, i.e. policymakers and central policy bureaucracies, 
comprising the Prime Minister’s office, the ministries and committees, who initiate, 
negotiate, and implement the trade agreements. The political system also includes the 
National Assembly, which ratifies the trade agreements. The state implements the policy 
under the instruction of the Communist Party of Vietnam particularly the Politburo, i.e. the 
top political leaders, who make final decisions. In regards to the relationship between the 
party and state, the party system penetrates to the state system, however the latter tends to 
be autonomy from the first (Katzenstein 1977). The party-state is also a term used in 
Vietnam to imply the state being dominated by the communist party, in which the party 
leads, and the state implements. The government institutions include the formal 
bureaucratic settings and informal norms, rules and practices.  
The state institutions are not homogenous entities. They often have different points of 
views within themselves, especially the “elite” groups, such as the central bureaucracies. 
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While the top political leadership may concern about national interests, regime maintenance 
and legitimacy, the central bureaucracy may care about maintaining their political interests 
of autonomy, authority and power, and their economic interests of state business interests, 
for examples SOEs (London 2014, p.7). The thesis assumes that these institutions gradually 
transform their ideas and interests to flexibly adapt to internal and external requirements for 
reforms. 
In addition to the formal institutions, the thesis also considers the informal rules as 
policymakers take advantages of the prevailing non-written rules to influence the trade 
policy. This is possible that the non-written rules may have prevailed from time to time as 
majority of rules and processes were not fully formulated, reflcting the will of politically 
influential policymakers. In addition, facing new trade issues, new institutions and 
institutional processes were formed to facilitate the domestic arrangements and 
coordination of trade negotiations, which in turn influence the power and interests of 
relevant stakeholders. Hence, the issue of institutional formations/ processes, frame-setting 
in the policy process will be taken into account.. 
The institutions influences trade policymaking through various mechanisms such as 
aggregating preferences, shaping the rules of the game for how actors interact, structuring 
the distribution of power, and transmitting influence in terms of agenda-setting and trade 
policy choice, setting the institutional resources available for policymakers (Gainsborough 
2010). The thesis will look at how institutions transform in a way that harmonizes with a 
particular institutional legacy as well as new institutions that help to shape trade 
preferences are incorporated.  
The institution-building efforts within the state were then an integral part of transitional 
economy like Vietnam, which in turns shapes trade policy. Joining new trade agreements, 
institutions are subject to transformation processes so they can fit to new trade preferences 
caused by new requirements. How the institutional changes are explained by the neo-
institutional theory which would point to the circumstances of institutional change by 
emphasizing importance of networks and communities, learning, emulation and 
standardization, producing a potential for global convergence. The thesis, thus, will look at 
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the overall interests of state, institutions within the state before articulating and assembling 
the partial insights to account for the whole. 
Ideas, interests of non-state actors  
The thesis further argues that the state must be considered not solely as a set of institutions 
and actors, but in the broader context of its relationships with non-state actorsThe state thus 
acts not only as a ‘supplier’ of policy by providing the institutional structure within which 
national and social interests are combined and compromised, but also a ‘commander’ that 
requests societal actors to comply with rules and to adapt to changes in external 
circumstances. This reflects the fact that though the state is dominant in trade 
policymaking, there is a tendency that the central bureaucracies’ authority and autonomy 
was diminished upon participation in the trade policymaking, while creating more policy 
room for non-state actors and increasing interaction between the state and society. Those 
changes, in Vietnam case, were due to Vietnam’s reforms to open more policy space for 
non-state actors. In the relationship with non-state actors, the state is referred as the general 
political authority.  
Societal actors may include the business community, think tanks and mass media, which 
act as one of the ‘sources’ of trade policy preferences. In Vietnam’s case, the business 
community includes foreign invested groups, current and equitized State-owned enterprises 
groups, export groups, import-dependent groups, import-competing groups and business 
associations, i.e. the ‘elite’ groups in the society. They act as both ‘demanders’ of policy 
change and as ‘suppliers’ of input information and expert consultation to trade 
policymakers, as a way of influencing trade policy in favor of their interests.  
The material interests of societal groups can potentially divide in many ways. They may 
split along class lines (as per the Stolper-Samuelson theorem), factor lines (according to 
Heckscher-Ohlin model) or exporting/importing industry (according to the Ricardo-Viner 
model). From the perspective of trade policy preferences, different agents may have 
different views on international trade policy options, i.e., support, oppose or be cautious 
about the partner selection, and the sequence, scope, nature and depth of the trade 
agreements. Each group has their own rationale to justify their trade policy positions on the 
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basis of national interests, self-interests, or sectoral interests. Thus, dealing with these 
competing interests will influence the outcomes of trade policy.  
Thus, within the state and society, although the government officials or even the public do 
not officially state their policy lines to be “reformer” or “conservatives”, these terms refer 
to the politician’s beliefs, supporting or delaying the liberalization process, which were 
formed based on their interests. Different types of actors will have different interests and 
ideas, and policy preferences, depending on their roles in the policy process. For instance:  
• Industry bosses will have material interests that may lead them to seek protection;  
• Bureaucratic agencies will have clients and may have stakes in some of these 
industries; while they also develop ‘developmental lines’ within the confines of the 
arenas of bureaucratic politics;  
• Central agencies may develop over-arching perspectives in line with national 
indicators of ‘success’ or ‘progress’ or may be overall regime stability, or policy 
coherence.  
These interests and ideas thus together shape the positions of the extent of supporting or 
delaying the trade reform. Their stances can alter over time: due to redefinition of their 
perceptions and interests and changes in external circumstances, or new institutions set up 
to facilitate or constrain the trade liberalization.  
What is required is an explanatory account of the conditions in which societal actors can 
emerge as important and influence the trade policy. The thesis argues that trade 
policymaking is mainly influenced by competition among these actors as they strive to 
ensure their trade preferences are embedded in government policy. It assumes that certain 
groups within the state could exert greater policy pressures by cooperation and 
establishment of close relationship with societal actors that share similar interests and ideas. 
On the other hand, the state could compromise, outlaw or isolate those groups sharing 
different interests and ideas with them. The patterns of inclusion and exclusion in the trade 
policymaking are analyzed to demonstrate the cooperation/non-cooperation behaviors 
between the state and societal actors. 
Interplay processes: The final step of applying the state approach to the thesis is to look at 
the interplay of interests, ideas and institutions that shape the choices of the state as the 
 
 39 
final decision makers. The approach is predicated on the argument that trade policy results 
not from interests, ideas, actors, or institutions alone, but rather the complex interaction of 
these variables.  
For example, new ideas influence the preferences by embedding into institutions and lead 
to institutional changes, which are then operationalized by state and societal actors 
(Skocpol 1985, Myerson 1996). This process might equally work in reverse, with actors 
advocating institutional changes, which then lead to the emergence of new ideational 
constructs. Such institutional and ideational changes lead to changes of interest power, 
which together result in policy change (Jessica C Shearer, Abelson et al. 2016). In other 
words, the influence of interests on policy is constrained by institutions, which distribute 
power among actors. On the other hand, new interests are introduced either by old or new 
actors due to new context and changes of actors’ perceptions of interests, leading to 
reshaping the balance of power and institutions and hence triggering the policy change. The 
new trade agreements require new rules, encouraging the emergence of new actors and 
interests and ideas. It is also widely recognized that the relationship among these variables, 
especially between ideas and interests are hard to untangle (Beland 2016). Or, indeed, in 
any number of complex formats any of the variables could, in certain specific contexts, 
function as an ‘independent variable’ that catalyzes changes in the others.  
There is no theoretical or a priori ground for assuming one to be the principal explanatory 
factor, which is instead an empirical question. The emergence of a dominant factor in 
relation to others depends on the historical context, the level of economic development, and 
the nature of the regime. Key socio-economic features of the context and their influence on 
the views and interests of relevant actors and institutions can be identified to reveal the 
origin, underlying cause, and dynamics of trade policy.  
Thus, the state-centered approach, when married together with mid-level theories like state 
corporatism and regime legitimacy, offer clear explanatory advantages in comparison with 
the societal, ideas, and institutional approaches. The rise of state corporatism in Vietnam 
explains the relationship between the state and interests groups, in which the “state 
controlled and managed interests groups” (Jeong 1997). In general, the regime legitimacy is 
sourced from charismatic, traditional and rational – legal, while in Vietnam it is explained 
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to include charismatic leadership, rule of law, constitutionalism (Thayer 2009). These mid-
level theories reveal insights to the domestic politics within the state.   
With respect to the society-centred approaches, the state-centered approach recognizes that 
it is the state that in the dominant position within the relationship with the non-state actors 
shapes the trade policymaking in Vietnam. It also overcomes the weakness of the ideas 
approach by showing that not only non-material but also material conditions can explain 
the shift toward greater trade liberalization. Finally, the approach is not constrained by the 
hard rules and the principled beliefs of the institutions approach, enabling a more in-depth 
examination of the interaction of actors, interests and ideas. This is especially important in 
Vietnam’s trade policy context where new institutions and rules were being formed for a 
socialist-oriented market economy. Instead of relying on fixed relationships among the 
variables as set by existing theories and approaches, the framework thus facilitates an 
investigation of the diversified and complicated relationships in the trade policymaking 
process.  
2.5 Conclusion  
This chapter has provided a literature review of theories and approaches to the study of 
trade policymaking, which serves as a basis for building an analytical framework for the 
thesis. The extant literature on trade policymaking is based on a debate among four 
competing approaches, principally the state-centred, society-centred, ideas-based and 
institutional approaches. These approaches each assume the one of these four factors 
influences trade policymaking, i.e., the state, societal actors, ideas, and institutions. Given 
the prominent role of the state in Vietnam, this chapter proposes to undertake the state-
centered approach for comprehensive assessment of the domestic actors involved, their 
ideas and interests, and the institutions of trade policymaking, with the aim of generating a 
broad understanding of Vietnam’s trade policymaking.  
This approach is suitable for a case study of Vietnam for a number of reasons. First, the 
thesis views the Vietnamese state not as a unitary actor but as comprised of various agents, 
including, for instance, the central bureaucracies that greatly influence trade policy. The 
central leadership of the Communist Party is at the highest level of policymaking, provides 
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leadership for not only the national development strategy but also for integration policy. 
The central bureaucracies, for their part, are tasked with initiating, negotiating, and 
implementing trade policy. Yet, they are influenced by vested interest groups that are either 
linked to their management interests or in society. These interest groups seek to influence 
trade policymaking in line with their perceptions and interests. Secondly, societal actors, 
though still passive, have gradually raised their voices to demand that policymakers make 
decisions in their favour. Societal actors are in the process of struggling to secure political 
power. Thirdly, institutions are important because they act as channels for interaction 
among domestic actors, and decide the extent of influence of different domestic actors on 
trade policymaking. This approach also incorporates changes in the ideas, interests, and 
power of domestic actors and the institutions that structure their relationships.   
The following chapters will examine the transformation of the role of the state and societal 
actors, followed by a detailed discussion of Vietnam’s WTO accession and TPP 










This chapter provides an overview of the historical development of Vietnam’s trade policy. 
The process began with unilateral domestic trade reforms designed to facilitate a more open 
business environment in the 1980s. It progressed through narrow geographically-based 
trade agreements through the ASEAN-centred FTAs in the 1990s before participation in a 
global and broadly based agreement through membership in the WTO in the early 2000s. 
Compared with its peers in the developing world, Vietnam was initially isolated and took a 
cautious approach to trade liberalization but by the end of the period it had transformed into 
a very active player by participating in high-standard trade agreements such as the TPP and 
the EU-Vietnam FTA.  
This process raises several questions: What factors led Vietnam to undertake such a 
dramatic change in its trade policy orientation? How did key domestic political and 
economic actors engage and in what ways did they influence the development of trade 
policy? The chapter argues that Vietnam undertook such dramatic change by a set of 
continuous transformation of the state’s redefinition of interests and ideas of which the 
economic development were the first and foremost objectives of the country. This 
redefinition of the state’s interests was driven by the need to overcome domestic economic 
crisis, and facilitated by the state’s changing their world-view that the world shifted to 
focus on economic development, open trade and liberalization.  
Since the 1980s, both the Vietnamese political economy and the international political 
economy have witnessed remarkable change. The Vietnamese economy carried out the first 
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economic reforms, namely, the Doi Moi initiated in 1986, which marked an historic shift 
from central planning to a market-based economic system. This change was in line with a 
broader trend marked by the end of Cold War, in which many current and former 
Communist countries adopted market-based economic reforms. Vietnam’s economy began 
a period of high-speed growth, averaging of 8% during the 2000s, and became a lower 
middle-income country by reaching the US$1000 GDP per capita in 2010 according to the 
International Monetary Fund – IMF’s classification. During this period, Vietnam’s 
economy also became far more economically integrated with others. This economic 
transformation was made possible by a dramatic change in the orientation of Vietnamese 
trade policy.  
3.2 Unilateral domestic trade openness: 1986 to 1994  
Vietnam carried out unilateral trade openness in the 1980s as an integral part of the Doi 
Moi economic renovation. One of the main aims of Doi Moi was to shift from a centrally 
planned economy to socialist-oriented economy. Accordingly, a relatively open economy 
policy was implemented. Various trade measures were carried out to meet this objective. 
First, institutional rules were dramatically transformed with the state removing its 
monopoly over foreign trade in 1988. This policy was in line with the abandonment of 
central planning and the adoption of a ‘socialist-oriented’ market economy, which led to the 
removal of the state’s monopoly over industries.  
Secondly, a series of trade reforms was implemented to expand foreign trade activities. 
Most goods were allowed to be imported and exported with the exception of a small 
number of strategic goods on a ‘forbidden list’ such as fuel, steel, fertilizer, crude oil, and 
rice (GoV 1998). In addition, a number of non-trade barriers such as tariff quotas and 
import quotas were gradually removed. To restrict the import of consumer goods, Vietnam 
applied high duties, and to attract capital and investment goods, it applied low tariffs 
(Schmidt 2004). To accelerate access to foreign markets, export quotas were eliminated in 
1995 for all commodities except rice. The reforms were, therefore, partial with a focus 
more on expanding overseas markets while continuing to protect the domestic market. The 
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country gave priority to exports to encourage production and investment, and to attract 
foreign capital to facilitate the import of machinery for domestic production (CPV 2006).  
Unilateral trade reforms took root as a result of both domestic economic stress and 
changing external circumstances. Firstly, the impetus for removing the state’s monopoly 
over the role of the private sector arose from the failure of the centrally planned economic 
model to distribute resources effectively, and to exploit and develop the potential capacity 
of the economy (MOIT 2016). This agenda received the strong support of the party and its 
leadership, which was especially important during the critical transition from a centrally 
planned to a market economic system (Nguyen 2006).  
Secondly, the change in Vietnam’s foreign trade policy was facilitated by the end of the 
Cold War, which launched an era of peaceful coexistence and economic development. In 
addition to the positive external context, the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) caused the loss of Vietnam’s main export market and source of 
economic aid, creating an urgent need for new export markets and trading partners. In that 
context, the party issued the resolution of the seventh National Congress in 1991 to adopt a 
formal foreign policy of friendliness with all countries. For the first time, an international 
economic integration policy was established - upgrading from the previously simple 
international cooperation policy – which aimed to resolve Vietnam’s economic and 
political isolation.  
Unilateral trade reforms, together with the Doi Moi reforms, contributed to the emergence 
of high-speed growth. Exports immediately increased six-fold, from US$2.9 million in 
1986 to US$13.6 million in 1995 (Customs Online 2014). The open economy policy 
resulted in a wave of foreign direct investment (FDI), which increased more than twenty-
fold from US$1.6 billion (1988-1990) to US$28.3 billion (1991-1996) (Foreign Investment 
Agency 2008). The annual rate of increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rose from 
4.4% from 1986 to 1990 to 8.2% between 1991 and 1995 (Nguyen 2006). In addition, 
exports expanded from a very few products to include a range of processed primary 
products, such as rubber, cashew nuts and coffee, and labor-intensive manufactures (Dollar 
1996). Thus, the open economy policy brought unprecedented economic achievements for 
Vietnam. This policy was significant in suppressing opposition from conservative political 
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forces hostile to reform and confirming the value of the state’s policy shift towards 
integrating with the world.    
These reforms resulted in new trading relationships. In 1986, trading partner priorities 
focused on the socialist community, with the Soviet Union the leading country (CPV 2006). 
Following the end of the Cold War, Vietnam’s expanding trade relations with more 
countries were supported by a foreign policy of diversification and multi-lateralization and 
a posture of friendship with all countries. Vietnam aimed to link its domestic market with 
international markets by participating in the international division of labour (CPV 2006). In 
1992, Vietnam signed textile trade agreement with the EU. By 1993, two-thirds of 
Vietnam’s exports were to countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), and two-thirds of its imports came from the Asian region - 
including the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), South Korea, Taiwan and 
Hong Kong - as a result of economic complementarity between Vietnam and these 
countries (Dollar 1996). Vietnam’s dramatic trade reforms thus diversified its export and 
import sources.  
Internally, unilateral trade openness resulted in a state’s reshaping of the balance of power 
amongst domestic actors with a reduction in the number of SOEs and the creation of new 
political forces, i.e., the private sector and foreign investors. SOEs generally supported 
liberalization because the old economic model constrained their behavior and the autonomy 
of their investment decisions. They no longer relied on central planning for materials and 
capital, which was increasingly constrained by the reduction in aid from the Soviet Union 
and socialist countries (MOIT 2016). On the other hand, certain SOEs wanted to hold on to 
the state’s support and avoid competition. The state itself continued to protect the SOEs, 
especially strategic domestic industries, by restricting imports (Riedel and Turley 1999). 
The SOEs maintained their important role and power in the economy in general, and in 
foreign trade in particular (Dollar 1996). In the 1986-1991 period, SOEs accounted for 96.6 
per cent of import/export value (Pham and Vuong 2009).  
The nature of the economic renovation policy was initially focused on agriculture and the 
attraction of FDI, rather than resource reallocation away from the SOEs (Tran 2013). 
Moreover, Vietnam maintained its socialist ideology through the so-called ‘socialist 
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oriented market economy’. This ideology placed the SOEs in a prominent economic 
position, while only the non-strategic areas were open to private sector competition. Hence, 
the state was able to maintain their control - economically, politically, and ideologically – 
through the SOEs, while at the same mobilizing investment and growth in other economic 
sectors.  
Second, in addition to the removal of the state’s monopoly over foreign trade, the private 
sector comprising formal private enterprises and informal household sector was created a 
policy space for emerging to play a more dynamic role, though still moderate. The private 
enterprises expanded from about 5000 registered companies (1992) to more than 40,000 
(1999), contributed 43% of export growth (1999) (Steer and Taussig 2002, Schaumburg-
Muller 2005). Most SOEs focused more on capital-intensive activities for domestic 
markets, did not expand in number, and paid less attention on export market (Steer and 
Taussig 2002). Foreign trade was facilitated by ideological change, which acknowledged 
the importance of the private sector, enabling for the first time a legitimate and active 
private sector. This transformation initially commenced with the state’s adoption of the 
‘multi-sectoral economy’ in 1986 (CPV 2006). In 1991, private sectors were licensed to 
engage directly in export and import activities. By 1998, the state removed foreign trade 
licenses and allowed all non-state economic firms to carry out import-export activities. The 
number of firms involved in foreign trade activities increased from 40 state units 
specializing in foreign trade (1986) to 270 in 1990, and 20,000 private sector firms by the 
end of 2005 (Pham and Vuong 2009). As a result, the non-state sector was encouraged to 
get involved in foreign trade, although the main export actors were the SOEs.  
Although the nascent private sector would take some time to develop and become an 
influential player in the policymaking process, this period marked an important starting 
point for the private sector to evolve after years of constraints. The private sector was 
mainly comprised of small and medium enterprises, while the larger ones were mainly 
SOEs or foreign-owned enterprises (Hakkala and Kokko 2007). The private sector now had 
a relative increase in their voice, role, and power in trade policymaking. This initial result 
was modest, but more importantly, it opened a new path for the development of non-state 




Accompanying trade liberalization was liberalization of investment, which encouraged the 
emergence of new political forces in trade areas, i.e., foreign investors. To meet domestic 
demand for capital, technology, management, and export market expertise, the first Law on 
Direct Investment was issued in 1987. It was a highly liberal foreign investment law 
designed to attract foreign enterprises to do business in Vietnam’s market by permitting the 
establishment of 100 per cent foreign owned enterprises (National Assembly 1987). While 
principally designed as an investment regulation, the law also included several trade 
provisions, including incentive schemes such as preferential tax and financial measures for 
export businesses (Gates and Truong 1995).  
With the removal of the state’s monopoly over trade activities, the authority of the state was 
significantly weakened in comparison with that during the central planning period. 
Administrative measures for state intervention in trade activities were removed, including 
import quotas and export subsidies. In particular, the Ministry of Trade’s role was greatly 
diminished, as the authority to export and import commodities progressively devolved to 
businesses, both private and state-owned. Despite this, the CPV’s overall legitimacy and 
prominent position expanded owing to the economic recovery and achievements following 
the economic crisis in the 1980s and 1990s.  
Despite their dramatic impact, Vietnam’s initial trade reforms were only partial. The state 
preferred a slow and gradual process of unilateral liberalization rather than a ‘big-bang’ 
adoption of laissez faire, liberal capitalism – as had occurred in the former Soviet Union 
and which was suggested by the World Bank and the IMF (Hayton 2010). The reason for 
the partial and slow progress of unilateral international trade liberalization was tensions and 
hesitation among the actors involved and between the need to protect certain domestic 
sectors and the broader agenda of market-based economy policy. Hence, unilateral 
liberalization was a learning and experimental process geared to avoiding domestic 
opposition. 
Policymakers mainly followed the import substitution policy (1986 to 1996), export-
stimulating with protectionism for some industries (1996-2007) (Nguyen 2018). This 
export-oriented policy was outlined in the document of the National Congress VII in 1991, 
which explained that “the strategy is strongly oriented toward exports replacing imports by 
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domestically produced products, and enhancing competitiveness in the domestic, regional, 
and international markets” (The 7th VCP National Congress 1991). Vietnam learned from 
the newly industrialized countries in East Asia by adopting a development strategy that had 
been successful based on attracting foreign investment and developing export-oriented 
industries (Tran 2009). Exports were the core objective of foreign trade (rather than 
increasing all trade generally), with special attention paid to the export of labor-intensive 
processed products in which Vietnam had a comparative advantage (Politburo 1996). 
However, Vietnam did not abandon import-substitution. Before 1986, trade served the 
inward-oriented development strategy by importing goods and exporting what the domestic 
economy did not use (Norlund, Gates et al. 1995). After 1986, the import-substitution 
industrialization policy continued to be applied to the development of the infant industries 
such as the steel, automotive, and electrical product industries, i.e. certain protectionism 
applied for infant manufacturing and heavy industries. 
In addition, the partial approach reflected the gradual process of change in ideology. This 
ideational change occurred in specific areas such as removing monopolies and export 
restrictions rather than a comprehensive change that included full trade liberalization. This 
partial ideological change was acceptable because it did not change the fundamental 
principles of socialism, i.e., the public ownership of the means of production and 
distribution according to labor productivity. Rather the process focused more on operational 
principles, i.e., removal of the central monopoly on foreign trade (Fforde and Beresford 
1997).  
In summary, during the early period of reform, it was the domestic demands for recovery 
from the economic crisis as well as the changes in the international system with the end of 
the Cold War that moved the policy focus to liberalization and integration into the world 
market. During this period, the process of liberalization saw new non-state groups emerge 
as political forces that were expected to have increasing influence on trade policy, i.e., the 
private sector and foreign enterprises. Although it would take time for these new forces to 
influence trade policymaking, this period opened a new era for their development.  
In addition, this period opened new choices for Vietnam in terms of the trading partners, 
trade growth, and the extent of trade liberalization. Compared to the previously limited 
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trading partners amongst socialist countries, Vietnam had more opportunity to trade with all 
countries and to expand its exports and attract investment. Thus, Vietnam moved gradually 
from isolated country to active trade player. The following sections will continue to discuss 
the leadership’s motivation in joining regional and global trade agreements as part of the 
continued effort towards trade liberalization in new trade areas.  
3.3 The Bilateral Trade Agreement with the United States, 2000 
Trade liberalization was advanced by the implementation of newly signed trade 
agreements. The most important one was the Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) with the 
United States in 2000 undertaken as a part of the bilateral normalization process between 
the two countries.  
The BTA marked a new phase in Vietnam’s trade policy. From previously being based on 
partial trade liberalization through the removal of export restrictions, the BTA opened a 
new chapter in the liberalization of imports. New trade rules such as the ‘most favoured 
nation’ (MFN) and ‘national treatment’ (NT) principles were applied, setting up a level 
playing field between domestic and foreign firms. Many import restrictions were removed, 
for instance, reducing tariffs on goods, and non-tariff barriers for services (Manyin 2001). 
New regulatory approaches were integrated into domestic regulations, such as permits for 
licensed domestic enterprises to export and import in 1998 (GoV 1998). Thus, although the 
tariff lines subject to tariff removal in the US BTA were limited, the economy was 
genuinely ‘opened to trade’ for the first time, exposing Vietnam’s firms to full competition 
with the foreign firms is the United States. 
Domestically, how was a political consensus reached for undertaking the BTA with the 
United States? Here an analysis of the interests, ideas, and institutions of relevant actors is 
useful. Vietnam’s economy witnessed robust economic growth as a result of the economic 
renovations in the 1980s and early 1990s. It was then thought that the next step to help 
Vietnam prosper was to reconnect with the United States, economically and politically, in a 
way similar to the strategies adopted by other countries in East Asia that had adopted 
export-oriented industrialisation strategies targeting the US market (Damond 2013). 
Located in a dynamic economic region, Vietnam hoped to become an ‘Asian tiger’ similar 
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to its neighbors. This goal, together with economic goals such as attracting US capital and 
managerial and technological expertise were the main motivating factors underlying the 
BTA. The opportunities for market access were huge given the prospect of the United 
States dropping its high import tariff of 50%-90% down to the more normal rate (averaging 
4%) given to other countries (Damond 2013). The relationship with the United States was 
seen as a decisive factor in integrating the Vietnamese economy with the world because the 
United States possessed significant economic influence in the international system. The 
BTA was also seen as a strategic step in preparing Vietnam for WTO accession, thus 
constituting a major preparation for the country’s long-term plan. Although the potential 
economic benefits were huge, however, there were some concerns were expressed by 
business and government officials regarding Vietnamese companies lack of experience 
when accessing the US market (Riedel and Parker 2003).  
Political considerations were also important in the signing of the BTA. It was not the first 
of its kind to be signed by the United States and former communist countries. However, the 
BTA with the United States required a determination to overcome Vietnamese suspicions 
of regime overthrow or economic sanctions by the United States. Before signing the BTA, 
the Vietnamese government had to handle implicit and explicit opposition from within and 
outside the party. In fact, the BTA was delayed for a year owing to opposition views in 
1999-2000 (Manyin 2001). This opposition came principally from high-ranking officials of 
the CPV Central Commission of Foreign Relations and the Ministry of Public Security who 
were concerned about the possibility of US intervention in Vietnam’s domestic affairs.2 
Despite the internal party politics, however, the BTA was signed owing to a final consensus 
and determination among the party’s leadership in support of a vital national interest, i.e., 
national economic development. This move clearly demonstrated that pragmatic political 
and economic interests, rather than socialist ideology, were the dominant concern for trade 
policymakers.  
In addition, the BTA was the first trade agreement in which the Western approach to trade 
liberalization was institutionalized in Vietnam’s domestic trade regulation system. Through 
the BTA, Vietnamese decision-makers for the first time became familiar with trade 
                                                
2 Interview with diplomatic official of the Vietnam Embassy to Algeria, through Skype in 2017. 
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concepts and rules used in the WTO and realized the need to apply these rules if Vietnam 
were going to properly integrate with the global trade system (Buckley, Io et al. 2008). New 
terms such as the ‘national treatment’ principle were adopted and new trade ideas, such as 
allowing foreigners and domestic firms to do business in areas that were competitive with 
the SOEs, were considered. These contributed to the transformation from a planned to a 
market-based economic system (Damond 2013). This learning process lasted beyond the 
signing of the BTA as the United States organized the ‘Support for Trade Acceleration 
Project’ to explain and guide Vietnamese policymakers on how to implement the BTA 
(Burghardt 2003). Hence, the BTA rules were not only developed out of a need to meet 
domestic economic demands but also part of a process of institutional learning. 
The BTA thus demonstrated the transformation of the interests, ideas, and institutions of 
relevant actors that enabled Vietnam to normalize trade with the most powerful and largest 
economy in the world. Once the relationship with the United States was initiated, 
relationships with other countries and regions could also be accelerated, facilitating the 
international economic integration and trade liberalization process.  
3.4 Regional trade agreements: 1995 to present 
Following the same broad trend of opening and integrating with the world, Vietnam began 
joining regional trade agreements in the 1990s. The first FTA was the ASEAN Free Trade 
Agreement (AFTA) signed in 1995 as a condition of Vietnam’s ASEAN membership. Its 
purpose was to integrate the markets of ASEAN members by reducing the intra-group tariff 
to 0-5 per cent (with the exception of some sensitive sectors) (ASEAN 2018). Thus, while 
the headline tariff cuts were significant, AFTA left room for developing countries such as 
Vietnam to continue protecting many sectors through the use of ‘exclusion lists’. For 
instance, in Vietnam’s AFTA exclusive list, there were 424 items, many of which were 
included for national defense and the state budget, price control, and macro-economic 
regulation purposes (Customs Online 2005). The Vietnamese sectors listed as sensitive 
included food products such as rice, fruit, and sugar.     
There were multiple reasons for Vietnam’s shift from unilateral trade liberalization to a 
negotiation-based approach to regional trade agreements such as AFTA. First, joining 
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AFTA - as one of the conditions for becoming an ASEAN member – was clearly a foreign 
policy move. Vietnam’s participation in ASEAN was part of its broader foreign policy of 
diversification and multi-lateralization, and building a peaceful environment for economic 
development. This foreign policy move aimed to improve the hitherto frozen relationships 
with its neighbors, to consolidate trust and strengthen relationships with other ASEAN 
members, and to build ASEAN as a strong regional organization. The Vietnamese 
leadership was unprepared and not initially aware that AFTA was a condition of becoming 
an ASEAN member and so was dependent on guidance and support from other ASEAN 
member to understand AFTA.3  
Secondly, while strategic and foreign policy objectives were decisive factors in Vietnam’s 
decision to participate in AFTA, economic interests were nonetheless important for how it 
was implemented. AFTA implementation was of overall benefit to the Vietnamese 
economy as well as strengthening the leaders’ confidence to continue the international 
economic integration policy.4 AFTA supported Vietnam’s aim of developing new export 
markets, which served as a means for economic recovery after the crisis of the 1980s and 
1990s. From a trade perspective, the leaders looked for new markets for exports such as 
rice, rubber, coffee, wood, and fisheries in the context of a narrowing down of traditional 
markets as a result of the political and economic crisis in the Soviet Union and in Eastern 
Europe (Council of Ministers 1991). In addition, the country could expect to attract more 
investment and promote trade with ASEAN members (Tongzon 1999). 
The process of joining AFTA was politically challenging as it created division amongst 
Vietnam’s leaders. Some of them had suspicions about ASEAN’s orientation, arguing that 
as many ASEAN members were US allies, the organization functioned as a ‘disguised 
NATO’ in Southeast Asia. Economically, the government was also concerned about 
Vietnam’s low level of development and wanted to delay the process of economic 
liberalization.5 In addition, AFTA raised concerns among businesses, which worried about 
their weak competitiveness owing to their lack of capital, technology, infrastructure, and 
                                                
3 Interview with official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2015. 
4 Interview with official from the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam in 2015. 
5 Interview with diplomatic official of the Vietnam Embassy to Algeria, through Skype in 2017. 
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knowledge relating to international trade rules (Frost 1995). Thus, as Vietnam’s first ever 
FTA, AFTA caused many concerns for policymakers. 
In dealing with these concerns, Vietnam’s trade policy regime underwent relatively few 
changes (Elliott 2012). It comprised a non-transparent system of complex and highly 
discretionary non-tariff barriers - such as quotas, customs surcharges, import licenses, and 
‘flexible’ tariff structures – resulting in a high effective rate of protection of 30-60% 
(Tongzon 1999). Fearing external pressures on domestic firms, the government used import 
taxes of 15 per cent when non-tariff barriers were dismantled and special sales taxes for 
products such as cars and beverages (Dollar 1996). In addition, Vietnam expanded its 
export volume in exchange for imports from ASEAN (Vo 2001). 
AFTA’s tariff reductions were structured around an inclusion list that included many 
products not produced in Vietnam (which had relatively low tariffs); a temporary exclusion 
list including domestically produced items; and a general exception list including strongly 
protected products such as fuel, broadcasting and cigarettes. Such an approach was viewed 
as the outcome of the state’s desire to continue protection for some of the key economic 
lobby groups (Schmidt 2004). In addition, as the first Vietnamese FTA, AFTA allowed a 
lot of ‘room to move’ for a developing economy like Vietnam. Under AFTA, Vietnam only 
had to meet all the obligations imposed by the Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
(CEPT) by 2006 while other ASEAN members had to implement them in 2003 (ASEAN 
2018). Hence, AFTA could not have a short-term negative impact because of the delayed 
tariff reduction schedule. 
In this process, there was evident conflict between Vietnam’s foreign trade policy (that was 
moving towards further trade liberalization) and domestic policy considerations (which, by 
requiring protection for key interest groups, could hold back the process). However, these 
concerns dissipated during the AFTA implementation process, with many exceptions and 
exclusions, and so did not cause serious negative impacts on the economy or key interest 
groups.6  
In addition to AFTA, Vietnam also deepened regional integration via ASEAN’s network of 
‘Plus One’ FTAs with regional economies: 
                                                
6 Interview with official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2015. 
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• ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement - effective for Vietnam in 2010;  
• ASEAN-Republic of Korea Free Trade Agreement in 2007; 
• ASEAN-Japan FTA in 2008,  
• ASEAN-India FTA in 2010;  
• ASEAN-New Zealand-Australia FTA in 2010.  




Table 3-1: Vietnam’s membership in key international trade agreements, 2018 




Signing  Entry into force 
Bilateral agreements 
Vietnam-US Bilateral Trade Agreement  6/1996 7/2000 12/2001 
Regional agreements (extension of AFTA to include ASEAN’s trade partners) 
ASEAN Free Trade Agreement     1995 1995 1996 
ASEAN-China Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation (ACFTA) 
2002 1/2004 2005 
ASEAN-South Korea FTA 2005 2006 2007 
ASEAN-Japan Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (AJCEP) 
2003 4/2008 12/2008 
ASEAN-India Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreement (AICECA) 
2003 2003 2010 
ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIG)    2003 2009 6/2010 
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA  2004 2/2009 2010 
Multilateral agreements  
World Trade Organization  1995 2006 2007 
Bilateral and multilateral FTAs 
Vietnam-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement 2007 2008 1/1/2009 
Vietnam-Chile FTA 2008 2011 1/1/2014 
Vietnam-South Korea FTA 2012 5/5/2015 20/12/2015 
Vietnam-Eurasian Economic Union FTA  2013 5/2015      5/10/2016 
Trans-Pacific Partnership 2010 4/2/2016 Collapsed  
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
Pacific Partnership 
2017 8/3/2018 30/12/2018 
Vietnam-European Union FTA (EVFTA) 6/2012 12/2015 Not yet effective  
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership  8/2012 Being negotiated 
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ASEAN - Hongkong 2014 Being negotiated 
Vietnam-Israel FTA  2015 Being negotiated 
Source: Asia Regional Integration Center, Tracking Asian Integration, available at 
http://aric.adb.org/fta-country, accessed on 3/5/2018. 
 
Vietnam’s ASEAN-based FTA commitments caused pressures mainly in relation to the 
trade in goods rather than the institutional reforms seen in the case of the US BTA and later 
its WTO accession. Tariff removal was highly variable, with rates as high as 98.1% in the 
ASEAN-AU-NZ FTA and as low as 80.87% in the ASEAN-India FTA. Vietnam’s average 
level of tariff liberalization in the ASEAN-centered FTAs was 89.5% (Fukunaga and Isono 
2013). The schedule for full implementation of these FTAs was 2015-2021, which gave 
Vietnam an exceptionally long lead-time to adjust to these commitments. The ASEAN Plus 
One FTAs were also criticized as being very weak because many sensitive sectors were 
exempt (e.g. agriculture and finance), rules of origin were restrictive, and low tariff 
liberalization overall did not go very far (Fukunaga and Isono 2013).  
Nonetheless, the ASEAN-centered FTAs were important insofar as they contributed to 
building the ‘ASEAN Economic Community’ (AEC) project (ASEAN 2008, Gaston and 
Khalid 2010) for ASEAN’s development. This project aimed to achieve a single market and 
production base, a competitive economic region, equitable economic development, and 
integration into the global economy (ASEAN 2008). As part of its commitment to the AEC, 
Vietnam agreed to eliminate most tariffs by 2018. In addition, ASEAN and its FTA 
partners have been negotiating a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 
since 2013. This is an attempt to ‘multilateralise’ the network by combining the six FTAs 
into a single agreement (Fukunaga and Isono 2013). To expand the network further, 
ASEAN negotiated an FTA with Hong Kong and discussed the possibility of FTAs with 
Canada and the European Economic Community in 2017.  
Vietnam was an active supporter of ASEAN’s regional trade agreements. For political 
reasons, Vietnam had a strong interest in building a well-institutionalized ASEAN. ASEAN 
shares many of Vietnam’s foreign policy interests: i.e., to maintain neutrality, to balance 
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powers, and to increase ASEAN’s role in mediating the great powers (Bowles 2002, Lee 
2016). For economic reasons, Vietnam was able to access regional markets through 
preferential treatment while still being able to protect sensitive domestic sectors. This was a 
preparatory step for Vietnam actively to select suitable trade partners to sign other bilateral 
and multilateral FTAs (Le 2012). Moreover, Vietnam, together with Laos, Cambodia and 
Myanmar, was given preferential treatment compared to other ASEAN members. For 
example, they were given a longer tariff removal schedule and more flexible and lower 
levels of tariff liberalization. Vietnam was permitted to implement the FTAs with a tariff 
line of 0% for around 90% of goods in 2015, while other ASEAN-China Free Trade 
Agreement members such as China implemented about 95% of tariff lines in 2010 
(Ministry of Finance 2015).   
On the other hand, in addition to the potential benefits, Vietnam is at risk of facing negative 
impacts from the ASEAN-centered FTAs. For example, if the RCEP is successfully 
implemented, Vietnam could face competition from China with respect to market access to 
Japan and South Korea and trade diversion away from Vietnam (Dordi, Nguyen et al. 
2015). At a sectoral level, tariffs are expected to be removed for the most protected areas, 
such as agriculture, textiles and garments, and autos, along with the possible risk of reduced 
exports of pork, chicken, and beef (Dordi, Nguyen et al. 2015). Vietnam’s competitiveness 
is weaker than other countries in the region, especially compared with China and other 
ASEAN members, even in the most competitive export sectors such as textiles and 
garments, and footwear (Ho 2012). Owing to the above concerns, Vietnam has continued to 
maintain high protection in sectors, such as services, using tariffs, non-tariff trade barriers 
and FDI restrictions (Sally and Sen 2005).  
In short, Vietnam’s regional trade agreements have been driven by multiple factors. They 
were initially motivated by the leadership’s determination to break down Vietnam’s 
isolation by establishing normal relationships with neighbors and by transforming its 
predominant posture in the region from one of hostility to friendship. Then, economic 
considerations came to the fore as trade relationships with ASEAN greatly benefited 
Vietnam’s economy. Domestically, the regional trade agreements required political 
compromises: first to overcome the suspicious attitude of some parts of the leadership and 
then to overcome conflict between domestic policy focused on protection of the domestic 
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market and international economic integration policy. These differences created pull and 
push pressures that made the trade liberalization process gradual and uneven. 
3.5 Multilateral trade agreements and WTO accession, 1995-2007 
In 1995, Vietnam applied for WTO membership, and a short time after that, to be an 
observer of GATT. The WTO accession was a great leap forward for Vietnam’s trade 
liberalization. While the ASEAN FTAs focused on trade in goods by reducing tariffs, the 
WTO required far more in terms of institutional reform. Moreover, while the FTAs were all 
at the regional level, the WTO opened Vietnam to a large global marketplace.   
The decision to join the WTO was a multi-factoral: it was first part of Vietnam’s foreign 
policy of international cooperation, while also being designed to gain the advantage of 
foreign investment for development and also to serve the national strategy of 
industrialization and modernization (CPV Central Committee 1997). The decision 
contributed to the foreign policy of normalizing and improving relationships with major 
countries and important international organizations. It was part of a larger effort to join the 
world through membership of international organizations such as the Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1998.  
WTO accession was strongly supported on strategic, political, and economic grounds. The 
leadership expected to it to help expand exports and enhance the country’s position in the 
international economy. Consequently, they expected fast, sustainable, and effective 
economic development. Other anticipated benefits were institutional reform to help create a 
fair business and investment environment, which was expected to attract foreign investment 
and promote domestic investment, thus creating new production and export capacities. It 
was also hoped that Vietnam would gain recognition of its economy as equal to others by 
providing access to the WTO’s dispute settlement system and rules (Agroinfo News 2006). 
This policy was in line with and assisted domestic demands to shift to an export-oriented 
policy in combination with the import-substitution policy (Prime Minister 2000).  
Although there was no formal feasibility study for the costs and benefits for WTO 
accession, there were concerns that made the negotiations challenging. The most prominent 
issue was a dilemma where, on one hand, Vietnam wanted to undertake global-level 
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economic integration while, on the other hand, it faced severe difficulties caused by its 
weak competitiveness, weak public officials and small domestic firms compared to global 
partners. The country had a hard choice balancing between WTO trade liberalization 
requirements, such as tariff reduction and removing subsidies, and protection required by 
the majority of state and non-state enterprises. Hence, the trade-offs regarding WTO 
accession involved a trade-off between multilateral trade liberalization and the cost of 
reducing the protection for weak domestic firms. This trade-off had not been posed in such 
stark terms by the relatively lower-standard AFTA, ASEAN, and US BTA. Additionally, 
there was a large gap between Vietnam’s domestic trade laws and WTO rules as well as the 
high costs of the institutional reforms necessary to comply with WTO requirements. 
Vietnam’s weak institutional and staff capacity and concerns regarding loss of the state’s 
authority, autonomy, and management power, and economic interests, made the WTO 
accession Vietnam’s most difficult trade reform to that point.  
Compounding matters, negotiation of WTO accession was not on a reciprocal basis like 
FTAs but required Vietnam to accept WTO members’ requests through complex bilateral 
and multilateral negotiations. The application process therefore created huge challenges for 
Vietnam’s trade policymaking. Policymakers had to deal with new, comprehensive, and 
complicated trade issues and negotiations that required professionalism and expertise 
beyond their previous experience in international trade negotiations. The WTO accession 
ultimately required 28 rounds of bilateral and multilateral negotiations, each of which 
included new international trade rules with which the Vietnamese were unfamiliar. 
Moreover, the commitments were made under heavy pressure from external partners, which 
generated internal opposition that delayed the process of accession. Thus, Vietnam’s trade 
policymaking had to be significantly adapted and develop a newfound level of flexibility to 
meet these challenges.    
Trade policymaking during the WTO accession displayed both continuity and change 
adjusting to these new challenges. Continuity was the paramount role of the communist 
party-state: relatively closed and limited consultations between the government and private 
sectors and policymaking undertaken with relatively low levels of transparency. In 
addition, there was a lack of interest in, capacity to deal with, and knowledge of the 
complicated WTO rules in the private sector. Nonetheless, major changes also occurred. 
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These included the emergence of new trade actors within the state, a mixture of top down 
and bottom-up approaches to identifying interests, and new procedures and institutions set 
up for internal coordination. The central bureaucracy decided between ‘defensive’ (to be 
protected) and ‘offensive’ (seeking liberalization) sectors depending on their compatibility 
with national political and economic interests. Such decisions were made without much 
transparency and influence from the private sector, reflecting the discretionary power of the 
bureaucrats. However, to access the large benefits of joining the world’s largest trade 
organization, Vietnamese trade policymaking had to transform its institutions to become 
more participatory and harmonize different interests and considerations.  
3.6 Bilateral and Mega-Regional FTAs: 2007 to present 
Vietnam’s trade reforms underwent yet another new radical change when it started to join 
various FTAs following WTO accession, most remarkably the new generation of FTAs that 
emerged in Asia during the mid-2000s. Vietnam attempted to start negotiations for bilateral 
FTAs with Japan in 2007, Chile in 2008, the European Union in 2012, the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in 2013, the Eurasian Economic Union in 
2013, and with eleven other countries in the Asia Pacific region through the Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (TPP) in 2010. Among these partners, the United States (in the TPP) and the 
EU were Vietnam’s largest and second largest export markets respectively. Export growth 
to these two markets had increased 400% in 7 years from 2003 to 2010 on the back of 
market access negotiated through WTO accession and the US BTA (Le 2012). 
This new generation of FTAs had very different characteristics to the ASEAN-centred 
FTAs of the previous decade. First, while the ASEAN-centred FTAs were narrow, simple, 
and weakly liberalising, mega-regional FTAs such as the TPP required comprehensive and 
highly liberalized level commitments. These FTAs covered many new trade issues such as 
labour standards and intellectual property rights. Secondly, the new generation FTAs 
required trade policy reforms in the direction of greater transparency and liberalization, 
building a legal system, and institutional reforms in line with international standards 
(Department of Commerce 2011). It was expected that these FTAs would prepare Vietnam 
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for new development opportunities in the form of the ‘Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific’ 
(FTAAP), an FTA ultimately planned for the 21 APEC economies.  
Vietnamese participation in these high standard FTAs was made possible by a number of 
factors including international pressure as well as the country’s domestic economic 
conditions. First, despite protectionism emerging in the world in the aftermath of the global 
financial crisis and economic recession, Vietnam’s leaders recognized the need to push 
ahead with liberalization in order to deepen the integration process and attract FDI to 
increase the economy’s competitiveness (Le 2012). Like all its previous trade reforms, 
Vietnam’s FTA strategy was expected to expand domestic and external markets for the 
development of production and exports, enhancing the quality and effectiveness of 
investment attraction, and facilitating domestic restructuring (Congthuongbentre 2012). In 
addition, the FTAs could contribute to restructuring and diversifying Vietnam’s exports, 
building market-based institutions for economic development, and enhancing Vietnam’s 
capacity to respond to changes in the global economy (Congthuongbentre 2012).  
Secondly, an FTA strategy was needed to meet domestic demands for development and 
reform. The FTA policy supported domestic economic policy, which focused on export-
oriented industrialization for the 10-year period 2011-2020 (Le 2012). Domestic 
institutional reforms that would be facilitated by these FTAs are considered key for 
improving the business and legal environment as it regulates new trade issues, such as 
government procurement, investor protection, and ensuring legal transparency.  
Thirdly, in terms of coverage, the FTAs aimed to diversify Vietnam’s trading partners. 
They were intended to catalyse an expansion beyond the traditional neighboring region of 
East Asia, which at the time dominated Vietnam’s trade. In 2017, ASEAN, China, Japan, 
and South Korea accounted for 81.9 per cent of total imports and 52.3 per cent of total 
exports owing to low transport costs because of geographical proximity (Customs Online 
2018). The leadership considered such economic dependence not only as an opportunity but 
also a risk given complicated and fast-changing regional political and economic context. 
Economically, fluctuations in these markets could cause growth reduction, reduced input 
for production, workers’ income and trade, and balance of trade and payment. Politically, 
trade could also be used to create political pressure. For instance, in retaliation for 
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Vietnam’s request to remove an oil drilling rig (HD-981) from Vietnam’s exclusive 
economic zone in 2014, China requested its SOEs to stop doing business in Vietnam 
(Nguyen and Ngo 2014). The CPV Central Committee promulgated Resolution No 06 
dated 5/11/2016 to speed up the process of diversification and multi-lateralization of 
economic relationships to ensure economic self-reliance (Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of Vietnam 2016). Thus, if in the 1990s, the diversification policy aimed 
to break from political and economic isolation, in the 2000s, this policy emphasized 
avoiding excessive concentration in one region for both political and economic stability 
purposes.   
Fourthly, instead of being subject to external pressures from trading partners - as seen in the 
WTO accession, AFTA and the ASEAN-centred FTAs - Vietnam could be more 
autonomous in selecting its trading partners and be in a better position to negotiate 
successfully to advance both its strategic political and economic interests. Vietnam has 
signed FTAs with those countries that supply important goods and investment and which 
have large trade with Vietnam, such as South Korea and Japan. FTAs with these countries 
offer a higher trade liberalization rate compared with the ASEAN ones, providing more 
market access than reliance on the ASEAN FTA network offers. Vietnam’s FTAs also 
focussed on major trading partners and developed economies such as the EU and the United 
States where Vietnam’s products were competitive, high-value added and could achieve 
high rates of growth. In addition, Vietnam signed FTAs with potential and traditional 
markets such as Russia, Eastern Europe, Africa, and Latin America (Le 2012). Thus, thanks 
to increased economic capacity, Vietnam was in a better position to participate actively in 
FTAs. 
The choices to enter a FTA with a country were also based on consideration of Vietnam’s 
geopolitical interests. Vietnam attached importance to countries in G77, the five permanent 
members of the UN Security Council,8 and members of the G20,9 which accounts for about 
85 per cent of gross world product and 80 per cent of world trade) (Nguyen 2011). 
                                                
7 The G7 is an informal bloc of industrialized democracies – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
United Kingdom and the US. 
8 Interview with official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2016. 
9 An international forum for the governments and central bank governors from 20 major economies, founded 
in 1999.  
 
 63 
Maintaining strong economic relations with these major developed countries would assist 
Vietnam to build ties with economies that exercised strong political and economic power 
globally. In total, Vietnam has 15 completed and on-going FTA negotiations with 58 
countries, out of which 17 belong to the G20, and all members of the G7.10 The FTAs are a 
means to strengthening relationships and serve security interests by enhancing economic 
security, diversifying markets, and implementing foreign policy by balancing major 
powers. 
Despite potential economic benefits, however, the negotiation of the FTAs has threatened 
to exert potentially negative economic impacts on the Vietnamese economy. While the 
earlier FTAs raised concerns relating to conventional trade barriers such as tariffs and 
quotas, the new FTAs would impose high reform costs relating to domestic regulatory and 
institutional systems such as requirements for intellectual property rights and environmental 
standards. Recent studies carried out by domestic and international research institutes and 
scholars have expressed concerns about the risk of failure and bankruptcy because of 
weakness in Vietnam’s traditional sectors (Nguyen and Nguyen 2014, Pham, Trinh et al. 
2016). For instance, agricultural products such as pork and chicken, vulnerable groups such 
rural farmers, and weak manufacturing firms would face much stiffer competition than 
previously. The institutional requirements of the FTAs could increase the adjustment costs 
for both the government and firms. Overcoming these challenges and taking advantage of 
opportunities would again prove politically challenging. 
Like the WTO accession, the signing of new generation FTAs required significant 
institutional changes as well as creating ‘winners’ and ‘losers’, which caused internal 
conflicts of interest. For some sectoral and industry interests, the FTAs were expected to 
bring many benefits. For example, exporters such as the fishery associations were expected 
to obtain an advantage over their trade competitors owing to reduced tariff rates in the 
FTAs.11 Yet, certain industries could face difficulties arising from participation in a FTA. 
Even within the agriculture sector, the horticultural and livestock industries would be under 
pressure from competition from imports from the United States or Australia.  
                                                
10 Interview with official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2016.  
11 Interview with official from the VASEP in 2016. 
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The government’s strategy to reach a compromise between these conflicting domestic 
economic interests was varied. Its positions in the trade negotiations were directed toward 
selective protection. This policy took the form of ‘infant industry protection’, where 
domestic sectors that were weak but had potential for development and competitiveness in 
the future were prioritized (Prime Minister 2015). However, the business community 
perceived the government’s trade strategy to be uneven: willing to liberalize in some 
previously sensitive areas such as agriculture, forestry, and fisheries, while others received 
ongoing protection (VCCI 2015). The most protected products were salt, sugar, eggs, and 
cigarettes, which remained subject to tariff quotas. The extent of ongoing protectionism 
was, therefore, quite significant, owing to the careful and cautious behavior and attitude of 
the top leadership of the CPV and the state.  
3.7 Conclusion  
This chapter has presented a historical sketch of the process of progressive yet ultimately 
dramatic trade liberalization in Vietnam, identifying the ideas and interests that underlay its 
trade choices. The chapter has shown that Vietnam’s trade policy underwent transformation 
from an isolated trade actor to an active trade player, initially via unilateral reforms then 
through participation in the ASEAN-based regional agreement, global engagement via the 
WTO and then more assertive negotiations for high-standard regional agreements. This 
shift towards a liberalised trade policy framework was the result of a set of strategic 
calculations in which the state balanced difficult choices around costs and benefits. Where 
there was expected vulnerability in the face of external competitive pressures and/or risks 
of losing state authority and autonomy, it engaged in only limited liberalization. However, 
it also attached importance to the opportunities to transform Vietnam’s economic structure, 
improve the business environment, augment the country’s competitiveness, and secure 
access to large regional and global markets. These trade-offs occurred at every step of the 
process, where advantages were seized and disadvantages had to be politically managed. 
There was also a distributional politics within Vietnam to be managed, as liberalization 
created winners and losers whose needs had to be balanced. 
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Vietnam’s move from an isolated trade player to accelerated liberalization and active player 
in negotiating trade agreements requires more detailed explanation. What were the trade 
policy preferences of the key domestic actors? How were certain groups able to shape 
policymaking in their favor? How did the distinct constellation of interests, ideas, and 
institutions influence the shallow but progressive process of liberalization and policy 
reform? The following chapters present answers to these questions in greater detail by 
analysing the domestic politics of competition among relevant actors for influence, and the 
interests and ideas behind their behaviours. The next chapter examines the communist 










This chapter begins the system analysis of development of Vietnam’s trade policy 
processes looking at the role and influence of the most important actor, the state. Given 
Vietnam, a socialist-communist country starting to join the capitalist crafted trade 
agreements, a number of questions are raised: How have state policymaking processes 
evolved as Vietnam has moved towards a more open trade policy? What were the key ideas 
and interests of state actors and how did these shape trade policymaking processes? How 
have different factions of the state adopted different positions and how has conflict and 
compromise between these outcomes? Specifically which actors brought distributive 
conflicts and how the communist party handled pressures of interests groups given 
Vietnam’s intensive trade agreements? 
The chapter argues that despite the varied interests of Vietnamese state actors, national 
economic development was the dominant interest underlying trade reform and prevailed 
over institutional goals and sectoral interests. The CPV and government leadership’s 
consistent approach to trade liberalization pushed the country toward deepening integration 
with the region and global economy. While Vietnamese trade policy showed continuity in 
the prominent role of the CPV, several reforms to policymaking processes necessitated by 
the liberalization process impacted on how the party approached trade agreements. First, 
the state became relatively more pluralistic, with an increasing number of agencies and 
organizations involved owing to the expanding number of issues associated with trade 
 
 67 
agreements. This emerging pluralism diffused power amongst state actors, reducing the 
monopoly power of the Ministry of Trade while increasing the role of relevant ministries 
and agencies, which gained opportunities to become involved in the policymaking process. 
An increasing number of new reformed minded coalitions comprising of CPV and 
government leaders and bureaucrats hence was facilitated to emerge during the process of 
negotiation of trade agreements due to their change of perceptions about diplomatic and 
economic benefits from the open economy policy. 
At the same time, weak internal coordination amongst government agencies resulted in 
fragmented policymaking. This situation created opportunities for the protection of 
politically powerful interest groups, resulting in internal divisions within the state in terms 
of policy preferences. Third, bureaucratic agencies increased their influence relative to 
party bodies because they possessed the technical capacities required to manage complex 
trade negotiations. Fourth, the state’s ideas and interests changed from placing top priority 
on political and foreign policy interests towards more weight being given to economic 
considerations. The chapter begins by describing the institutional setting within the state 
before analysing the transformation of the state’s interests and ideas. Finally, the chapter 
discusses the contestation between competing interest groups on trade policy issues.  
4.2 Institutional arrangements for Vietnamese trade policymaking 
The institutional arrangements for Vietnam’s trade policymaking have displayed both 
continuity and transformation in facilitating the move towards trade liberalization. While 
the role of the CPV has remained paramount, there have been changes in the institutions of 
trade policymaking. The predominantly top-down structure has shifted to a mixture of top-
down and bottom-up along with a transition from a state monopoly over policymaking to a 
more participatory and pluralistic setup. 
The most significant characteristic of Vietnam’s political regime has been, and remains, the 
paramount role of the CPV, which has maintained control since the establishment of the 
country in 1945. The CPV’s National Congress is the most important political institution, 
laying out strategic directions for the country’s development in general and for international 
trade in particular. Within the CPV, the Standing Committee and the Politburo members, 
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elected by the National Congress every five years, represent the ‘core’ of party decision-
making (Government Online News 2017). The Politburo is tasked with deciding the 
guidelines shaping all issues relating to foreign policy and is responsible to the Central 
Committee in that task (CPV 2011). For example, the Politburo and the Central Committee 
ratified the resolution approving the signing of important trade agreements such as the 
WTO and the TPP, before submitting these to the National Assembly for ratification (Inter-
sector Steering Committee on International Economic Integration 2015). As such, decisions 
relating to international trade agreements are made at the central level under the close 
supervision of the top leadership of the CPV.  
Another significant characteristic of the policymaking process is the principle of 
‘democratic centralism’ (CPV 2011), which mandates consensus rather than majoritarian 
decision-making. Inside the Politburo, this rule is applied such that group consensus must 
be reached before a final decision is made, which is achieved through free discussion. In 
situations when one or more members of the Politburo dissent from a proposal, consensus 
mechanisms often require further study to be carried out.12 The principle of a collective 
approach combined with personal responsibility to the leadership is a core value of the CPV 
and is designed to ensure that no single figure becomes dominant in political decision-
making.  
One of the important implications of the supreme role of the communist party is the degree 
of consistency in policymaking that it has produced. The economic policy trajectory has 
consistently moved towards greater openness and economic integration since the ‘Doi Moi’ 
economic renovation policy of 1986. With the long-term goal of economic development, 
the leadership has successfully maintained this policy agenda for three decades. In addition, 
the economic achievements that resulted from opening markets ensured that the party 
remained committed to regional and global integration at an accelerating pace in recent 
years as reflected in the WTO accession, ASEAN-centred FTAs and new generation FTAs.  
With the removal of the state’s monopoly over trade and the expanding and increasingly 
complicated issues covered by trade agreements, trade policymaking has also no longer 
                                                
12 Interview with official from the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam in 2015. 
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been controlled exclusively by the Ministry of Trade.13 Rather it is now made with the 
involvement of a large number of relevant ministries and agencies although the Ministry of 
Trade remains the principal bureaucratic agency and plays a leading role in coordinating 
with other ministries and agencies. The Ministry is authorized by the Prime Minister to 
initiate, carry out studies, make proposals for negotiations, and sign bilateral, multilateral, 
and regional trade agreements (GoV 2012). In particular, the Ministry is also tasked with 
consulting the relevant ministries about negotiations for trade agreements. For instance, in 
preparing proposals for trade negotiation, the Ministry has to consult the different views of 
concerned agencies before submitting them to the Prime Minister. While the head of trade 
delegations is the Vice-Minister of Trade, other members are normally the deputy heads of 
the international cooperation departments of relevant agencies. 
Each relevant ministry is responsible for elements of the negotiation pertinent to their 
administrative jurisdiction and expertise. For instance, the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment is in charge of issues relating to the services trade, the Ministry of Finance is in 
charge of tariff concessions, while the Ministry of Industry and Trade (merging former 
Ministry of Trade and Ministry of Industry in 2009) is responsible for not only exports and 
imports but also consolidation of sector negotiation plans as well as taking primary 
responsibility for the conduct of negotiations. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is concerned 
with strategic and political considerations including evaluations of the conformity of the 
treaty with national interests and foreign policy. The Ministry of Justice provides legal 
opinions (National Assembly 2006). Finally, depending on the coverage of the proposed 
trade agreement, the relevant agencies may include the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, and the Ministry of Labor, 
Invalids and Social Affairs. The three key ministries that are always consulted are the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Ministry of National 
Defense.14 Trade policymaking through this consultation process ensures conformity of 
trade policy with broad policy direction and introduces ‘bureaucratic pluralism’ into the 
CPV’s single party system.  
                                                
13  The Ministry of Trade was merged with the Ministry of Industry and renamed the Ministry of Industry and 
Trade (MOIT) in 2009.  
14 Interview with official from the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam in 2015. 
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When disagreements occur among government agencies, the Prime Minister consults 
different agencies for solutions. Until agreement is reached, the official communist party 
sections of the recommending agency submit the proposal to the Politburo for 
consideration. The Politburo can organize a meeting with relevant ministries to listen to the 
latter’s explanations, on which the Political Bureau members will then discuss. In such 
meetings, the role of the Prime Minister is equal to that of other Political Bureau 
members.15 Thus, the central party channel exercises close supervision and leadership over 
the executive branch regarding the trade policymaking process during the processes of 
initiation, proposal, planning and negotiation of trade agreements.  
                                                
15 Interview with official from the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam in 2015. 
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Table 4-1: Responsibilities of relevant ministries/agencies for trade agreement 
negotiation and implementation  
Relevant ministries/agencies Roles and responsibilities 
1.Decision to start negotiation The President or the Government (to be directed by the 
Standing Committee of the National 
Assembly/National Assembly) 
2. Negotiation  The Government  
Ministry of Industry and Trade Chair, coordinate to prepare negotiation plans covering 
all areas and to negotiate trade-related services. A 
Deputy Trade minister heads the trade negotiations, 
while a trade director-general level will act as deputy 
head. 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs  A director-general level will act as deputy head of trade 
negotiation; also manages political and diplomatic 
issues 
Ministry of Planning and 
Investment  
Negotiation of investment issues and investment-
related disputes 
Ministry Science and 
Technology 
Negotiation of intellectual property issues 
Ministry of Communication and 
Information 
Negotiation of telecommunication and postal services 
regulations 
Ministry of Tourism Negotiation of tourism services 
Ministry of Finance  Tariff reductions 
Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development 
Negotiation of agricultural issues and sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) regulations 
Ministry of Labour, Invalids and 
Social Affairs 
Labour, movement of natural persons 
Ministry of Natural Resource 
and Environment 
Environmental issues  
 




State Bank of Vietnam Financial services 
Ministry of National Defence 
and Ministry of Public Security 
Goods and services relating to national defence and 
security 
3. Signing and approval By the President or the Prime Minister  
Rectification By the National Assembly in case of conflict with 
current legal documents or not provided in any legal 
documents 
4. Implementation  The Government  
Source: Compiled by author from the Law on signing, accession and implementation of 
International Treaty 2005; Decision no 30/2003/QD-TTg dated 21/2/2003 issued Working 
Regulations of the Government negotiation delegation on international trade and economics 
and the VCCI’s study on Solutions to strengthen effective enterprise consultation in FTA’s 




Third, to facilitate the negotiation of trade agreements, both the party leadership and the 
involved ministries have improved their technical capacity in trade negotiations. During its 
negotiations for AFTA and WTO membership, the Vietnamese government did not have 
access to high-capacity trade advisors because of a lack of domestic knowledge of 
international trade rules and practices.16 Its trade negotiators were trained in socialist 
countries and thus mainly had experience in handling socialist, rather than market-based, 
trade agreements (Tran, Vu et al. 2015). The complex nature of trade issues forced the 
bureaucracies to invest in technical capacity, opening opportunities for younger, Western-
educated government staff and academics to be involved in policymaking. The result was 
an improved understanding of the negotiation and implementation of trade agreements. 
This was particularly catalyzed by the complex WTO accession process and regional FTAs. 
Thus, the shifting character of the trade bureaucracy toward technocrats helped to narrow 
the knowledge gap between Vietnam and its trading partners, increasing its capacity to 
engage in making new trade agreements (Palmujoki 2007).   
Fourth, new state institutions were established to facilitate trade policymaking. The first 
working groups were established to conduct feasibility studies for FTAs, including the 
Vietnam-South Korea FTA in 2009, the TPP in 2010, and the Vietnam-European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) in 2011 (Vietnam - Member States of the European Free Trade 
Association 2011). These feasibility studies reviewed bilateral trade and investment 
relationships between Vietnam and its trading partners, analyzed the agreements’ strength, 
weaknesses, opportunities, and challenges (SWOT), and proposed areas for discussion and 
consideration upon mutual agreement to negotiate an FTA. Because of confidentiality 
reasons that might have affected the negotiation process, the feasibility study of the TPP 
was not disclosed to the public, but those for the Vietnam–EFTA and Vietnam–South 
Korea FTA were published. These studies were also provided to the partner governments 
for consideration and direction (Vietnam - Member States of the European Free Trade 
Association 2011). Technical studies were also carried out by academics using computable 
general equilibrium (CGE) models. These studies enhanced the policymakers’ knowledge 
                                                
16 Interview with official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2015. 
 
 73 
of the potential pros and cons of trade agreements and were used for an impact analysis of 
both the Vietnam-EU FTA (Philip, Laurenza et al. 2011) and the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) on Vietnam’s economy (Dordi, Nguyen et al. 2015). These 
studies reflected an institutional improvement compared with the poor information 
available during AFTA and BTA negotiations in 1990s.   
Despite these improvements, some traditional institutional settings created constraints on 
concluding trade agreements. First, because of technical limitations in the feasibility 
studies, negotiators struggled to quantify the potential benefits or losses from particular 
aspects of the agreements. For example, during the WTO accession there was a lack of 
quantitative studies that provided a full analysis of costs and benefits and recommendations 
for the extent of concessions. Hence, policymakers had to make qualitative and informal 
assessments which, according to Vietnam’s chief BTA trade negotiators, were of a very 
provisional nature (Viet 2005). Thus, policymakers were sometimes required to make 
commitments with only a partial knowledge of their impacts. These institutional capacity 
constraints, which were more pronounced for Vietnam than its (typically developed 
country) partners, posed a major challenge to its effective participation in trade 
negotiations.  
Secondly, there was a lack of coordination between the external trade negotiators who took 
the initiative for negotiating trade agreements, and domestic trade regulators (Thanhnien 
Daily 2015), which resulted in delayed trade liberalization. While the trade negotiators 
actively committed to high standards in an increasing number of trade agreements, the 
domestic trade regulators proved relatively slower in adopting market-based rules and 
reforms. The slow adoption of market reforms domestically was caused by local and 
sectoral interests, and protection of individuals and agencies within the state’s mechanism 
according to National Assembly delegates in the National Assembly hearings with the 
ministers in 2016 (Nguyen 2016).  
The role of Vietnam’s National Assembly was also important in the law-making required to 
implement trade agreements domestically. Article 83 of the Constitution provides that the 
National Assembly decides basic external and internal policies, and ratifies or nullifies 
international treaties (Vietnam Constitution 2001). The National Assembly was thus 
 
 74 
required to ratify trade agreements that mandated changes to the legal system, such as the 
bilateral agreement with the United States and the WTO accession package and the TPP. 
The National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee and National Assembly delegates, 
based on the government’ statements and feasibility studies, would investigate, examine, 
verify and query the relevant ministries and agencies about particular trade agreements 
(Vietnamnet News 2018).  
Nonetheless, the National Assembly’s role is different from that of the US Congress, which 
is constitutionally tasked with legislative responsibility for implementing trade agreements. 
Unlike in the United States, in Vietnam, political authority is centralized in the CPV, which 
then delegates decisions to state bodies. Supreme power over trade agreements rests with 
the Politburo, while the Prime Minister and the Government only have responsibility for 
negotiating and implementing trade agreements following its instruction, while the National 
Assembly ratifies the agreements.  
The National Assembly was mainly involved in amendment and ratification of domestic 
laws and international trade agreements. It took only two weeks for the protocol of access 
to the WTO to be ratified by the National Assembly on 29/11/2006 (National Assembly 
2006) since the Government’s submission of the statement on 15/11/2006 (GoV 2006), 
which ostensibly was supposed to consult with and consider possible negative impacts for 
relevant stakeholders. Such an approval process is dramatically quicker, and less rigorous, 
than in other countries. For example, it took almost four years for South Korean lawmakers 
to approve in 2011 the free trade agreement concluded with the U.S in 2007 (voanews 
2011). During this period of consideration, the National Assembly considered various 
aspects of the FTA, and dealt with protests, and opposition parties.  
The interaction between the government and academics, international organizations and 
trading partners contributed to an acceleration in the process of trade liberalization. Access 
to new trade policy knowledge occurred by learning lessons and experiences from other 
countries, advisors from think tanks, and experimentation by government officials. 
Vietnamese officials also drew on experience from the newly industrialized countries in 
East Asia in relation to, for example, the promotion of foreign investment and the adoption 
of export-oriented strategies (G.Tarr 2009). The policy to join certain trade agreements 
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could not be made on the basis of economic modelling and feasibility studies alone (as in 
Western countries) because of a domestic lack of technical skills and knowledge. Instead, 
studies of how other countries with similar political and economic systems (such as China) 
or geographical proximity (such as the ASEAN states) engaged in trade liberalization were 
a major source of knowledge for Vietnamese policymakers. China’s WTO accession was 
an especially pertinent example for Vietnam. Immediately following its WTO accession, 
investment flows surged into China’s economy, helping to promote trade liberalization and 
creating a political consensus for further economic integration with Western countries. 
China’s experience was viewed by Vietnamese policymakers as one that the country could 
successfully emulate (Nguyen 2005). 
In sum, the institutional settings for trade policymaking in Vietnam evolved and gradually 
transformed from a top-down approach, during the period of central planning, to a system 
that combined top-down control from the CPV with the bottom-up participation by 
involved stakeholders. While these bottom-up mechanisms are yet to grow to the levels 
seen in developed countries, they mark a major shift in how Vietnamese trade policy had 
operated in comparison with only a few decades earlier. These institutional transformations 
enabled policymakers to implement the trade liberalization process flexibly. 
4.3 Ideas and ideologies underlying the state’s approach to trade 
policy 
Alongside these institutional reforms, the trade policy ideas and interests of the state 
similarly evolved. The most significant was a change in the CPV’s worldview of Vietnam’s 
position in the regional and global economies, which led to a repositioning of international 
trade policy as a core element of the national development agenda.  
External changes in the international system initially drove the leadership to focus on 
economic development and favor trade liberalization. The CPV leadership was sensitive to 
world geopolitical and geo-economic trends of the time. During the 1990s, they realized 
that economic openness and globalization had become a dominant global trend, and that 
trade agreements had become a key requirement for success in the global economy. 
Vietnam was fortunately located in the most dynamic economic region in the world, with a 
 
 76 
rising China and Asian tigers such as Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Korea having recently 
experienced periods of high-speed growth and industrialization. The success of Vietnam’s 
neighbors was based on an economic model where exports and foreign investments were 
used as the engine of economic development, which Vietnamese elites sought to emulate by 
adopting their own liberalizing reforms. This was reflected in the strong emphasis on 
improving exports as the core goal of foreign economic policy, and on attracting foreign 
investment and official development assistance (ODA). The ‘open door’ policy would 
create a growth model based on the export of natural resources, low-cost labor-based 
processing industries, and a lasting role for SOEs (Dang 2012).  
When the Soviet Union was dissolved in 1991, Vietnam’s economy was badly damaged 
first by economic collapse of its main (socialist) trade partners and the drying-up of aid, 
which was compounded by the trade embargo imposed by the United States until 1994. In 
its wake, the CPV leadership identified an urgent need to re-establish relationships with the 
non-socialist world and to develop new markets to replace those lost with the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. Trade liberalization began to be viewed as a part of an overall ‘open 
door’ foreign economic policy, which included an openness to foreign investment and 
participation in multilateral economic institutions such as the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank (Party's Central Executive Committee 1992). Vietnam’s efforts to join 
the international economic system saw it subsequently apply for membership of ASEAN, 
APEC, and the WTO. 
As the influence of an increasing number of international and regional linkages mounted, in 
1996 Vietnam initiated, and then gradually developed, a formal international economic 
integration policy. The CPV assessed the importance of globalization as “an objective 
trend, attracting an increasing number of participating countries, having both negative and 
positive aspects, containing both cooperation and struggle aspects” (The 8th VCP National 
Congress 1996). This policy explicitly recognised that economic isolation was not a viable 
option for a small and developing economy and advocated an export-oriented and open 
economic system that could benefit from integration with regional and global partners (The 
8th VCP National Congress 1996). The international economic integration policy gradually 
expanded in its geographic scope: from a focus on regional integration through AFTA and 
ASEAN-centred FTAs in the early 1990s to the global level with WTO accession in 2007. 
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Together with these changing perspectives about the world, the leaders reinterpreted 
socialist ideology to adapt to the new requirements of international economic integration. 
First, a doctrine known as ‘new international economic thinking’ emerged as an adaptation 
to new trading relationships. Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach advocated the principle of 
coexistence between capitalist and socialist systems (Porter 1990). This approach differed 
from the previous view of capitalist countries as the enemy and the capitalist international 
system an object of struggle. Secondly, the market economy was explained not as a product 
of capitalism but rather as a feature of any commodity-based economy, which could co-
exist with different political regimes including socialist ones. Accordingly, the state’s 
ownership over the means of production transformed, allowing different types of ownership 
beyond the state and facilitating the development of the private sector.  
As stated in the 6th VCP National Congress in 1986, this change in the socialist ideology 
led to the establishment of a “socialist-oriented multi-sectorial economy under the state’s 
management and party’s leadership” (CPV 2006), which laid the foundation for the 
development of the socialist-market economy. This economic model operates in line with 
market economy rules and ensures a socialist orientation in keeping with each phase of 
national development, as explained by the former Trade Minister Truong Dinh Tuyen 
(Truong 2015). Although this view continued to emphasize the role of the state and the 
party in the economy, it opened a new path for economic growth and private sector 
development.  
This discursive shift was instrumental in enabling the CPV to overcome ideological 
difficulties posed by the transition to participation in the global capitalist system. It also 
facilitated economic cooperation with major powers like the United States that had 
previously been considered as capitalist and imperialist enemies. In addition, it facilitated 
the acceptance of international trade rules such as the national treatment principle, and 
hence for the first time allowed for the legal protection of some rights for foreign investors. 
Thus, ideological changes facilitated Vietnam’s international economic integration process 
and particularly its participation in trade agreements. 
In practice, however, the new market-based economic system had to be implemented in a 
way compatible with the maintenance of state socialism and CPV rule. State-owned 
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economic sectors were to continue playing a major role in achieving socialist objectives, 
economic autonomy and the country’s independence (The 11th CPV National Congress 
2011). With a view to building SOEs so as to be competitive with foreign multinational 
corporations, the CPV leadership merged many SOEs to establish 10 ‘state economic 
corporations’ on a pilot basis in 2009. These corporations were in the key sectors such as 
energy, telecommunications, coal, mineral resources, finance and insurance, textiles and 
garments, rubber, and oil (GoV 2009).  
More specifically, it is the CPV that wished to maintain and promote its communist 
ideology and regime interests, especially during the period of international economic 
integration with the capitalist world. Accordingly, the Prime Minister was expected to build 
strong SOEs, economic corporations/groups of the economy, similar to South Korea’s 
Chaebol, which received government’s intervention and support and drove the national 
economic development. But in Vietnam case, these economic groups were run by the state. 
The state mobilized and distributed rich financial, land, management, and human resources 
to the SOEs, and state’s economic groups, while the private sector were in their own 
nascent development process. Such a development of the state economy would build the 
socialism because the formulation of the state capitalist comprises ¾ of the socialism, 
according the interpretation of V.I. Lenin’s philosophy by the Vice Chairman of the 
National Assembly who is also a member of the Central Committee of the CPV (Phung 
2018). Hence, the prominent role of the state in Vietnam is in line with the state theory that 
argues that the state is “the principal agents” and creates necessary conditions for “global 
capital accumulation” (Barrow 2005). Thus, the maintenance of socialism alongside 
engagement in global capitalist markets reflected an ongoing desire for autonomy and the 
state’s prominent role in making international trade policy.  
4.4 Changing state interests and preferences  
International trade policy was also sensitive to the domestic political concerns of the state. 
The state’s interests refer to economic development and foreign policy objectives as well as 
political stability and regime legitimacy of the CPV. These interests have transformed and 
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emerged as dominant from time to time depending on the change in the CPV leaders’ 
awareness of domestic demands as well as the historical context.   
• Economic interests: Similar to other developing countries, Vietnam wanted to 
leverage opportunities from foreign markets to promote industrialization and growth 
(Luu 2012). According to the CPV, the objectives of liberalization were to “expand 
markets, take advantage of capital, technology, management knowledge to 
accelerate modernization, industrialization in the socialist direction” (Politburo 
2001). An open economy was expected to create new opportunities, diversify 
markets with high preferential treatments, enable deeper participation in global 
production networks and supply chains, contribute comprehensively to domestic 
reforms, reduce the processing sector of the economy, and shape rules to protect 
national interests (Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam 2016).  
• Motivating domestic economic restructuring and transformation in Vietnam’s 
growth model: Although economic liberalization was initiated and proactively 
implemented by the government, policymakers acknowledged that integration with 
the world economy acted as a lever for reform. This thinking and interest emerged 
as a result of the negotiation of trade agreements, especially the WTO accession 
negotiations. Policymakers realized that meeting the WTO’s transparency 
requirements for management institutions contributed to improving the business 
environment (Nguyen 2005, Nguyen 2006). Trade agreements set high demands for 
not only domestic firms but also the government, especially in terms of improving 
competitiveness. Meeting these demands required the government to implement 
institutional reforms. Thus, international economic integration acted as motivation 
for economic reforms and growth promotion for a self-reliant economy (QDND 
2017).  
• Foreign policy objectives: In 1991, the Vietnamese government shifted from a 
socialist-focused to a multilateral foreign policy in order to build a self-reliant 
economy and independent foreign policy following the collapse of the Soviet Union 
(The 7th VCP National Congress 1991). Trade agreements played a major role in 
this agenda as a means to strengthen broader diplomatic relationships with partner 
countries. Indeed, many of Vietnam’s FTA partners have been close political allies. 
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It was the first Southeast Asian country to sign an FTA with the Eurasian Economic 
Union (EAEU) in 2015, which was built on its longstanding strategic relationship 
with Russia. Vietnam has also sought to build links to the United States (via the 
TPP), the EU, South Korea and Japan (through bilateral FTAs), and with Southeast 
Asian partners (through AFTA and RCEP). Indeed, in some cases foreign policy 
interests prevailed over economic considerations For example, the FTAs with Chile 
and Turkey have few economic benefits because of low trade volumes but were 
seen as a way to cement important diplomatic relationships (Cassing, Trewin et al. 
2010). In this way, trade reform also functioned as a part of foreign policy, 
enhancing Vietnam’s role and position in the world arena by strengthening 
relationships with major powers and economies. 
• Regime legitimacy: Regime legitimacy is one of the interests that the CPV pursues 
through its economy liberalization efforts. The high-speed growth achieved by the 
newly opened economy rather than pure reliance on the political ideology of 
socialism was considered a way to build regime legitimacy. This objective was 
gained by ensuring Vietnam did not lag economically compared to other regional 
countries and allowing the party thus to claim legitimacy as a developmental actor 
(The Communist Party of Vietnam 2007). This logic first emerged when the CPV 
carried out the Doi Moi economic renovation in 1986 when regime legitimacy was 
at risk given internal economic crises (Keough 2016). The comprehensive and 
deepening trade liberalization in the following decades continued to strengthen 
regime legitimacy owing to high economic growth resulting from trade and 
investment openness. Thus, the communist party state was able to respond in a 
politically effective self-interested way to the rise of globalization. 
In many cases, the political and economic motives behind Vietnam’s trade reforms have 
tended to coincide. However, in some instances reforms were driven principally by political 
objectives, while in other cases economic concerns have been paramount. These competing 
interests needed to be balanced. For example, joining AFTA was a compulsory condition 
for Vietnam to become an ASEAN member, which was a strategically important step in 
implementing its post-Cold War foreign policy. But at the same time the economic interests 
in AFTA participation were unclear as this was the first time Vietnam had joined a regional 
 
 81 
FTA. As a result, leaders were hesitant to make strong commitments in AFTA – despite the 
foreign policy motives for doing so – which slowed its trade reform process.17 Similarly, 
the decision to access the WTO was driven primarily by the strategic and political interest 
in becoming a member of a world trade forum. Indeed, its economic rationale was 
contested owing to the perception that Vietnamese firms might lose out because of their 
comparatively low levels of competitiveness.18    
In sum, the transformation of the state’s interests greatly influenced trade policymaking. 
First, the national interest with respect to trade changed from prioritizing security in a Cold 
War context to national economic development in the context of globalization. This change 
was stimulated by the domestic economic crisis of the late 1980s until mid-1990s. The 
external environment also facilitated the change. War morphed into peace and the 
economic development, and international trade rules guided the direction of national 
economic reforms. This change was further consolidated by Vietnam’s successful 
economic achievements as reflected in the high GDP growth rate of almost 9% from 1993-
1997 (Belser 2016). Since this time, decisions to join trade agreements have attached 
continually increasing importance to economic considerations, such as market access, 
attracting FDI, and facilitating domestic economic reforms for national development. Thus, 
the efforts to close the development gap by trading with the major economies and the world 
have stimulated and sustained the trade liberalization process. 
4.5 Trade policy debates between competing groups within the state 
Vietnam’s trade liberalization process opened up the policymaking process to a much wider 
range of state agencies. Moreover, the uneven distributional impacts of liberalization meant 
that there were major differences between the interests of these agencies. Although the 
overall economic impact of trade liberalization was positive, the underlying reason for 
Vietnam’s adoption of a gradual approach to liberalization was the need to balance the 
interests of different actors within the state to avoid the emergence of concerted opposition 
to the reform program. 
                                                
17 Interview with diplomatic official of the Vietnam Embassy to Algeria, through Skype in 2017. 
18 Interview with official from the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam in 2015. 
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Internal divisions within the state played a prominent role in shaping the development of 
trade policy. Broadly speaking, the state was in transitional period with a mix of different 
attitudes. While the national leaders are keen on reforms and open trade policy, the lower 
level bureaucrats (directors and deputy directors) are more diversified with quick, slow and 
reluctant adapters. The underlying issues that influenced the positions of these groups were 
the impact of trade liberalization on their authority, power, ideas, mind-set, preferences and 
interests and the legacy of command and control political system and practices.  
The central CPV and government leadership which, adopting a whole-of-country and 
strategic view, were committed to what they perceived to be the national interest in trade 
reform (i.e., economic and geopolitical benefits from opening the market and integrating 
into the global economy). They were confident that national economic performance as well 
as the competitiveness of national and domestic enterprises could be increased through this 
process (Vuong 2016). The leaders’ attitude was important for several ‘breakthrough’ trade 
policy decisions such as joining the TPP and the WTO. The determination to reform moved 
up a level when the 12th CPV National Congress in 2016 launched the second economic 
renovation (the first one was initiated in 1986). This reform set a target of building the 
institutions of the socialist-oriented market economy up to the universal standard of a 
modern and internationally integrated market economy by 2020 (The 12th CPV National 
Congress 2016).  
As such, the CPV and government leaders played a key role in moving trade policy towards 
liberalization by integrating and implementing the international trade rules and ideas, 
agreed during external trade negotiations, into domestic policy regimes. Once institutions 
associated with these external commitments were established, it would prove difficult for 
domestic opponents to resist the direction of reform. For example, it would prove very 
costly to overturn commitments made in Vietnam’s bilateral and regional FTAs because 
these treaty commitments were enforced by international law. Vietnam could be subject to 
international trade dispute settlement processes if it failed to follow the committed 
provisions, particularly those of the WTO. By establishing legal commitments externally 
and new institutions internally, the reform efforts of the CPV leadership were able to ‘lock-
in’ liberalizing reforms in the face of opposition. 
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On the other hand, a certain groups of government agencies tasked with responsibility for 
certain sectors or functions (Pham 2013) – were more concerned with their sectoral 
interests. Politically, this included ensuring their autonomy and authority in areas under 
their jurisdiction, which was critical in shaping their attitude towards trade liberalization. 
For example, the reduction in non-tariff barriers such as import licenses, import quotas, or 
subsidies for exporters would directly harm the enterprises for which line ministries were 
responsible. Moreover, the capacity for line ministries to engage in regulation was also 
reduced owing to provisions such as national treatment and investor-state dispute 
settlement (ISDS) that allows foreign firms to challenge regulatory decisions through 
international arbitration.  
The question of whether these constraints constituted a ‘loss’ of state autonomy or not 
depended on how a particular part of the bureaucracy defined the scope of state functions. 
While international trade rules facilitate trade by limiting some forms of state intervention 
in the market (most notably, but not exclusively, the application of tariff protection), 
Vietnamese bureaucratic agencies could still intervene in markets in other domains. They 
could create institutional constraints such as administrative red tape and distribution of 
resources in preferential ways through the control of SOEs. As a result, many ministry-
linked firms, particularly large SOEs in sectors considered ‘strategic’, continued to receive 
resources from their line ministries on a privileged rather than a competitive basis. Some 
reform-minded figures, like the former Trade Minister Truong Dinh Tuyen, were sensitive 
to these problems and believed there was a need to transform the role of the state toward 
facilitating the market rather than clinging to older forms of state control. He argued, “it is a 
concern that the role of the state could be diminished, but that’s not true. The state has to 
change from commanding to facilitating development” (Thanhnien Daily 2015).  
State-related institutional reforms were also delayed because government staff lacked an 
understanding of how to build a modern market economy (Thanhnien Daily 2015). The 
head of the Central Institute of Economic Management stated that many officials still did 
not fully trust market mechanisms despite several decades of reform. This situation made 
Vietnam different from most members of the OECD whose governments generally believed 
in the market’s effectiveness in mobilizing and distributing economic resources 
(VnEconomy News 2015). The lack of a fundamental consensus regarding the market 
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mechanism created invisible constraints on trade liberalization as many officials were 
reluctant to implement reforms fully (Do 2016). 
In addition, the interests of bureaucracy-linked firms, predominantly large SOEs, heavily 
influenced the views of the ministries that managed them. Some SOEs were resistant to 
trade liberalization and preferred to maintain the status quo, in which they benefited from 
incentives, rather than reforming to compete fairly with the private sector. As a result, 
various forms of SOE protection were maintained for both ideological and economic 
reasons. Ideologically, the SOEs played ‘the mainstream role’ in the economy to keep 
socialism (The 11th VCP National Congress 2011). Economically, the SOEs represented 
the interests of relevant executive agencies that owned the SOEs (Vu 2014).  
In response, the state, more particularly the relevant ministries, protected the SOEs during 
the WTO accession (Pham 2013). It formed ‘State Economic Groups’ that were assembled 
by merging existing SOEs into larger and better-resourced groupings. These mergers were 
undertaken to ensure that the SOEs would be able to compete with foreign firms on a more 
equal footing following liberalizing reforms. Two prominent examples were the Vietnam 
Electricity Group and Vietnam Airlines, which accounted for 37 per cent and 80 per cent 
respectively of market share in their industries (Vu 2014). Thus, while the private sector 
received minimal protection in response to external commitments, due to lack of close 
interests with relevant groups within the state, the SOEs were considered key actors that 
needed to be strengthened to be competitive following liberalization.    
In addition to state’s protection on the ground of improving competitiveness, furthermore to 
the protection of politicians, officials, who had interest and connections with the equitized 
state companies due to their profits earned from the latter’s equitization (Gainsborough 
2010). This comes from the fact that, despite conflict of interests, the government officials 
and politicians or their relatives bought the shares of the equitized SOEs and hence had 
direct ownership and relations with the equitized SOEs. This situation takes roots from the 
equitization process of the SOEs. Similar to China, instead of privatization of SOEs, 
Vietnam’s state continued to equitize and controlled the SOEs with a controlling ownership 
of 50% or more of authorized capital and sold the remaining part to the private sector to 
mobilize the private sector’s fund (saigondautu.com.vn 2018). However, the selling process 
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was not transparent with leaders of the former SOEs buying the SOEs’ assets with 
undervalued price. The state equitization process was very slow with only about 92% of 
total SOEs being equitized and only 10% of state capital being replaced by the private 
sector since 1992 (saigondautu.com.vn 2018). This new state business and the formulation 
of equitized SOEs has become a new way for the groups within the state to pursue their 
interests. 
From an ideological perspective, certain government agencies, especially the Ministry of 
Public Security or Ministry of National Defence, opposed reform on the grounds of national 
security. Their opposition was especially apparent when Vietnam started cooperation with 
the United States, given the country’s longstanding animosity following the war. The 
implementation of the BTA with the United States was delayed for one year from 1999 to 
2000 because of the concerns of the Ministry of Public Security – responsible for national 
security issues – about the possibility of the political regime being overthrown.19 These 
ideological concerns diminished by the time of the WTO accession as years of political 
stability and economic growth since the implementation of BTA in particular, and 
economic reforms in general, reduced such concerns.20 
In addition, the government agencies were successful in protecting many import-
substituting industries in the trade agreements on the grounds of facilitating the 
development of infant industries. These industries were included in Vietnam’s general 
exception and temporary exclusion lists in AFTA, and accounted for 41 per cent of items in 
the reduction schedule in 1998 (Pham 2004). Protection in the form of long-term 
implementation schedules was also used. For example, in Vietnam’s WTO accession 
protocol, it was only after 12 years that agreed tariff cuts would fully take effect (VCCI 
2009). Other protection methods such as import quotas and licenses continued in areas of 
political sensitivity (Pham 2004).  
From an institutional perspective, the hesitant behavior of the ministries and line agencies 
could also in part be attributed to their weak technical capacity. Despite the central 
government’s explanation of the opportunities and challenges arising from participation in 
trade agreements or the WTO (GoV 2006), and feasibility studies and economic models 
                                                
19 Interview with diplomatic official of the Vietnam Embassy to Algeria, through Skype in 2017. 
20 Interview with diplomatic official of the Vietnam Embassy to Algeria, through Skype in 2017. 
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that supported trade liberalization, the costs and benefits of joining a trade agreement were 
complex and difficult to measure. As Chi Lan, an advisor to the then-Prime Minister, 
reported in 2005, this led to much uncertainty about the desirability of particular 
commitments within the trade agreements (Nguoilaodong News 2005).  
The central government used various methods to strike a compromise between these 
protectionist interests and its desire to move towards a liberalized trade regime. 
Policymakers adopted a gradual and slow approach to reform, a key element of which was 
long-term tariff removal schedules (see Table 4-2 below). The shortest time for 
implementation in Vietnam’s FTAs was 11 years, while the longest time was 21 years in 
the case of the Vietnam-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement (VJEPA). This strategy 
gave affected firms, and their supporting ministries, a very long grace period within which 




Table 4-2: Tariff removal schedules in Vietnam’s FTAs 
 Effective 
year 








1. ATIGA 1999 2018 19 98% 
2. ASEAN - China FTA  2005 2018 13 90% 
3. ASEAN - Korea FTA  2007 2018 11 86% 
4.  ASEAN - Australia - New 
Zealand FTA 
2009 2020 11 90% 
5. ASEAN - India FTA 2010 2020 11 78% 
6. ASEAN - Japan CEP  2008 2025 17 87% 
7. Vietnam - Japan EPA  2009 2026 17 92% 
8. Vietnam - China FTA  2014 2030 16 89% 
9. Vietnam - Korea FTA  2016 2031 14 88% 
10. VN-EAEU FTA 2016 2027 11 88% 
11. ASEAN FTA 1999 2018 19 97% 
12. Vietnam - Chile  2031 2016 15 89% 
13. Vietnam – Custom Union  2027 2016 11 90% 
14. Vietnam-EUFTA  Not yet signed 99% 
 
Source: Nguyen, D. T., T. T. H. Nguyen, Ken Itakura, Nguyen Thi Linh Nga and T. T. 
Nguyen (2015). The impacts of TPP and AEC on the Vietnamese Economy: 
Macroeconomic Aspects and the case of Livestock Sector. Hanoi, VEPR. 
 
This gradual approach allowed reform-minded negotiators to complete deals with trade 
partners while assuaging the concerns of the cautious views. After a gradual phase-in 
period, policymakers expected that protected domestic sectors would progressively become 
competitive without major economic adjustment costs. In addition, as argued by the 
Director-General of the International Cooperation Department of the Ministry of Finance, 
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long schedules for tariff removal reduced concerns about state budget revenue 
(tapchitaichinh 2015). The gradual approach allowed Vietnam to confidently join AFTA 
and the WTO while managing various concerns.  
Thus, similar to Stiglitz’ assessment regarding the economic role of the state that state can 
not only maintain but also can be used to restrict competition, Vietnam’s state had great 
influence to accelerate and at the same time can be used to restrict the process of joining the 
international trade agreement (Stiglitz 2003). The final state’s positions depended on the 
extents of influences of different groups within the party-state. While the central leadership 
of the party and the state generally supported the trade liberalization, certain constraints 
relating to narrow ministerial interests and coalition between the relevant ministries and 
SOEs constrained the scope and pace of this process. Yet despite the variance in interests, 
the most important national interest relating to economic development and growth 
ultimately prevailed over other narrow institutional or sectoral interests, and this 
contributed to harmonization of interests in the long run. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the role of the state in Vietnam’s trade policymaking during the 
period of its economic opening. Some persistent characteristics remained unchanged, while 
certain transformations were made to adapt to new external and internal demands. The most 
important feature was the paramount role of the CPV in providing a strategic direction for 
the country’s international economic integration policy. This policy was consistently 
maintained, albeit with adjustments over time, to cope with both advantageous and 
disadvantageous external circumstances. Importantly, the centralization of state power and 
the supreme role of the CPV were instrumental in creating a consensus in support of 
liberalization. In addition, the CPV and central state agencies transformed their interests 
and ideas towards prioritizing economic over geopolitical interests when deciding trade 
policy. 
Many changes to the trade policymaking process occurred as a result. First, policymaking 
gradually became more pluralistic, with the range of agencies involved in the process 
expanding. Bureaucratic actors increased their role as the state’s monopoly over foreign 
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trade policy was removed and there was a high demand for professional and technical 
capacity to deal with the comprehensive and complex nature of the trade issues involved. 
Secondly, new institutions were set up to facilitate the negotiation of trade agreements such 
as the working groups for FTA feasibility studies. Thirdly, institutional and professional 
constraints were gradually reduced as bureaucrats gained experience through multiple 
external trade negotiations. The initial transformation of ideas and interests catalyzed a 
change in the institutions. In turn, these new institutional arrangements allowed a 
compromise between reforming and cautious views, which enabled the successful 
implementation of liberalizing reforms.   
Most importantly, the dramatic reorientation of Vietnam’s trade policy was enabled by the 
leading role of the CPV. The international trade policy process in Vietnam continues to be 
based around a political system in which the party and state make the majority of decisions 
and societal input is relatively limited. Indeed, the pace of trade policy reform was itself a 
result of diversified views within state, with a neutralized point of view to slow the process 
to assuage the concerns of weak competitiveness and shock therapy. Although many 
studies point out that democracies are more open to trade liberalization (Oneal and Russet 
2001), Vietnam has successfully made the transition to an open and liberalized trade policy 
regime with a state-controlled and market-driven economy. The above discussion also 
highlights the fact that despite centralization and the one-party system, trade liberalization 











This chapter investigates the role of societal actors in Vietnam’s trade policymaking and 
their influence on trade policies and outcomes. The differential preferences of these actors 
are explored as the mechanisms by which they contributed to policymaking in the context 
of Vietnam’s changing approach to trade. The chapter analyses the political settlements, 
which identify informal rules, the power relations, as well as the patterns of inclusion and 
exclusion underlying the state-society relationship. It investigates the extent to which 
societal actors exercised influence on international trade policy choices by looking at 
factors such as representation, ideas, and institutions, and what strategies society actors 
employed for influencing the trade policymaking process.  
The chapter contributes to the understanding of Vietnam’s trade liberalization policy by 
explaining domestic politics relating to the demand side. It reviews the transformation of 
ways in which societal actors’ became involved in the trade policy process and explains the 
origin of societal actors’ trade preferences and how the government responded to them as 
reflected in trade policy choices. The chapter argues that while it is a common perception 
that the Vietnamese state dominates the trade policymaking, liberalizing reforms 
nonetheless opened institutional space for societal actors to gain greater access to and 
exercise influence over the policymaking process. This analysis serves as a general 
introduction to the additional case studies in Chapters 5 and 6, which assess the specific 
experiences of Vietnam’s WTO accession and its involvement in the TPP agreement.  
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5.2 The transformation of the nature of state-society relationship  
In regards to the general state-society relationship, it has been widely recognized by the 
scholars that the state-society relationship in Vietnam is intermingled, as the distinction 
between the state and society is not clearly defined (H.K.Heng 2004). This is reflected by 
the fact that in each major social sector, the state establishes, organizes and runs the mass 
organizations such as women, youth, workers, which is called the phenomenon of state 
corporatism (Kerkvliet 2001). In the international trade field, VCCI is one of such state’s 
hybrid-organizations, serving the state’ interests more than business community’s interests. 
Such nature of the relationship is, explained by Thayer, a feature of mono-organizational 
socialism (H.K.Heng 2004 citing Carlyle Thayer 1992). 
In addition to the state corporatism, the state-society relationship was asymmetric with 
more weight given to the state business due to the nature of state capitalism and less to 
private sector development. The party accepts the state capitalism, which is seen as a 
combination of state and private sector in a transitional period for more effective and 
dynamic use of resources (Phung 2018). However, foreign scholars see the state capitalism 
as a way for the state to capture partly rents through SOEs regarding, for instance, export 
activities (Christine and Vlad 2018). With the new definition of the SOEs with the state’s 
ownership being 100% (Enterprise Law in 2014) rather than 50% (Enterprise Law in 2005) 
of the total capital and the equitization and restructure of SOEs, the number of SOEs 
dropped from 5,000 (2001) to below 1,000 (2017) (Ven.vn 2017). Such definition causes 
concerns the private sector’s independence from the state and real meaning of the private 
sector in Vietnam. The remaining SOEs continued to enjoy state’s protection of the 
interests of the SOEs, in fact the state’s business interests, such as tariffs, local content 
policy, import restrictions applied for industries such as motorcycle until WTO accession in 
2007 (Lim 2018). On the other hand, the state only can utilize the SOEs as their instruments 
for political and economic purposes in the areas that these SOEs can play a leading role in 
the industries, such as the telecommunications with state’s monopoly, textile-garment with 




Beside the close relationships with the state, the SOEs also link with its industrial 
associations. For instance, the General Director of the Vietnam National Textile and 
Garment Group (VINATEX) - the biggest SOE in the textiles and garments sector - was 
also the Vice-Chairman of the Vietnam Textile and Garment Association (VITAS), whose 
relationship with the state was in indirect forms (Fujita 2017). The equitized firms, on the 
other hand, continue to maintain their personal relationships with the state for their 
influence on policy.  The SOEs further strengthen its power by establishment its mutually 
beneficial relationship with foreign directed investment enterprises to establish joint 
venture partners in strategic areas that have close relationships with the state (Lim 2018).  
In addition to state capitalism, the crony capitalism aiming at protecting crony relations also 
emerged to be persistent characteristic of the state-business relationship (Christine and 
Tarko 2018). The term ‘crony capitalism’ was officially mentioned in the World Bank for 
the first time in their report for Vietnam 2035, although the crony relationships have existed 
since the centrally planned economy (Cao, Demombynes et al. 2016). The situation has 
become prominent with commercialized relationship between interests groups among the 
equitized SOEs, private enterprises, FDI groups and government officials for the biased 
distribution of resources. For instance, the crony capitalism is evident in sectors such as 
motorcycle where the FDI enterprises are dominant and private sector developed well, and 
the SOEs withdraw their roles (Christine and Vlad 2018). According to a joint report of the 
World Bank and the Government Inspectorate of Vietnam in 2016, 50% of businesses view 
that the procurement process was favoritism given to relatives, while 38% assumed there 
was bribery, and only 36% viewed the process to be transparent and impartial (World Bank 
and The Government Inspectorate of Vietnam 2016). In the same report, 100% of firms and 
citizens in bottom performing provinces consider state connections as key to business 
(World Bank and The Government Inspectorate of Vietnam 2016).  
Such relationships distort the market, inhibit the fair competition and fairness of business 
environment and public interests “compromised by the private interests of public officials” 
(World Bank and The Government Inspectorate of Vietnam 2016), eroding trust, and in the 
worst case, social instability. In regards to terms of international trade agreements, the firms 
can use the favoritism to lobby for protection (Tran 2018).   
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While fully appreciating this intermingled and biased state-society relationship in the 
2000s, this thesis also acknowledges certain improvements in this unique relationship due 
to Vietnam’s participation in the trade agreements. It admits that the roles of organizations 
controlled by the government such as those for women, youth and famers regarding 
participation in the policymaking are unchanged overtime. However, certain changes were 
seen with more space being given by the state to the non-state actors as the non-government 
organizations support and cover areas that are insufficiently provided by the government 
(H.K.Heng 2004). With liberalizing economic reforms and the development of the private 
sector, the number and diversity of economic actors in Vietnam multiplied, creating new 
opportunities for non-state actors to engage with the trade policymaking process. New trade 
policy constituencies beyond the state emerged from the liberalization process, of which the 
business community was one of the newest. Thus, the business sectors seem to have more 
policy space and autonomy for development than the civil society, especially in the areas 
that are almost private such as agricultural sector. Meanwhile the business sectors are 
accounted for more than 50% of valued added in service sector, while contributing to a 
declining share of less than 30% value-added in industrial sector (Riedel and Tran 1997) 
Vietnam’s successful implementation of trade liberalization also required that state 
agencies have greater and deeper interaction with societal actors when formulating trade 
policy. During this period, Vietnam signed many external trade agreements and joined both 
regional (AFTA) and global (WTO) trade organizations. Societal actors performed an 
important role in these processes by contributing to trade policymaking. Their influence on 
trade policymaking was dependent on various factors including the institutions that 
governed interaction between the state and society, the perspectives of the state and society 
about their roles, and the capacity of societal actors to influence the state.  
Societal actors increased their involvement in the policymaking process after Vietnam 
signed its first major external trade agreement - AFTA - in 1995. Interaction between the 
societal actors and the state began to change around this time. Where it had previously been 
based on limited state-society exchange and a relative lack of interest among societal actors 
themselves, mechanisms for formalized interactions between the two sides were gradually 
put in place. Yet, as late as the WTO accession in 2007, the state’s engagement with 
societal actors remained largely top-down. Trade policymakers consulted far more widely 
 
 94 
than they had done in the pre-reform period but limited such consultation to relevant 
ministries, agencies, research institutes, and SOEs under the control and management of the 
government (VCCI 2012). The consultations were made internally within the 
bureaucracies, i.e., the relevant ministries and agencies, provincial departments, and 
amongst trade negotiators. Externally, a limited number of enterprises and business 
associations were selected by policymakers to collect information and data regarding the 
development situation in the relevant sector.21 This ‘selective’ approach focused on 
consultation with favoured (and state-linked) groups rather than following a systematic and 
structured consultation process that drew in the wide range of (often non-state-linked) 
economic interest groups. 
The domestic process behind Vietnam’s WTO accession is a good example of this 
institutional arrangement. Initially, the business community showed little interest in general 
trade policy matters or in the specific challenges posed by WTO accession, which was 
reflected in very limited attendance at WTO accession workshops, seminars, and training 
courses organized by the government.22 This meant that it was the government’s officials 
and bureaucracies that primarily had to determine Vietnam’s interests and approach to 
WTO negotiations,23 in a large part because the capacity of sectoral business associations 
was too weak to provide useful information and recommendations (Hoang and Pham 2015). 
Hence, as late as 2007, the government was relatively isolated from the business 
community despite contacts between the state and society. 
The trade policy making opened more space, still not satisfied, for private sector’s 
participation in the policy process. This is reflected through a tendency of contrasting 
bottom-up and demand-driven approach to trade policy consultation gradually which 
emerged after WTO accession although the processes involved remained quite different 
from what can be observed in Western countries. An official consultation mechanism was 
set up in 2012, with the government delegating consultation tasks to the VCCI 
(Congthuongbentre 2012). The VCCI had been established in 1963 as a government 
agency, with the initial functions of exploring and expanding international markets and 
                                                
21 Interview with official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2015. 
22 Interview with official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2015. 
23 Interview with official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2015. 
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attracting foreign investment (even from those countries with which Vietnam did not have 
diplomatic relationships). In 1993, the VCCI was separated from the state and became an 
independent organization, and has since performed both the ‘traditional’ policy tasks of 
consulting and advising the government on investment and trade issues and the new task of 
representing the business community and its interests in the policymaking process (VCCI 
2013). The delegation of the trade policy consultation function to the VCCI reveals that 
both the state and the private sector recognized the contribution that business groups could 
make when deciding international trade commitments, and hence the need for them to have 
a more formal institutional role in the policymaking process.  
Since then, the VCCI has conducted various activities that have contributed to international 
trade policymaking. For example, they have carried out lobbying activities in relation to the 
TPP and EU-Vietnam FTA as well as other FTAs (VCCI 2015, VCCI - TrungtamWTO 
2015). They have also completed studies on the possible impacts, opportunities and 
challenges of various trade agreements for particular sectors and for the whole economy. 
These studies have generated recommendations for policymakers negotiating Vietnam’s 
FTAs. The VCCI has argued for pursuing FTAs with major markets where Vietnam faced 
high tariffs but could expect to be competitive in export sectors, which would maximize the 
long-term benefits for the economy (VCCI 2012). Significantly, the VCCI has also opposed 
some trade initiatives. For example, it expressed concern that a proposed FTA with South 
Korea could increase the trade deficit and that it was better to utilize the ASEAN-South 
Korea FTA (AKFTA) for trade with that country (VCCI 2012). In these ways, the VCCI 
functioned as an institution representing business interests within the trade policymaking 
process. 
Various types of informal interactions also diversified the channels of state-business 
relations. Besides the VCCI which, despite its relative autonomy, is not yet seen as a social 
actor, other sectoral associations of the private sector such as the Vietnam Association of 
Seafood Exporters and Producers (VASEP) and the Vietnam Leather, Footwear, and 
Handbag Association (LEFASO), Vietnam Private Entrepreneurs Association, Vietnam 
Small and Medium Enterprise Associations were established and increased interaction with 
the state. The interactions took place in the form of lobbying activities such as seminars, 
meetings, and workshops (VCCI 2013). Informal personal interactions were also utilized as 
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former SOE leaders and retired government officials joined the business associations, soon 
accounting for the majority of these business associations’ leaders (Pham 2013).  
On the other hand, the VCCI and business associations are not the only channels for the 
government to interact with the business community. Since 2000, the government has 
created more means of inclusion, for example, organization of direct dialogues with firms. 
The highest level is that between the Prime Minister and firms through Vietnam Business 
Forum organized twice a year. The Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc chaired the business 
forum for direct dialogue with enterprises, met with multinational corporations, some of 
which attracted nearly 2000 leaders of enterprises, discussing their needs relative not only 
to trade agreements in 2017 (Vnexpress 2017). The next level is between relevant 
ministries and firms, for instance the Ministry of Industry and Trade, on itself, or in 
corporation with foreign donor-funded projects, for example, the European Union – funded 
Multilateral Trade Assistance project have organized many seminars and workshops for 
relevant businesses to update information and get recommendations for negotiation of trade 
agreements. The last level is between the provincial authorities and firms (Vo and Nguyen 
2006). The information collected from these levels serves as one of input sources collected 
for the central government’s policy. Such seminars open more space for the voices of small 
and medium enterprises to be heard regarding policy formulation. 
In addition, a series of debates on trade have taken place in the mass media in recent years 
with the participation of chief trade negotiators or negotiation members, which aimed at not 
only directing but also gaining the support of the public (Pham 2015). These debates 
covered both generic topics (such as the introduction of economic integration opportunities) 
as well as challenges for specific areas such as Rules of Origin (ROOs), Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS), Technical Barrier to Trade (TBT) and Intellectual Property 
Rights (IPRs). This form of public-domain discussion on trade policy issues was a new 
development in Vietnam, reflecting a greater degree of consultation and information flow 
than in previous phases of economic reform. 
Several factors accounted for such state’s opening space and private sector’s contained 
participation. First, from the state side, state agencies became aware of the importance of 
business sector in the economy in general and participation for the effective negotiation and 
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implementation of international trade commitments in particular. This is reflected by the 
Ministry of Planning and Investment’s plan for private sector development to increase the 
private sector’s contribution to the GDP from 40% to 50% (2020) and 60-65% by 2035 
(Ven.vn 2017). Policymakers realized that the business associations’ role was essential 
because trade was increasingly being conducted by the private sector rather than by the 
SOEs (Vietnam Packaging Association 2006). Vietnam’s increasingly complicated trade 
agreements (particularly bilateral FTAs and the recent TPP) also mandated greater societal 
involvement. The state lacked the resources, including financial and human resources, to 
effectively collect, analyse, and communicate with a large range of stakeholders as well as 
to represent, negotiate, and implement commitments in multilateral negotiations 
(VanGrasstek 2008).  
However, the CPV’s points of views regarding the importance of the private sector were 
changing in a very slow and delayed manner. In general understanding, the term ‘private 
sector’ is comprised of individual business, household business and small and medium 
enterprises together accounting for about 40% of GDP in 2017 (Phan 2018). Initially, the 
‘private sector’ was not named and hidden in the so-called ‘multi-stakeholder economic 
model’ in 1986 Doi Moi. It took almost more than thirty years for the Party to recognize the 
private sector as the core force to build a market economy with fully institutionalized and 
protected property rights, rights to business freedom by individual and organizations, as 
reflected in the CPV’s Resolution No. 10-NQ/TW in 2017 (Communist Party of Vietnam 
2017).  
In line with the CPV’s resolution, the government issued the directive to emphasize the 
core role of the enterprises, and instruct the whole system to partner, support, listen and 
response to enterprises’ requirements during the negotiation and implementation of FTAs 
in 2018 (vneconomy.vn 2017). The government considers the enterprises as partners rather 
than subject of control, as explained by the economist advisors to the government 
(vneconomy.vn 2017). This change of thinking continues to promote the developmental 
state model launched by the new government under the new Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan 
Phuc in 2016. Accordingly, the developmental state reduces its intervene in the market, but 
facilitates the private sector’s development, as defined by the Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan 
Phuc (vneconomy.vn 2017).  
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Reasons for such a change in 2017 were due to increasing public debt and budget deficit 
while national infrastructure requires large amount of money for investment that needs the 
involvement of private sector (doanhnhansaigon.vn 2017). Although the idea of changing 
from regulatory state to developmental state was initially raised by the former Prime 
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung in 2014 in preparation for the political report of the CPV’s 11th 
National Congress, it was not supported by the CPV at that time, reflecting the delay within 
the thinking of the CPV to accept new state’s functions (vneconomy.vn 2017). 
Second, from the society side, private sector enterprises also changed their attitude during 
the liberalizing reforms: from one of initially little interest to an increasing awareness of 
and capacity and preparation for participation in various FTAs. According to a survey 
carried out by the PACE Business School in 2015, the awareness of surveyed businesses of 
the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), TPP and WTO agreements was 43.2 per cent, 
59.1 per cent and 66.6 per cent respectively (PACE Business School 2015). In 2016, a 
survey of 1500 enterprises carried by the VCCI showed that 88 per cent of enterprises had 
plans to increase production capacity to take advantage of FTAs like the TPP and the 
EVFTA (VCCI 2016). Enterprises also became more prepared for agreements such as the 
TPP agreement and EVFTA thanks to their improved awareness relating to the 
opportunities for expansion these FTAs might offer (Truong 2016).  
Increasing private sector engagement, as well as its more general expansion as a result of 
the liberalizing reforms, catalyzed a change in the state’s attitude towards private sector 
from closed to more participatory trade policy making. The number of private sector 
enterprises increased more than 10 times in about 15 years, from about 35,000 enterprises 
in 2000 to nearly 700,000 in 2017, accounting for about 40 percent to Vietnam’s GDP 
(Pham 2016, Ven.vn 2017). This private sector development was a product of the 
transformation from central economic planning to a multi-sector economic model based on 
multiple types of ownership. The Enterprise Law issued in 1999, and the revised version 
issued in 2014, further facilitated the development of the Vietnamese private sector.  
The private sector had some more voice as the SOEs gradually lost the state’s support due 
to the emerging private large conglomerates which gained the state’s attention (Pincus 
2015). The reason for the attention was because the largest private businesses focus mainly 
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in the manufacturing, processing sectors, service sectors such finance, banking, insurance, 
information and communication, which are also the priority areas of the government’s 
economic restructure policy. This emerging business class shared great interests with 
reform-minded bureaucrats, which could formulate a coalition to push for reforms and open 
economy policy towards fair trade environment. The private sector then contributes to 
changing the mind-set of the government officials in terms their contribution to the national 
development. For examples, creation of jobs, mobilization of labour forces and finances 
from citizen and businesses for the national development while the state retreats its role and 
withdraws capital from business to focus more on creating favourable environment for 
businesses (vov.vn 2018).  
In addition, the state’s support to the SOEs somehow restrained due to the international 
trade commitments, such as the non-discrimination rules in the WTO. Although the state 
co-optation still exists, the state’s direct intervention in the industry is dramatically reduced, 
according to the state’s policy of equitization of SOEs. This trend would be further 
accelerated in recent international trade agreements such as the TPP (then CPTPP) where 
the SOEs has increasingly become one of developed countries’ key targets of negotiation to 
break the unfair trade, reduce the state’s subsidies and support. As such, the international 
trade agreements facilitate the domestic markets move toward fairer trade rules, equality 
among different enterprises, regardless international or domestic. 
However, there were only a few sectoral associations that had sufficient resources to 
represent the voices and interests of their members, carry out studies, provide information 
to members, and access policymakers so as to influence trade outcomes (baophapluat 
2017). Moreover, many business associations were not effective in representing their 
members’ interests in the trade policymaking process. About 83 per cent of the 
associations’ staff were current or former government officials who lacked experience in 
the private sector (MOIT 2015). Their knowledge and preferences might, therefore, not 
always align with the enterprises they ostensibly represented. Moreover, many associations 
- particularly the farmers’ and women’s union - were considered to not be genuine societal 
organizations independent of the state because a lot of their funding and staff were typically 
provided by the government (Ferrington 2007).  
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Indeed, the VCCI and most of the large sectoral associations were sometimes considered as 
a ‘hand of the government’ itself. This assessment was made because their institutional role 
required them to advocate for and disseminate government policy amongst their members 
(baophapluat 2017) rather than representing the interests of these members (Ngoc 2010). 
Even some associations with complete financial independence from the government have 
been observed to function largely along the same lines as government agencies 
(baophapluat 2017).  
Despite these capacity limitations, a group of industry associations have since emerged that 
have at least some effectiveness in representing private sector interests in the trade policy 
process. Vietnam had 450 registered business associations across all industries by 2014 
(Nguyen 2015). Some of the more prominent bodies such as the Vietnam Textile 
Association (VTA) (VCCI-TrungtamWTO 2011) and the Fertilizer Associations of 
Vietnam (FAV) were active in providing timely information about the market, the contents 
of signed agreements, and preparations that members should undertake (Vu and Le 2016). 
The Vietnam Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers (VASEP) also performed a 
major role because it was in charge of representing members in anti-dumping cases (Dau, 
Pham et al. 2012). In this business association, the interests and voices of all members were 
equal regardless of the size of the members and hence VASEP became a reliable 
association from which members could seek assistance.24 The level of activity of the 
associations was sometimes due to the close connections between their leaders and 
policymakers.  
In short, the nature of state-society relationship regarding participating in trade agreements 
has witnessed certain continuity and changes. The types of hybrid organizations such as 
VCCI for business’s interests or Vietnam General Confederation of Labour for workers’ 
interests (as explained in the Chapter on participation in the TPP) for containing private 
sector’s participation are continuing features of a socialist country like Vietnam. Although 
the state’s intervention in the economy has been remarkably reduced by the state, but it still 
maintains its management capacity over the society in general and private sector in 
                                                
24 Interview with official from the VASEP in 2016. 
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particular while at the same time opens policy space for the latter’s development as both 
share benefits of economic prosperity.  
Though the political settlements have provided more space for both the state and society 
participation through contextual and informal rules, the final decision makers, again, 
remain with the central government. This increased inclusion in the process of decision-
making does not guarantee the fair and inclusive distributional incomes for the enterprises, 
where certain groups enjoy more access to political and economic resources. The patterns 
of inclusion in the decision-making are based on a selective incorporation of first of all 
some key groups, business associations, or leading corporations rather than mass 
enterprises, especially small and mediums enterprises. As it is implicit that the state has 
contacted with few ‘elites’, those highly organized groups and business associations, rather 
scattered small and medium groups. Personal relationships rather than impersonal ones 
influence the bureaucratic culture. This could result in the free trade agreements’ benefits 
distributed to mainly some key exporters rather the mass.  However, the change toward a 
participatory approach in policy-making, which is not the exclusive domain for the state, is 
remarkable as it opens a new trend in the bilateral relationship, in line with a new spirit of 
creating a new wave of building a start-up nation, with government’s facilitation for start-
up enterprises.   
5.3 The trade policy preferences of Vietnamese businesses 
The changes in the pattern of interaction between the state and the business community in 
Vietnam’s trade policymaking pose important politico-economic questions. First, which 
business groups benefited and which were harmed by the state’s liberalizing reforms? 
Secondly, how did winners and losers push for policies that benefited their interests? 
Thirdly, how did the state balance between these competing sectoral interests?  
All of Vietnam’s trade reforms produced asymmetric distributional outcomes: benefiting 
firms, which enjoyed new trade opportunities, while harming those who lost access to 
protective mechanisms. These distributional outcomes forced both potential winners and 
losers to be more active in influencing trade policy in favour of their interests. 
Distributional politics first emerged during negotiations for the Bilateral Trade Agreement 
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(BTA) with the United States in 2001 as this was the first agreement that required Vietnam 
to make significant tariff reforms (Coello, Fall et al. 2010).  
Political contestation between winners and losers of trade reform became increasingly tense 
with Vietnam’s participation in the much more demanding WTO accession and subsequent 
bilateral FTAs. As Vietnam was a labour-abundant country, the least competitive sectors 
exposed to tough competition were capital- and technology-intensive industries such as the 
automotive, telecommunications, finance, and banking sectors as well as import-competing 
sectors such as livestock and some other agricultural sectors. The winners were 
predominantly exporters, of which Foreign-Invested Enterprises (FIEs) accounted for the 
majority of export values, and heavily protected firms in the petroleum, electricity, mining 
and financial sectors, which were mainly SOEs. In this way, patterns of winners and losers 
were not only determined by industry sector but also by political strength.  
At the aggregate level, Vietnamese businesses supported membership of the WTO and 
participation in FTAs. For example, support for the EVFTA was 97 per cent of all surveyed 
firms in 2012 (VCCI 2012). According to the US-based Edelman’s survey, 93 per cent of 
enterprises and 96 per cent of consumers also supported the TPP and believed that it would 
provide benefits for Vietnam’s economy (Vneconomy News 2015). About 53 per cent of 
enterprises reported that the EVFTA would positively impact on their business (Dau 2016). 
America’s Pew Research Center provided a similar result, reporting that 89 per cent of 
Vietnamese surveyed in 2015 described the TPP as a beneficial agreement (PewResearch 
2015). These were remarkable levels of public support for FTAs considering that only 49 
per cent of Americans shared the same view of the TPP (PewResearch 2015). 
These high levels of public support were predictable because FTAs were widely expected 
to generate positive benefits for participating economies (VCCI 2012). Amongst 
businesses, the reasons for their support were varied. According to a PACE Institute of 
Management survey, businesses expected, first, export and market expansion (37 per cent), 
secondly, opportunities for cooperation and business (24.6 per cent), and thirdly, progress 
towards development and international and regional integration (23.8 per cent) (VCCI and 
World Bank 2015). This high level of support from business enabled the government to 
engage more easily in FTA negotiations than in other countries where domestic views were 
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more polarised. This made trade politics in Vietnam different from that of Western 
countries where there were demonstrations and protests against the TPP, such as in 
Australia, Chile, New Zealand, and the United States (Cormack 2015, McGee 2016, RT 
News 2016, Telsur News 2018), and leaders had to overcome political opposition in order 
to get trade agreements signed. In contrast, Vietnam demonstrated consolidated societal 
views about the benefits of international trade integration.  
These benefits included lower tariffs, which would result in market access opportunities 
relative to competitors; institutional reforms and reform of domestic enterprises; and 
opportunities to access technology and management skills. Consumers and import-using 
industries had more opportunities to buy cheaper goods and inputs. Indeed, enterprises 
declared support for liberalization not only for imports that Vietnam needed such as high 
technology, but also for benefits for less competitive services such as logistics and port 
services, or sensitive services such as telecommunication and education (VCCI 2012). 
Since 2012, the groups benefiting from trade liberalization have urged the government to 
accelerate the reform process.  
5.3.1 The proponents of trade liberalization 
Regarding the trade liberalization issue, there were two types of groups that the government 
had to deal with: proponents and opponents. As in Japan, interest groups supported or 
opposed trade liberalization on the basis of the distributional effects of international trade 
agreements (Mulgan and Honma 2015). In general, supporters were the import-dependent 
groups, which relied on imports for their production, while export-dependent groups 
expected to improve market access as a result of trade agreements. Export-dependent 
groups were the driver of Vietnamese growth. In the 2017, phones and accessories, 
electronics products and accessories, textiles and garments, footwear, steel, and fish 
products were Vietnam’s key exports (Customs Online 2017). The increasing number of 
export sectors was a major change compared to the era before economic renovation, when 
natural resources accounted for 74 per cent of total exports (Doan 2007).   
These ‘winners’ had a range of interests in trade reform. First, FTAs could help them to 
expand export markets as a result of tariff reduction by their main trading partners (Truong 
2016). Key export sectors such as textiles and garments, fishery products, and footwear 
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could exploit their competitive advantage in foreign markets, particularly leveraging 
Vietnam’s natural resources and low-cost labor force (VCCI 2012). They were also more 
competitive when compared with other regional countries - particularly China - by virtue of 
their inclusion in global and regional trade architectures.25  
Secondly, the business community broadly agreed with the government’s moves towards 
signing FTAs in order to diversify import markets and avoiding a concentration on low 
quality and unstable import and export markets such as China (VCCI 2012). This concern 
was related to China’s unpredictable trade policy changes, such as restrictions on key 
imports from Vietnam from 2011 onwards including rubber, agricultural products, mineral 
products, and fisheries, causing difficulties for domestic exporters (tienphong 2012). 
Indeed, China was Vietnam’s key trade partner, with imports of US$25 billion accounting 
for 23.4 per cent of total import, and export of US$11 billion, accounting for 11.3 per cent 
of total exports in 2011 (Customs News 2012). As the Director-General of the Vietnam 
Institute of Economics warned, Vietnam’s dependence on the China’s economy meant its 
slowing rate of economic growth could create difficulties for Vietnam (Customs News 
2015).   
Thirdly, with the more recent ‘new generation’ FTAs, the business community saw an 
opportunity to improve the regulatory environment and secure sustainable economic 
development. These FTAs covered non-trade issues such as the environment, 
competitiveness, and labour, where Vietnam had not yet engaged in systematic reform. The 
VCCI argued that the new generation FTAs could facilitate access to clean and high 
technology from developed countries, attract foreign investment in production and services, 
and improve the business and investment environment (VCCI 2012). These benefits were 
considered the long-term counterparts to the short-term interests of the export and import, 
and services trades (VCCI 2012).  
Fourthly, FTAs could facilitate the development of market-economy institutions including 
greater transparency, a level playing field amongst enterprises, and a favorable business 
environment for private sector development. Specifically, these agreements asked for the 
removal of maximum-level tariffs, or for very short schedules for tariff removal, simple or 
                                                
25 Interview with official from the VASEP in 2016. 
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flexible rules on product origin, liberalization of services trades, reduction of requirements 
for service suppliers, removal or minimization of technical barriers and other barriers, and 
equal treatment for both imports and domestic goods (Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry 2010).  
Finally, export-competitive sectors benefited from better treatment in foreign markets. 
While many countries confirmed their recognition of Vietnam’s market economy, some 
countries such as the United States and the EU still considered Vietnam as a non-market 
economy. Its non-market economy status could be a major trade barrier: for example, the 
United States applied anti-dumping tariffs on Vietnam’s catfish based on this criterion in 
2003 (Brambilla, Porto et al. 2012). Recognition of market-economy status became one of 
the important political and economic issues that the government negotiated.  
In addition to domestic enterprises, FIEs also emerged as strong advocates for trade reforms 
as an important group of major beneficiaries. They enjoyed an average annual growth rate 
of 24.4 per cent over the 2006-2016 decade and their share of exports rose from 37 per cent 
in 2006 to more than 71.5 per cent by 2016 (vnmedia 2017). Following WTO accession, the 
FIEs focused on steel, electronics, and high technology products, all of which were export-
oriented. The FIEs were the principal driver of Vietnam’s most recent trade successes 
(Dinh, Eckardt et al. 2016).  
The contribution of the FIEs to the economy was directly enabled by trade reform. They 
were initially promoted by the unilateral trade liberalization policy during the early stages 
of the reform process. Then in the 2000s, the government opened up the domestic market 
by gradually removing import quotas during the WTO accession. The FIEs were also an 
important beneficiary of the new-generation FTAs, with the higher requirement for investor 
protection compared with those in the WTO. For instance, in Article 12.4 of the revised 
Law on Investment in 2005, the state allowed for dispute settlement through various 
methods other than Vietnam’s Court of Arbitration. However, the domestic regulations did 
not allow foreign investors the right to sue state agencies on matters relating to investment 
in the EVFTA (VCCI 2016).  
Import-dependent groups were also major supporters of trade liberalization in order to 
reduce import tariffs on materials needed for their business. Import-dependent industries 
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were those industries that depended on imported machinery, raw materials and intermediate 
goods for production (Hakkala, Kang et al. 2001). These industries accounted for 91.4 per 
cent of total imports in 2017 (tapchitaichinh 2018). For instance, the plastics industry 
imported more than 80 percent of its inputs. Some export industries such as cashew nuts, 
fisheries, textiles and garments also imported 86 percent of their inputs (baocongthuong 
2018). These industries stood to gain considerably via reduced import tariffs.  
5.3.2 The opponents of trade liberalization 
On the other side of the policy debate were opposing groups largely drawn from industries 
and sectors exposed to economic risks from trade liberalization. The government’s strategy 
of responding to different industries depended mainly on the relative importance of 
particular industries to its overall national development strategy. Accordingly, the state 
supported claims for protection from the most sensitive sectors. It also protected the 
important import-substitution industries such as iron and steel, paper, chemical fertilizers, 
cement, oil products, automotive, and some construction materials and agricultural products 
such as sugar. The government also supported uncompetitive sectors such as livestock, 
medical services, and financial services on which trade agreements with countries like 
Australia and the United States would have a negative impact.  
Indeed, the state’s first priority was to protect the most sensitive sectors in the economy. In 
its FTAs from AFTA onwards, processed food, alcoholic beverages, petroleum products, 
cement, plastic products, automotive accessories, and machinery all benefited from very 
long implementation periods for tariff reduction. The most protected products were eggs, 
tobacco, cigarettes, petroleum, automotive tires, construction steel, and types of 
automotive, and accessories (Truong, Vo et al. 2011). This ‘sensitive list’ accounted for 
about 5-7 per cent of the total tariff lines in the case of the ASEAN Trade in Goods 
Agreement (ATIGA).  
In addition, non-tariff barriers for imports were set up to protect weak domestic industries. 
For example, during the WTO accession negotiations, Deputy Prime Minister Vu Khoan 
instructed the Ministry of Public Security to build technical requirements to limit the entry 
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of imported high capacity motorbikes, such as the age of drivers, and pollution.26 
Policymakers also imposed restrictions on foreign pharmacy companies opening retail 
shops in Vietnam.27 Nonetheless, these sensitive lists were still subject to gradual tariff 
removal - in the case of AFTA, in exchange for accelerating Vietnam’s electronics exports 
to ASEAN countries (baodautu 2016, Huu 2016).      
Other highly protected industries were those classified as either import-substituting or 
infant industries, such as the petroleum, steel, and automobile sectors. Protective measures 
were implemented through tariffs and long schedules for removing tariff rates. For instance, 
the tariff on automotives was initially very high (100 percent in 1991), and it took nearly 
twenty years to drop to 0% by 2018 in line with Vietnam’s AFTA commitments. The 
import-substitution industries were included in Vietnam’s ‘general exception’ and 
‘temporary exclusion’ lists in AFTA and accounted for 41 per cent of items in Vietnam’s 
AFTA schedule in 1998 (Pham 2004).  
According to the Minister for Trade, ongoing protection of these industries was essential 
for building a self-reliant and strong economy (Huu 2016). The Prime Minister asserted that 
an underlying reason for the protection policy was to assist different sectors’ gradual 
improvement in competitiveness in domestic markets before expansion into foreign 
markets; supporting nascent industries; and protecting the interests of important domestic 
manufacturers and consumers (Prime Minister 2008). The government made tariff 
decisions based on ministries and agencies’ calculation of the strength, weakness, and 
potential loss of market share of each sector and commodity.28 
5.3.3 Excluded groups in trade policymaking 
Although trade policymaking shifted towards a more participatory and inclusive model, 
there were certain groups that remain excluded. The political settlements set rules for the 
exclusion of certain groups on the grounds of threat to country or regime. These groups 
were, for example, the Former Vietnamese Prisoners of Conscience which was comprised 
of former prisoners of conscience and human right defenders outlawed by the government 
                                                
26 Interview with official from the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam in 2015. 
27 Interview with official from the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam in 2015. 
28 Interview with official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2015. 
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for being reactionary against the regime. Different from the businesses that focussed on 
material interests, these groups focused more on non-material interests, i.e., human rights 
issues, particularly labour conditions and the freedom of association in relation to the free 
trade agreements. These groups strongly supported the FTAs on the grounds that they could 
contribute to improving human rights owing to high-standard rules such as the requirement 
for freedom of association.  
These groups used various methods for influencing the government. They called upon the 
government through the mass media (mainly websites and Facebook) to consider workers’ 
conditions and their right of association as well as the need for corporate social 
responsibility.29 As these groups were not legally recognized by the government, they 
tended to use various indirect methods to influence the government, one of which was 
cooperation with foreign authorities such as the United States and EU.30 They acted as 
sources of information regarding the lack of enforcement of human rights in Vietnam, 
which was otherwise not available in the official mass media.  
Vietnam’s trading partners considered pressure from human rights groups as a bargaining 
card to be used to push it to remove duties on highly protected and high labour cost 
domestic goods (Sicurelli 2015). For example, in the EU-Vietnam FTA, International 
Labour Organization-derived labour provisions were included in the Trade and Sustainable 
Development chapter, and in the TPP, labour provisions were handled in a dedicated labour 
chapter. Under pressure from European NGOs, the European Commission carried out a 
human rights impact in the ex-post impact assessment of the EU-Vietnam FTA (Russell 
2018). In this way, foreign governments used human rights - a non-trade issue - for political 
purposes during the negotiations.  
5.4 Explaining the differential influence of competing societal 
interest groups 
While access to the trade policymaking process for societal interest groups increased, not 
all groups enjoyed equal access. The principal beneficiaries were large and politically well-
                                                
29 Interview with a FVPOC member in 2018 
30 Interview with a FVPOC member in 2018 
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connected businesses, particularly SOEs, equitized firms and FIEs. These groups had 
preferential access owing to the government’s prioritization of them: for SOEs to develop 
heavy and import-substitution industries and for FIEs to attract foreign investment. These 
groups had hidden interests with the state, and so the statements about their positions and 
interests are not public. However, the state’s protection for these groups is reflected in the 
process of negotiation of trade agreements through the terms proposed by Vietnam’s 
negotiator’s position (as analyzed by the example of Viettel – Vietnam Telecommunication 
in the Chapter 7 negotiation of the TPP). The SOEs have long benefited from the privileges 
and preferential access to the leaders as well as other business conditions such as land, 
credit despite of long-term efforts for reform and equitization of SOEs. In that situation, the 
state shares the business interests with the SOEs, equitized firms. In other words, this 
reflects the situation of state capitalism or state corporatism where the state protects its own 
business interests through the SOEs.  
On the other hand, smaller domestic businesses had far less access to trade policymaking 
for various reasons. First, the private business sector was in an inferior position to influence 
trade policymaking because it was largely considered by the state as an information 
provider. In exchange, firms’ requests for information such as the progress of FTA 
negotiations and specific sectoral schedules for tariff removal were not fulfilled by state 
agencies (baocongthuong 2015). The state tended only to provide general accounts of 
economic integration31 or summaries (rather than the full content) of chapters of trade 
agreements under negotiation (Truong 2016). In addition, the state showed less interest in 
considering firms’ comments or feedback because the government viewed this information 
as biased and based on their own sectional interests rather than the national interest (Dao, 
Nguyen et al. 2013). As explained by the Chairman of the VCCI in 2010, the government’s 
consultation with the business community was more for procedural and formalistic 
purposes (taichinhdientu 2010). State consultation with societal actors was a means to 
mobilize business associations for the state’s interest rather than for the benefit of private 
interests. 
                                                
31 Interview with official from the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam in 2015. 
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Such an inferior position was determined in part by political culture where the general idea 
was that the state should give administrative orders and domestic firms should simply 
follow the state’s guidance (Nguyen 2015). The negotiation and signing of trade 
agreements was seen as mainly as a task for the state as in the case, for example, the 
negotiation of Vietnam’s WTO accession (Dang 2006). Indeed, it was sometimes the 
policymakers who instructed the enterprises to push for protection of their sectors. For 
example, the former Vice-Minister of Trade suggested that the Petrolimex Company should 
open as many petrol stations as possible before he made a commitment to open the retail 
sector to foreign competition (Tran, Vu et al. 2015). This was a legacy from the previous 
centrally planned economy in which enterprises complied with the state’s policy rather than 
actively participating in the policy formulation process (Dwight Perkins, David Dapice et 
al. 2013).  
Secondly, the majority of private sector firms, about 98 per cent of which were small and 
medium enterprises and their trade associations, lacked sufficient capacity to contribute to 
trade policymaking. Trade negotiators were sceptical about the capacity of business 
associations, particularly their knowledge of complicated Western trade issues in the WTO, 
as only a few policymakers (many of which were Soviet-trained economists) had sufficient 
understanding of these issues.32 Some interview respondents reported that most business 
associations were weak in this respect, with the exception of a small number such as those 
in the textiles and garments sector (Hoang and Pham 2015).  
The private sector also had little precise information about how the policymaking process 
functioned. Companies were particularly confused about the shared responsibilities of 
different ministries for trade policy. For example, negotiations in the lumber sector 
concerned three ministries: the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development was 
responsible for plantations while the Ministry of Industry and Trade was responsible for the 
sale of wood and the Ministry of Finance had jurisdiction over tariff removal as part of the 
market-opening process (VCCI 2010). It was unclear to firms which of these bodies they 
should seek engagement with. In addition, the SMEs still lack of detailed understandings 
about the FTAs and could not foresee the short-term impacts of FTAs and lack of resources 
                                                
32 Interview with official from the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam in 2015. 
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to carry out studies, strategy and plan for effective participation and rely more on the state 
authorities (Bnews.vn 2018).   
Thirdly, firms and trade associations did not coordinate with each other during their 
lobbying efforts. In an interview, the VASEP revealed that the organization did not 
cooperate with the VCCI in relation to lobbying activities.33 The representative of the 
Vietnam Small and Medium Size Enterprises (VINASME) explained the lack of 
cooperation between their associations and the VCCI was due to their assessment that the 
VCCI was seen as an extended hand of government. In their view, it was focused on 
disseminating the government’s policy rather than representing the interests of 
enterprises.34 This answer makes sense because the VCCI used to be a state organization 
before becoming independent. Yet, the VCCI was still considered important enough by the 
government to act as a coordinator for communication channels between the state and the 
business sector. In that context, VINASME had to invite foreign experts to organize 
workshops for its members in order to understand and improve their advocacy activities 
with the government.  
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the transformation in the role, interests and impact of societal 
actors in relation to trade policymaking in Vietnam during the reform period. It argues that 
societal actors made increasing, if still somewhat limited, contributions to trade 
policymaking. Their changing interests and the growing importance of their role have been 
the principal factors driving increased levels of engagement.  
The findings demonstrate that the changes have been dramatic. First, a meaningful state-
society relationship was institutionalized with the establishment of informal and formal 
channels of communication, which culminated in the VCCI’s adopting a formal position in 
the trade policymaking system in 2012. Second, firms changed their approach from relative 
disengagement to one actively expressing their interests through the mass media, 
workshops, seminars, and via their sectoral business associations. Third, societal actors 
                                                
33 Interview with official from the VASEP in 2016. 
34 Interview with official from the VINASME in 2010. 
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improved their capacity to engage with the policymaking process both in terms of 
developing an understanding of complex international trade rules as well as through 
methods systematically to make input into policy decisions. 
This transformation not primarily driven by the societal actors themselves but rather by the 
state’s changing view of and approach to how trade policy should be made. State agencies 
realized the importance of the business community’s participation in increasingly complex 
trade agreements and the need to engage with views from enterprises for effective decision-
making. As new channels for societal engagement were opened, Vietnam’s trade policy 
process acquired a significant and clearly defined place for business associations.  
However, despite the reduction in political distance between the state and societal actors, 
the latter still considered themselves as marginalized. Business associations perceived their 
concerns to be secondary as the state continued to control information regarding trade 
agreement negotiations and outcomes. A lack of transparency and communication remained 
obstacles in the state-society relationship relating to trade policy. These obstacles resulted 
from the institutional legacy of the former central planning mechanisms. The state still 
retained a tight monopoly over trade policy authority and managed enterprises in a way that 
it saw fit. This reflected the fact that state agencies continued to be the dominant decision-
makers in Vietnamese trade and, despite their increasing role, societal actors had a long 
way to go before becoming a powerful force. 
Additionally, contestation amongst interest groups with respect to influencing trade 
policymaking intensified. These contests pitted pro-liberalization groups against those 
seeking to ensure on-going protection. Importantly, groups from both sides of this divide 
were successful in influencing policy outcomes. For example, export sectors such as 
fisheries, textiles, garments and footwear all supported (and benefited from) liberalization 
while some opposing groups like those in the steel, automotive and sugar industries 
successfully lobbied for on-going protection. SOEs also received protection during the 
liberalization process reflecting their status as a special interest group within Vietnam’s 
socialist system led by the CPV. In this way, compromises were struck in which some 




Therefore, the relative success of interest groups’ ability to shape policymaking largely 
depended on their political positions and connections with Vietnam’s political institutions. 
Unlike in developed countries, the private sector has little political influence in Vietnam. 
Hence, their involvement in policymaking was limited to providing information about the 
practical situation facing their sectors. In contrast, SOEs were able to exert significant 
influence on government positions on trade policy issues owing to their political 
connections with state agencies. FIEs became influencers when they established joint 
ventures with the SOEs and expanded to operate in targeted export-oriented industries such 
as electronics, accessories, garments and textiles. The FIEs, as drivers of the Vietnamese 
growth model, thus also became one of the government’s preferred targets in its 
international trade agreements.  
By providing this analysis of the role of societal actors, this chapter has developed an 
understanding of the demand side of trade policy in Vietnam, which complements the 
supply side analysis of state actors in the previous chapter. The next two chapters will 
combine the supply and demand side analyses in two case studies of important Vietnamese 
trade agreements: WTO accession and membership of the TPP.   
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Chapter 6: Case Study 1: Vietnam’s accession to the 




6.1 Introduction  
World Trade Organization (WTO) accession was one of Vietnam’s most important 
international trade policy decisions, marking its full integration into the global economy. It 
was also a long and difficult process for Vietnamese trade policymakers, requiring the 
involvement of a wide range of actors and harmonization of their different interests. This 
chapter seeks to identify the actors involved, their trade preferences, and how they 
interacted to shape Vietnam’s WTO accession.  
The chapter contributes to the thesis by providing empirical insights into trade 
policymaking regarding Vietnam’s WTO accession. The chapter reviews the transformation 
of the trade policymaking process, which facilitated WTO accession, and explains this 
transformation by identifying the changing preferences of the relevant actors and how these 
preferences influenced WTO negotiation outcomes. It argues that the politics of WTO 
accession were the result of interaction between domestic and international politics, which 
shaped the process and trade preferences of relevant actors and vice versa. Despite the 
strong political commitment of the leaders, the complexity of interests and ideas of relevant 
actors, both domestic and international, created roadblocks to the accession process. 
Internally, the process of transformation and harmonization of different interests and ideas 
over the pace, scope, and extent of WTO accession – which drew in both state and non-
state actors, and pitted reformers against conservative forces – complicated Vietnam’s 
negotiating position. Externally, its position as a latecomer meant that other WTO members 
insisted on applying ‘WTO Plus’ requirements to its accession package, which imposed 
very high adjustment costs on the Vietnamese political economy.  
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6.2 A summary of Vietnam’s WTO accession process 
The WTO is the pre-eminent institution in the global trade system and the only 
international trade regime with a genuinely global reach. Its principal functions include 
acting as a forum for negotiation of multilateral trade rules, settling trade disputes amongst 
its members in a transparent and rules-based manner, and supporting developing countries’ 
efforts to participate in the international trade system (WTO 1996). It rules - as codified in 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (1947, updated in 1994) - set 
disciplines for members in the areas of tariffs, the application of subsidies, and non-tariff 
barriers such as quotas, export/import licensing, national treatment, and sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) measures. The WTO also has additional agreements that regulate 
‘behind-the-border’ issues such as intellectual property rights, investment and competition 
policy (WTO 1996).  
WTO accession requires prospective member states to accept the WTO’s existing set of 
multilateral agreements (principally, although not exclusively, the GATT) as well as to 
negotiate an individual set of accession requirements with the existing membership through 
a working parties process. Four major phases need to be completed. The first step includes 
a request for membership and establishment of a working party. The next step is a fact-
finding stage that requires the applicant to submit a ‘Memorandum on the Foreign Trade 
Regime’ and other documentation as requested by existing members. The negotiation stage 
covers multilateral negotiations on rules, plurilateral negotiations on agricultural support 
and export subsidies, and bilateral negotiations on market access for goods and services. 
The final steps include procedures for the acceptance by at least two-thirds of the WTO 
membership and implementation by the applicant (WTO 1996).  
Vietnam’s WTO accession process lasted 12 years. It began in 1994 when Vietnam first 
applied for GATT observer status, and then made a full membership application in 1995. In 
the same year, a Working Group comprising 28 members was set up to examine Vietnam’s 
application (WTO 2017). In 1996, Vietnam started the process by providing the 
memorandum on trade policy, which was the same year that Vietnam started to negotiate 
the bilateral trade agreement (BTA) with the United States. Vietnam completed the trade 
policy transparency phase through a series of multilateral meetings between 1998 and 2000, 
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by responding to 2600 different policy queries from existing WTO members (vietstock.vn 
2007). Then, Vietnam completed bilateral negotiations for market access with 28 countries 
and territories between 2002 and 2006; and 14 multilateral negotiations regarding 
institutional issues and trade policy between 1998 and 2006. In July 2006, Vietnam 
consolidated the outcomes of these processes, negotiated outstanding issues, and prepared a 
report for the Working Group to submit to the WTO for consideration. On 11 January 2007, 
Vietnam officially became a WTO member (Ministry of Finance 2011).  
Table 6-1: Stages in Vietnam’s WTO accession 
 
Phase 1 Application for WTO membership and policy transparency 
1/1/1995 Vietnam applied for WTO membership  
31/1/1995 WTO’s working group for Vietnam was established comprising 28 countries and territories 
7/1998-2000  Policy 
transparency  
Vietnam sent trade policy MOU, answering 2600 questions for policies 
relating to areas such as IPR, tax, investment, agriculture, trade in goods, 
and trade in services.  
Phase 2 Negotiation for membership  
4/2002 to 
2006 
Market opening  The first meeting based on the first offer was in late 2001 
1998-2006 Multilateral negotiations  
2000-2006 Bilateral negotiations: removal of non-tariff barriers and tariff reductions 
Comply with WTO agreements regarding market opening 
2004  Completed bilateral negotiations with the EU  
2006  Completed bilateral negotiation with the United States  
2007  Became a full WTO member  
Source: Ministry of Finance. Landmarks of Vietnam’s WTO accessio, available at 
www.mof.gov.vn, retrieved on 4/5/2018. 
 




• First, the other regional trade agreements that Vietnam had previously negotiated 
(such as AFTA and the BTA with the United States), were narrower in terms of 
sectoral coverage. The WTO required ‘most-favoured-nation’ (MFN)-based 
liberalization, which imposed far more comprehensive requirements on trade 
policies and institutions, levels of market access, and compliance with the WTO’s 
dispute settlement mechanism (DSM). In addition, WTO accession created 
pressures for institutional reforms and opening both services and goods markets, 
and required deeper tariff removal than any of Vietnam’s prior trade agreements 
(Perkins, Dapice et al. 2013, Truong 2013).  
• Secondly, the WTO negotiation process was more complex than for FTAs because 
it included requirements relating to domestic trade practices before moving onto 
bilateral and multilateral market access talks. It took Vietnam seven years, from 
1995 to 2002, to finish the first phase of answering the members’ queries about its 
trade regime. For the second phase from 2002 to 2007, Vietnam concluded 28 
bilateral negotiations and multilateral negotiations. 
• Thirdly, negotiation for WTO accession was not performed on a reciprocal basis 
like FTAs. WTO accession requires the applicant’s compliance with existing WTO 
rules and any additional requirements imposed by the incumbent members. Hence, 
as a latecomer, Vietnam was in a weaker bargaining position (Baccini, Impullitti et 
al. 2015). 
Thus, WTO accession was the most complex and lengthy trade negotiation ever undertaken 
by Vietnamese officials.  
As a developing and socialist economy, Vietnam faced more difficulties than other WTO 
applicants. WTO accession imposed tremendous economic, political and institutional 
challenges for a country in its position. First, it was hard for Vietnam as a late-developing 
country to be competitive with the WTO members, particularly as it faced high demands 
from these members. Its weak economic capacity exerted constraints on moving towards a 
market economy-based WTO trading system and on its ability to comply with the same 




Institutional challenges were also significant. Vietnam could face six challenges such as 
rules of origin in the textiles and apparel sector, competition in both domestic and foreign 
agricultural markers, intellectual property rights (IPRs), reform of SOEs, reforms in its 
legal system, and labour standards requirements (Nguyen, Nguyen et al. 2015). These 
challenges emerged because Vietnam’s trade institutions were in a transitional phase 
between the previous centrally-planned and a market-based economic system, requiring 
extensive legal reforms to narrow the gap with the institutions required to meet WTO 
regulations. There were many laws and regulations that did not exist in Vietnam, for 
instance, anti-dumping laws, and some laws existed but were inadequate such as 
intellectual property right laws (Nghia 2003).  
In addition, in the policymakers’ view, Vietnam was required to go beyond the standard 
WTO agreements by undertaking so-called 'WTO-Plus' commitments, which were typical 
for transitional economies. For example, Vietnam was requested to carry out the 
privatization and equitization of the SOEs, although these types of commitments were not 
covered by the GATT/WTO Agreements (WTO 2006). These requirements served to 
introduce ambiguity and unpredictability into the negotiation process.   
From a practical perspective, Vietnam also lacked trade negotiators and experts who were 
familiar with WTO practices. Vietnam’s officials would first have to learn, and only then 
could they begin to assess and implement new trade rules such as the removal of 
import/export business licenses, the removal of quotas and qualitative restrictions on 
imports (Minh and Ngoc 2016). This ‘learning by doing’ approach would challenge the 
capacity of Vietnam’s limited number of trade officials and greatly slow the negotiation 
process. 
These challenges made the WTO negotiation a complicated process. It was not simply a 
trade process but a political negotiation process simultaneously occurring at both the 
international and domestic level. Domestic negotiations for tradeoffs among different 
sectors to reach a balanced approach, also had to be decided. The WTO required significant 
domestic regulatory reforms that shifted the balance of benefits and costs to different actors 
and sectors, igniting competition amongst different interests.  
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Vietnam made significant concessions to join the WTO, including institutional reforms 
towards greater openness, transparency, and fairness. For market access in goods, it agreed 
to reduce the average tariff from 17.4 per cent to 13.4 per cent during a 5-7 year period for 
10600 tariff lines (VCCI-TrungtamWTO 2010). For market access in services, the country 
agreed to liberalize a number of previously monopolized service sectors such as banking, 
financial services, telecommunication and distribution services (Vo 2005). Moreover, 
Vietnam agreed to eliminate all types of subsidies, for instance export subsidies for 
agricultural goods (GoV 2006). In line with WTO regulations, the country implemented the 
necessary institutional reforms by revising hundreds of laws and regulations, including 
Intellectual Property Rights and issued new regulatory rules for the first time, such as the 
Competition Law. Vietnam also agreed that WTO members would apply non-market 
economy (NME) rules to it for up to 12 years after accession.  
The above concessions were a result of a balance struck between the push of strategic 
interests and the pull of domestic interests, as well as the balance between Vietnam’s 
offensive and defensive interests. While the strategic benefits of WTO membership were 
comprehensive, covering national development and integration, Vietnam’s offensive and 
defensive interests were narrower and sectorally focused. Its offensive interests were the 
gains that Vietnam expected to make, such as market access for key exports such as 
textiles, garments, and electronics. Its defensive interests were those sectors that Vietnam 
wished to continue to protect such as the uncompetitive beef, chicken, automobiles and 
services industries (Truong, Vo et al. 2011). What follows is a discussion of the domestic 
policymaking process and negotiations that helps to provide an understanding of the 
political economy of Vietnam’s position regarding WTO accession.   
6.3 Why did the central leadership start WTO negotiations? 
The central leadership sought WTO membership for a number of strategic reasons. First, 
WTO accession was a part of a broader strategic policy of reconnecting Vietnam with the 
world, strengthening the country’s position in the international arena (The 8th VCP 
National Congress 1996), and improving the country’s image of as a friendly, reliable 
partner of the international community (Prime Minister 2006). The reasons for this 
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reconnection to the world needed to be understood in its unique historical context. 
Economically, the country was isolated because of the 19-year US trade embargo from 
1979-1994. This situation generated a need to reconnect with the world to exploit economic 
development opportunities. Such thinking was further encouraged when the leadership 
recognized that global politics were moving away from ideological rivalry and towards 
peaceful coexistence focusing on economic development. Hence, strategic political 
interests drove the WTO accession as it was in line with the CPV’s consistent global 
integration policy.35   
Secondly, the WTO accession reflected Vietnam’s political determination to implement 
economic renovation and reform (GoV 2006). The WTO accession was a continuation of 
the economic reform program launched in 1986, which aimed to transform the centrally 
planned economy into a market-based one. The WTO’s institutional requirements, such as 
MFN and transparency commitments, could act as levers to facilitate domestic economic 
reform. Many of Vietnam’s economic institutions in the early 2000s still reflected the 
former central planning system, which was not compatible with the standards required by 
the WTO. As such, Vietnam had for the first time to incorporate WTO principles into its 
domestic legal regime, including behind-the-border issues such as intellectual property 
rights. Such institutional reforms required by the WTO reinforced the leadership’s 
determination to reform institutional legacies and set up new market-based institutions 
(Pham 2012).  
Thirdly, the WTO was expected to provide an opportunity for Vietnam to exploit its 
comparative advantage in global trade, increase its competitiveness, and facilitate 
participation in the international division of labor (GoV 2006). In particular, it was 
expected to facilitate non-discriminatory MFN-based market access to the key export 
markets in Western countries and create a regulatory environment that would attract foreign 
and domestic investment. Moreover, it was expected to improve access to technology, 
modern management methods, equipment imports, and cheaper and diversified goods. A 
market economy mechanism would align domestic economic institutions with the rest of 
the world, enhancing competitive advantages (Politburo 2001).  
                                                
35 Interview with diplomatic official of the Vietnam Embassy to Algeria, through Skype in 2017. 
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Fourthly, Vietnam sought to protect its domestic enterprises against trade disputes through 
access to the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) (GoV 2006, GoV 2006, Prime 
Minister Nguyen Tan Dzung 2006, Vu 2012). Before the WTO accession, investigating 
authorities from importing countries could apply anti-dumping duties against Vietnam 
without recourse to independent review. Without access to an independent tribunal to hear 
these cases, the resulting decisions were perceived to be biased against Vietnam’s firms. 
The WTO dispute settlement mechanism would  provide a level playing field for such trade 
disputes and Vietnamese enterprises could rely on the government to defend them through 
the WTO DSM (Dinh and Nguyen 2015).  
Because of the strategic significance of WTO membership, the CPV - especially the 
National Congress, and the Politburo - paid a special attention to the process. The Politburo 
issued Resolution No. 07/NQ-TW in 2001 to confirm the party’s commitment to begin the 
WTO accession process. This high-level resolution helped to avoid delay for reasons such 
as domestic suspicion of threats to the regime, which had delayed the BTA with the United 
States two years earlier.36 The top party leaders’ support for WTO accession remained 
unchanged throughout the entire accession process.  
6.4 The law-making role of the legislature 
The National Assembly also contributed to policymaking on WTO accession. Its role was 
principally the ratification of the huge number of laws that were required to achieve 
compliance with WTO regulatory provisions. Its role expanded further with the 
replacement of the government’s administrative commands by laws and regulations to set 
up a rule-based market economy. The National Assembly’s primary contribution was a 
large and comprehensive review and revision of Vietnam’s laws relevant to the WTO. On 
average, it normally passed about 10-15 laws per year but this increased to 20-30 laws 
during the peak of the accession reforms in 2005-2006 in addition to the amendment of 
many existing laws. The National Assembly approved 29 important laws in total to 
facilitate WTO membership including laws relating to trade, investment, corporations, 
customs, banking, insurance and taxation (MOFA 1995). In this way, the National 
                                                
36 Interview with diplomatic official of the Vietnam Embassy to Algeria, through Skype in 2017. 
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Assembly acted as a supporter to the WTO negotiations rather than as a political 
obstruction.  
Despite this change, the National Assembly was secondary to the government in terms of 
influencing trade policymaking. Two reasons accounted for this:  
• First, Vietnam’s political system is characterized by the leadership of the CPV over 
state organs in contrast to some Western countries (such as the United States) where 
legislatures have power over trade policy. Thus, the National Assembly, 90 per cent 
of which is comprised of CPV members, shared the same political views as the 
executive branch.  
• Secondly, National Assembly members worked on a part-time basis and their 
capacity to make judgments on complicated issues such as the WTO was limited. 
The process of WTO accession was complex and time-consuming. It required staff 
to be professionally trained in economics as postgraduates from foreign institutions 
and to understand international trade rules so as to draft new domestic laws. The 
shortage of such individuals was one of the National Assembly’s difficulties and 
contributed to a delay in the process of law-making to meet WTO requirements. 
As a result, the National Assembly was primarily focused on ratification, rather than 
decision-making itself, and was principally a facilitator of the negotiation process. This is 
in stark contrast to other countries – particularly the Congress in the United States 
(O'Halloran 1996) – where the legislature regulates and imposes constraints on how the 
executive can engage in external trade agreements. 
6.5 The negotiation approach of the central bureaucracy  
6.5.1 The objectives of the central bureaucracy 
In addition to the party’s central leadership, the central bureaucracy’s interests greatly 
impacted on WTO policymaking. This was because these state organs were directly 
responsible for the WTO accession in bilateral and multilateral negotiations. Their 
negotiation positions depended on their perception of their ability to balance the costs and 
 
 123 
benefits of WTO commitments in the sectors for which they were responsible. The 
reactions of different ministries were, therefore, varied:  
• Some ministries used available methods of protection, such as increasing tariffs to 
protect domestic products, as a defensive measure. In agriculture, for example, 
tariffs were defensively increased from 17.7 per cent in 1996 to 27.1 per cent in 
2004 before dropping back down to 21 per cent as the final tariff cut under the 
agreed WTO package (Bridonneau 2014). With such a tariff, agricultural 
bureaucrats were confident that farmers would not face bankruptcy owing to these 
protective steps combined with comprehensive agriculture reforms (Agroinfo News 
2007). 
• Other ministries took a more positive approach to trade liberalization. For example, 
the Ministry of Industry and Trade, especially its leaders, supported strong reforms 
and therefore undertook early action for trade liberalization (Perkins, Dapice et al. 
2013).  
• Being reformers, the relevant ministries could be cautious of possible negative 
impacts and prepared appropriate measures. For instance, during the negotiations on 
WTO accession, the Ministry of Finance was concerned with the reduced state 
budget revenue owing to tariff reductions, which resulted in very careful 
management of the tariff reduction schedule (Song 2015).  
The ability of ministries to engage in these behaviors was due to the fact that they retained 
vast discretionary power over policies in their relevant sectors, enabling a flexible approach 
to adjusting domestic laws and policy in line with WTO rules.37 The leadership’s ‘room to 
move’ in this regard was greater than was typical in Western liberal democracies where 
leaders are directly constrained by legislatures and indirectly restricted by stakeholders and 
public opinion.  
In addition to the discretionary power that facilitated policymaking and institutional 
reforms, ministries had to balance defensive and offensive interests. In regard to defensive 
interests, they hesitated to open up 100 per cent of the market as requested by WTO 
members, which showed a continuation of the cautious position displayed in the AFTA and 
                                                
37 Interview with diplomatic official of the Vietnam Embassy to Algeria, through Skype in 2015. 
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ASEAN negotiations. For example, Vietnam was under pressure from the United States to 
open the telecommunications sector by 100 per cent. However, representatives of the 
telecommunications sector claimed that it could only accept 49 per cent foreign ownership. 
The WTO’s position regarding the telecommunications sector was in line with the 
Telecommunication ministry’s integration roadmap that included two phases: the first 
phase until 2005 was for domestic competition and the second phase was for opening the 
market to foreign competition (Dinh 2004).  
Similarly, final agreements between Vietnam and the United States involved Vietnam’s 
allowing foreign banks to hold 30 per cent of its domestic joint-stock commercial banks 
and opening its insurance and stock markets (VCCI-Trung tam WTO 2010). The country 
set out quantitative restrictions on foreign investment by requesting joint ventures with 
local partners, such as advertising services, or foreign ownership caps in sectors such as 
freight transportation services or telecommunications (Amcham EU 2014). The 
commitments to open these sectors together with conditions for opening insurance and 
stock markets were agreed in exchange for removing the textiles and garments quota, which 
protected the second largest export sector.  
Protectionist pressures largely arose from sectors linked with bureaucracy-managed SOEs 
(Baccini, Impullitti et al. 2015). WTO members, especially the United States, were 
concerned about the monopoly powers of the SOEs and the support that the government 
provided them. Members made several requests: (1) the elimination of SOEs’ monopolies 
and subsidies (2) that reforms should require SOEs to do business based on commercial 
considerations; and (3) the inclusion of SOE privatization in the WTO accession (all 
despite the fact the WTO does not have specific regulations for SOEs!) (Tuoitre Online 
2006). In response to these demands, the state accelerated SOE reform by ‘equitizing’ (i.e., 
partial privatization) some of them and removing WTO prohibited subsidies while 
simultaneously taking advantage of WTO-permitted preferential and protective treatment 
for SOEs. Nonetheless, the sectors dominated by SOEs were able to enjoy higher barriers 
and longer tariff removal schedules than other sectors dominated by the private firms 
(Baccini, Impullitti et al. 2015). 
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The government also protected domestic market-oriented industries, such as the automotive 
sector, on the grounds of infant industry support. Such industries were perceived as being in 
need of protection owing to the fact that they were heavily dependent on state support: the 
contribution of state subsidies to the sector accounted for nearly 73 percent of their value-
added (James Riedel and Tran 1997). The Ministry of Industry and Trade protected these 
industries via a long transition period, for instance, the tariff for cars with engines with 
capacities of 2500 cc dropped from 90 per cent to 52 per cent over 12 years (VCCI-
TrungtamWTO 2010). In addition, the state protected sectors that were critical to the 
economy in order to shield them from competition. According to the Trade Minister 
(Central Committee of the Communist Party 2007), these sectors were services and energy 
industries such as petrochemicals, ship-building, securities, banking, energy supply, mining 
and civil aviation, distribution, and logistics (Flint 2011).  
In short, bureaucratic agencies had their own agendas for WTO accession and an 
institutional position that allowed them to shape the process in ways they favoured. The 
ministries’ direct involvement in the negotiation process allowed them to protect their own 
sectors and the SOEs under their management. Pluralistic policymaking was a new 
characteristic that made international trade policymaking more transparent and democratic 
with the participation of various stakeholders. The harmonization of diversified interests 
resulted in a more balanced approach to WTO policy. Different institutions and agencies 
had the chance to raise their voice to protect their sectoral interests and hence policymaking 
processes were influenced by both protectionist and open market viewpoints.  
6.5.2 Internal coordination mechanisms for WTO negotiations 
Inter-ministerial coordination for the negotiation of WTO accession was facilitated by the 
establishment of a negotiation delegation chaired by the Ministry of Industry and Trade 
(MOIT) in coordination with relevant ministries and agencies. After collecting individual 
plans from relevant ministries, MOIT consolidated and submitted the overall negotiation 
plans to the Politburo and the Government for consideration and approval. Most of the 
time, the Government accepted the negotiation plans proposed by the chief negotiator. 
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However, there were times when the plans failed when presented to external actors because 
of the high demands from the WTO members.38  
Internal coordination for the negotiation of WTO accession progressively changed from 
loose to tight cooperation among ministries. Coordination in the beginning phase of the 
negotiations was weak for several reasons. First, the capacity of government staff to deal 
with complicated WTO trade issues was weak and many officials were unfamiliar with 
provisions in some service sectors (Phan 2006). This weak capacity posed a barrier to 
making timely analyses of the costs and benefits of responses to partners’ demands and 
hence resulted in slow responses during negotiations. It could take a month for the relevant 
ministry to provide feedback regarding negotiation terms, another month for the MOIT to 
consolidate, and another month to submit the response to the government.39  
Secondly, different ministry representatives had opportunities to express their views before 
and during negotiations, which were sometimes not fully acknowledged by the coordinator. 
Bureaucratic coordination was fragmented with each institution having its own voice and 
authority in their sectors, which limited the coordination with others. As former Minister 
Truong Dinh Tuyen explained, the chief negotiator did not always know all of the 
negotiation plans prepared by the relevant state agencies (Vnexpress Online News 2005).  
In the last two years before accession, the government established a special mechanism for 
fast-tracking decision-making designed to overcome these shortcomings and better manage 
negotiations with difficult and highly demanding trade partners. The Prime Minister 
assigned a special envoy - the so-called “Mr. WTO”, Minister of Trade Truong Dinh Tuyen 
– to become directly involved in negotiations with the United States. Such a decision 
expanded the minister’s authority to finish the negotiations early with the United States, 
Vietnam’s most difficult and complicated partner, in May 2006, paving the way for 
conclusion of WTO accession (Nguyen 2018).  
In its final stage, WTO accession was also accelerated by the involvement of key political 
figures and reformers, such as the Deputy Prime Minister Vu Khoan. The Minister of 
MOIT could directly call the Deputy Prime Minister to ask for direction and approval of 
                                                
38 Interview with an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - through telephone in 2017. 
39 Interview with an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs - through telephone in 2017. 
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specific decisions. For complicated issues, the Deputy Prime Minister would convene 
meetings with the ministers of relevant sectors, bypassing slower bureaucratic channels. In 
this way, WTO negotiation was a dual process, with domestic and international 
negotiations occurring simultaneously over the same issues (VTV 2017). The special 
attention from the high-ranking officials accelerated the negotiation process as a result of 
the concerted effort to overcome the fragmentation of trade policymaking. 
Finally, the stability of the political regime offered benefits in terms of consistent trade 
policy. During the 11 years of WTO negotiation, there were only three ministers of trade. 
This low rate of leadership change resulted in stability and consistency within WTO 
policymaking. In addition, the leadership was all reform-orientated and strongly committed 
to completing the negotiations (VTV 2017). Thus, the institutional procedures and 
processes for WTO accession were changed to accelerate the negotiations. These changes 
were possible because of the political determination and commitment of the leadership 
towards completing the lengthy negotiation process. 
6.5.3 Central bureaucracy’s flexibility in the WTO negotiations  
Having been driven by the above-mentioned interests and facilitated by the described 
internal coordination, the central bureaucracy went through tough time and lengthened 
WTO negotiations, which forced them to be flexible and compromise to reach the deal. 
There are various reasons for such difficult negotiations, which were mainly due to big gap 
between Vietnam’s economic systems with that of the WTO members. Such a gap required 
the leaders’ dramatic changes of their mind-set, redefinition of their interests, balancing 
various interests, and transformation of institutional mechanisms against the WTO 
requirements.   
In the beginning of the WTO negotiations, the process was slow. Firstly, the lengthened 
process of the WTO negotiations was mainly because it took nearly seven years just to 
answer the WTO members’ queries regarding aspects of Vietnam’s foreign trade regime.40 
In addition, Vietnam’s trade negotiators found WTO issues alien in comparison with the 
socialist trading system to which they were accustomed. The limited knowledge and 
understanding of the Soviet Union-trained government officials who were only familiar 
                                                
40 Interview with official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2015. 
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with previous trade agreements and practices with socialist countries resulted in limited 
awareness of issues associated with WTO accession. Weak English literacy and academic 
capacity to carry out economic studies to analyze the impact of the WTO accession also 
limited negotiation capacity.41  
From 2001 onwards, with the emergence of a new top leadership group established at the 
9th CPV’s National Congress, a second generation of WTO trade negotiators replaced the 
first one. The second generation comprised younger officials who had received post-
graduate and/or professional training in developed countries such as Australia, New 
Zealand, Japan, and Singapore. This generation contributed greatly to the acceleration in 
WTO accession because they were young, enthusiastic, open-minded, and equipped with 
English literacy and knowledge about international trade (Luong 2017). Policymakers also 
received advice from international experts supported by the World Bank and the EU. These 
new technocrats carried out sectoral studies, undertook field trips to learn WTO-related 
experiences from other countries such as China, and received technical assistance funded 
by international organizations such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and 
AusAID (Auffret 2003). The negotiation for WTO accession thus facilitated the process of 
‘turning politicians into technocrats’ as they had to acquire knowledge about complicated 
WTO rules and issues. 
Secondly, the hesitate attitude of the party and government leaders was attributable to their 
concerns about the effect meeting with the WTO high requirements from trade partners 
could have in terms of any unexpected negative impacts on the economy. According to 
Deputy Prime Minister Vu Khoan, this ‘learning-by-doing’ process’ was the reason behind 
Vietnam’s gradualist approach to the WTO accession as well as its initial reluctance to 
engage in high-level tariff reduction (Vietnamnet News 2005). The bureaucracy took a 
conservative attitude to prevent the bankruptcy of firms, which could be beyond the state’s 
control and have unexpected consequences (Xuan 2002). The former chief trade negotiator 
of the BTA in 1997 explained that the Vietnamese government initially claimed the country 
should be categorized as a ‘least developed country’ and might, therefore, only have to 
accept WTO trade rules fully by 2020 (Huynh 2011).  
                                                
41 Interview with official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2015. 
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In 2003, just one year after the first bilateral negotiations began, Vietnamese negotiators 
were under both external and domestic pressures to accelerate the process. Externally, the 
negotiators were set with a target of completing the negotiations before the next WTO 
Round was completed (the Doha Round, at the time expected for 2004) in order to avoid 
the possible higher standards that it may deliver. As Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Manh 
Cam argued at the time, the Doha Round was expected to result in higher market access, 
less protection, and more policy transparency requirements, making it an imperative for 
Vietnam to accede under the easier Uruguay Round rules (Nghia 2002).  
On the other hand, quickly acceding to partner demands to complete before Doha might 
result in bigger concessions being made. Because the negotiators wanted to accelerate the 
WTO accession rather than to delay it, they had to accept many trade-offs in certain sectors, 
such as opening a range of service sectors at the behest of the EU (Truong 2013). For 
instance, in the two years following the WTO accession, the telecommunications sector was 
open to 100 per cent foreign-owned enterprises to provide registered services. This open 
commitment was possible because the telecommunications ministry was aware of the need 
for trade liberalization for the sector’s development, both from a business standpoint and as 
a state administrator. The leaders of the state-owned post and telecommunications 
corporations, who were the former Minister and Vice Minister of the Ministry, learned 
from foreign experts from the telecommunications sector in Germany, France and Italy. 
This experience helped them to adopt a less conservative and defensive approach to the 
concessions required by the WTO, and to view them instead as an opportunity to enact 
reforms (Vietnamnet News 2016). At the same time, some sectors would be less protected 
on WTO accession. For instance, in 2002, Vietnam continued to provide export subsidies 
for rice, coffee, pork, canned fruit, and vegetables as well as privileges for SOEs (Nghia 
2002). Early WTO accession also meant the end of these subsidies. Hence, domestically, 
the government was under pressure to broker domestic consensus among different interest 
groups relatively quickly. 
The party and government leaders were determined to move forward, thanks to the 
transformation in their view of Vietnam’s position in the global economy. Hitherto a 
relatively isolated economy, Vietnam had approached sectoral development policies on the 
basis of the requirements of its own economy. However, in the case of cooperating with 
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other countries through accession to the WTO, the country had to accept integration and 
competition, identify and concentrate on sectors with comparative advantage, and to some 
extent relinquish its weakly competitive sectors, facilitating the development of other 
economic sectors (Pham 2012).  
In addition, using the WTO accession requirements as effective leverage to balance 
conflicting interests, the leaders committed to changing laws to create a level playing field 
among enterprises, reducing the SOEs’ monopolies, subsidies, power, and role in the 
economy as well as credit from state-owned commercial banks by mandating that the SOEs 
conduct business following commercial criteria (Goh 2006). According to the Vice-
Minister of the Telecommunications Ministry, the removal of the SOE monopoly could 
create motivation for social development, positively impacting on consumers’ interests, and 
eliminating red tape that threatened the development of the sectors as well as the economy 
as a whole (Vietnamnet News 2014). The party and government leaders were then 
determined to implement the WTO’s basic trade liberalization rules and to adapt domestic 
economic rules to international economic standards and rules so that the country could 
integrate with the region and the world (Dinh, Le et al. 2006). As Deputy Prime Minister 
Vu Khoan argued, state officials realized that maintaining protection stagnated the 
economy, and vice versa (Vietbao News 2006). 
The increasing professionalism gained through the WTO negotiations also contributed to 
changing the state’s thinking about trade liberalization. The hesitant approach gradually 
gave way to a more confident posture as negotiations progressed. This thinking was 
influenced by the exchanges of ideas and the conduct of negotiations with trading partners. 
In addition, various seminars and studies were carried out. The World Bank organized the 
first seminar on the potential impact of the WTO on Vietnam’s economy in 2004, although 
this was too late in the final stage of negotiations to warn the government about possible 
risks. The seminar included the dissemination of fifteen internationally-authored studies 
and two nationally-authored studies from the Central Institute for Economic Management 
(Pham 2012). The study of the Central Institute for Economic Management in 2004 
analyzed the impact assessment of the WTO accession on jobs, wages and human resources 
development (CIEM 2004).  
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Despite the above changes in the thinking, in practice, the state still faced difficulties in 
balancing the various interests involved in these trade-offs. There was no overall 
international economic integration strategy that laid out specific plans and the timing for 
reducing and removing tariffs to open sectors in varying degrees in bilateral, regional, and 
global trade agreements (Ngo 2000). The studies focused more on a few aspects rather than 
providing an overall assessment of trade-offs among different sectors. The government 
lacked the ability to identify the positive and negative impacts on a sectoral basis; nor did 
they have a mechanism for building an overall strategy of balancing different interests, 
which would guide which sectors were to be prioritized and which were to be ‘sacrificed’.42 
Hence, the relevant ministers negotiated trade-offs not on the basis of these technical 
studies but rather through direct political negotiation with each other (VTV 2017). Hence, 
decisions were based more on the subjective assessment of the ministers for the potential 
overall impact of WTO accession rather than detailed evidence-based studies about the 
potential impacts of WTO accession on specific sectors. 
Facing high-pressure demands from the WTO members, the target of completing accession 
negotiations by 2005 could not be achieved partly because of a lack of reliable technical 
studies that could have facilitated the negotiations to move faster (Viet 2005). Instances for 
such tough trade partners’ requirements were relating to transparency, labour standards, 
non-market economy status, agriculture export subsidies, life insurance, ceiling for foreign 
ownership in banks, and services (Luong 2007).  
In many instances, the trade negotiators had to compromise and strictly followed the WTO 
rules. For example, the US requested Vietnam to remove government’s subsides provided 
for the textile and garment sector, which was regulated in the Decision no. 55 in 2001 
regarding domestic support for domestic businesses and production of textile and garment 
for export by 2010. The government considered the garment and textile as the key 
industrial sector for export, not only to create jobs for the society but also to firmly 
integrate to the world and region’s economy. The government also set the state economy to 
play the key and leading role in the sector development while encouraging participation of 
all economic sectors and foreign investors (Prime Minister 2001). The government finally 
                                                
42 Interview with diplomatic official of the Vietnam Embassy to Algeria, through Skype in 2017. 
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had to give up all types of support or subsidies that were not in compliance with the WTO 
rules as requested by WTO members.  
Underlying such government’s moves was the domestic debate. In 2005 the Deputy Prime 
Minister Vu Khoan stated that the country could only accept accession conditions that were 
possible to implement and that it was impossible to join the WTO without “all costs” fully 
evaluated because the economy could “collapse” (Thanhnien Daily 2005). However, he 
was criticized by academics about the vague term ‘all costs’, which were yet to be fully 
specified and analyzed (Viet 2005). Some elements of the leadership were cautious about 
the timing and the extent of commitments for accession. They were concerned that Vietnam 
should join the WTO only when Vietnam was well prepared in order to avoid unexpected 
compliance and implementation costs. They argued that if trade liberalization accelerated 
too quickly, domestic sectors could be harmed.43 In particular, there were concerns about 
negative impacts such as a decline in national security, regime instability, weak 
competitiveness, an increasing unemployment rate, farmers’ losses, bankruptcies, and 
removal of import licenses for automotives (Xuan 2002).  
The negotiations were finally pushed across the line in 2006 when regional leaders 
participating in the APEC Summit in Hanoi explicitly dealt with the issue of Vietnam’s 
WTO accession negotiations (VTV 2017). The whole Vietnamese political system, 
especially the leaders actively involved in political and diplomatic activities to enhance 
bilateral relationships with WTO members, were involved in these talks and lead-up 
activities designed to support them. The President and Prime Minister conducted many 
official visits to address obstacles with trade partners. For example, Prime Minister Phan 
Van Khai conducted official visits to the United States in 2005; President Tran Duc Luong 
visited Brazil, Chile, and Argentina in 2004; and the Chairman of the National Assembly 
visited the WTO office in 2005 and expressed Vietnam’s high political will and 
commitment to WTO accession (Ngo 2017). These visits contributed to a consolidation of 
the WTO members’ belief that Vietnam was serious about improving its legal system, 
which contributed to the completion of the multilateral negotiation round, which was 
formally ended in 2006 (Ngo 2017). 
                                                
43 Interview with diplomatic official of the Vietnam Embassy to Algeria, through Skype in 2017. 
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In short, WTO accession was made possible by the transformation of trade policy 
institutions that facilitated internal coordination amongst the Vietnamese bureaucratic 
agencies. In addition, the party and government leaders had transformed their thinking and 
interests, viewing trade liberalization (rather than protection) as a tool for fostering new 
development opportunities. However, this thinking only gradually took hold as it was 
constrained by ideas of the economy’s weak competitiveness that forced policymakers to 
make careful moves. Thus, WTO policymaking was strongly influenced by the 
transformation in policymakers’ ideas and interests, and in the institutions of trade 
policymaking.   
6.6 The WTO trade preferences of societal actors 
In general, enterprises supported WTO accession despite their lack of competitiveness. 
According to a survey carried out by the Economic Institute in 2003, about 70 per cent of 
enterprises wanted to join the WTO while 30 per cent were hesitant about the pressures of 
competition (Vietnamnet News 2003). The main reasons for support included expectation 
of new opportunities for development, including increased exports, attraction of foreign 
investment, fair treatment in partner markets (54%), and access to the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism (34%) (Nguyen 2003).  
Other reasons for the private sector’s support were the potential benefits from the WTO 
accession. Indeed, WTO accession was a catalyst for major changes for Vietnamese 
businesses, especially the nascent private sector. The most important benefit was the 
improved business environment in Vietnam owing to the reduction in tariffs, elimination of 
non-tariff barriers, subsidies, quotas, licenses, and increased market access. New trade rules 
established a more transparent and fair environment, aiding the formation of new business 
groups. Exporting firms also benefited considerably with increased market access to 
important foreign markets and greater opportunities to attract investment (VCCI 2009). 
Similarly, import-dependent firms benefited from WTO accession owing to reduced tariffs, 
particularly on imported machinery, equipment, and materials.  
Equally significant was the fact this changed business environment could reduce the power 
of previously protected groups, particularly incumbent SOEs. These firms would be subject 
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to competitive pressures owing to the removal of state support such as subsidies, qualitative 
restrictions on imports, high tariffs, and information gained from their informal relationship 
with the state (VCCI 2009). The removal of preferential treatment and protection was 
expected either to encourage the sectors to grow or to restructure into new activities. For an 
example of the latter, some sectors previously monopolized by the state – such as the 
telecommunications sector - would be able to expand into both the domestic market and 
global markets. 
In addition to the supporters, certain groups expressed their concerns, as WTO accession 
was a mixed development for the private business sector. Many firms, especially those in 
weakly competitive sectors such as some agriculture sectors were concerned about how 
competitive they were in international markets as they were typically the weakest 
businesses in terms of financial and technological capacity. With the exception of some key 
agricultural export sectors such as rice and coffee, agriculture was largely organized along 
traditional lines with rural farmers comprising one of the most economically vulnerable 
sectors in the Vietnamese economy. These weak agriculture industries faced more 
challenges compared to other sectors because of both domestic and external difficulties: 
• Many agricultural products, covering 500 tariff lines in the livestock, dairy, tropical 
fruit, and processed foods sectors, were subject to tariff reductions (VCCI 2009). 
For example, the tariff for beef and pork was cut from 20 per cent and 30 per cent 
respectively at the time of accession to 14 per cent and 15 per cent after 5 years 
(Tran 2009). This was the best negotiation result that Vietnam could achieve given 
demands to cut these tariffs to 0-5 per cent from Australia, Canada, and New 
Zealand (Tuoitre Online 2006). Meanwhile, Vietnam was successful in maintaining 
the same level of protection for 535 tariff lines (VCCI 2009), including live 
animals, rice, tea, and food sectors (VCCI - TrungtamWTO 2010).  
• Many agricultural sectors such as cane sugar and maize also faced competition from 
imports that were subsidized by developed economies (OXFAM International 
2004). Overall, farmers in the OECD countries received annual support government 
averaging at US$273 billion during the period of 2003-2005 (Tran 2009).    
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Similar to the banking and finance sectors, Vietnam’s agriculture sectors were not 
internationally competitive but, unlike banking and finance, they had little political power 
to influence the government because of a lack of political links to the government. While 
some agricultural associations were active, such as the Vietnam Cashew Association, 
Vietnam Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers, and Vietnam National Textile 
and Apparel Association, the majority was comparatively weak. As former Deputy Prime 
Minister Vu Khoan argued, they operated less as professional associations to advocate for 
business than as administrative organizations (Vietbao News 2006). The broader Farmers 
Union similarly operated more like a state organ than as a representative association, as 
reflected in the Prime Minister’s decision in 2011 to assign policymaking tasks to the 
Union (Prime Minister 2011). As a result, the sector relied mainly on experts from the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development to speak for their interests during WTO 
accession decision-making.44  
Surprisingly, opening the agricultural sector did not receive support from international 
NGOs such as OXFAM. OXFAM was not supportive of the government’s initial offer for 
an agricultural tariff of 25.3 per cent and publicly argued that this would create risks for 
rural livelihoods (OXFAM International 2004). Despite domestic opposition, the 25.3 per 
cent offer had to be reduced to 20 per cent by the end of negotiations under pressure from 
WTO members (VCCI 2015). Instead of tariffs, the government continued to rely on tariff 
quotas and safeguard measures, especially for pork, beef and poultry, despite the working 
group members’ request to Vietnam not to apply these measures (OXFAM International 
2004). However, WTO restrictions applied to these safeguards were limited, with tariff 
quotas only applicable for sugar, eggs, tobacco leaves and salt. This trade-off was necessary 
to obtain quota removals from WTO partners in the textiles, garments, rice, coffee, and 
pepper, and fruit sectors. In this way, the leadership accepted losses in certain areas as 
trade-offs for gains in others. It believed that competition could help enterprises learn to 
cope with new challenges and hence opportunities would prevail over challenges.45  
                                                
44 Interview with official from the WTO negotiation delegation in 2016. 
45 Interview with official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2015. 
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6.7 Patterns of interaction between state and societal actors 
As WTO accession greatly impacted on societal actors, it is important to evaluate their role 
in the policymaking process. Few business associations with some input from non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) as well, were among the main societal actors that 
engaged with the WTO accession process. To what extent did societal actors engage with 
policymaking in order to shape it towards their interests? Although they generally support 
the WTO accession, they - especially the private business sectors - had limits in direct 
influence on WTO policymaking despite the fact they were the main stakeholders. In WTO 
policymaking, the communist party and government acted as decision-makers and agenda-
setters for international trade. On the other hand, societal actors, principally businesses, 
acted as consultation and information providers. This relationship was therefore, distinctly 
asymmetric, and worked in favour of the state’s interests and ideas.  
While the government secured strong support from the public for accession, the 
participation of societal actors in WTO policymaking was limited. The leaders recognized 
the need to provide information that could impact on key interest groups and to consult 
with enterprises and business associations in order to create a consensus for the agreed 
reforms (National Assembly 2006). In addition, central policymakers and state research 
institutes had close contacts and consulted with business associations and farmers through 
various visits and direct interviews, and were, therefore, aware of the difficulties as well as 
the demands of the sectors in regard to the WTO negotiations (Tran, Vu et al. 2015). 
However, what they could obtain from the business associations was limited. According to 
statistics provided by the Statistics Department of Ho Chi Minh City, about 97 per cent of 
enterprises had little or very little information about WTO accession (Dantri News 2005).  
The limited influence of societal actors on WTO policymaking was due to two principal 
factors. First, from an institutional perspective, there were no formal mechanisms for 
consultation between the state and society in regard to WTO accession. This institutional 
shortfall resulted in ad hoc consultation on the basis of requests from the government. 
There were only a few business associations who had access to policymakers such as the 
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Vietnam Textile and Garment Association.46 These sectors were able to attract the attention 
of policymakers because of their large quantities of exports.  
Secondly, the legacy of the command and control economy, top-down approach in trade 
policymaking since the centrally planned economy continued to shadow the WTO trade 
policymaking and hence limited the societal actors’ role. From the negotiators’ perspective, 
the accession process was too complicated for the negotiators to consult with enterprises 
due to the WTO’s coverage of large ranges of issues and technical capacity restraints of 
both the government and enterprises, as explained by former Minister of Trade Truong 
Dinh Tuyen (Vietnamnet News 2007).  
From the societal actors’ perspective, businesses and academics criticized the government 
for keeping information about the WTO negotiation confidential. It was difficult for 
businesses, intellectuals, and academics to follow the process because of a lack of available 
information, except for government consultations with major interest groups such as 
textiles associations and footwear associations (Pham 2012). Only these associations 
managed to access the trade negotiators.47 Even personal contacts between the Vice-
Chairwoman of the VCCI and trade minister and chief trade negotiators could not assist in 
obtaining information regarding the obstacles in the WTO negotiations (Pham 2012). 
Moreover, enterprises could not be sure whether their recommendations were taken into 
consideration by negotiators (VCCI 2013). The interest groups that had a better relationship 
with the government had a higher chance of getting their voices heard to protect their 
interests. In addition, companies continued to rely on the state’s protection as an 
institutional legacy of the centrally planned economy where the state supported firms 
(Pham 2012).   
In short, the business community played only a secondary role in WTO policymaking. 
Instead of actively exploring the new ‘offensive’ opportunities that WTO membership 
would offer, its approach focussed on ‘defensive’ efforts to maintain as much protection as 
possible. This attitude created domestic pressure for protection against the external 
pressures for market opening.  
                                                
46 Interview with official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2015. 




This chapter has explained the process of Vietnam’s trade policymaking during its WTO 
accession. As the WTO had comprehensive requirements for both bilateral and multilateral 
trade negotiations, Vietnam’s existing trade policymaking approaches were adapted to fit 
with the new external requirements. The analysis shows that WTO policy was a result of 
balancing between strategic push factors (predominantly decided and influenced by the 
leadership of the party-state) and domestic pull factors (relating to concerns about the 
uncompetitive economy). The compromises struck between these different objectives were 
a product of the ideas, interests, and institutions of involved actors. 
The key features of Vietnam’s WTO trade policymaking were, therefore, the following. 
First, the role of the central leadership was essential in providing a strategic push for 
openness as this group was the most committed to the importance of WTO accession and 
they were in a strong political position to provide strategic direction. The party-state 
initiated and drove the process of negotiation whereas societal actors played only a 
secondary role that had a limited impact on the WTO policymaking mechanisms.  
However, important changes occurred in the realm of ideas about trade policy as Vietnam 
accepted the international trade rules mandated by the WTO. These included accepting the 
MFN and NT principles, significant removal of both tariff and non-tariff barriers, and 
opening some new sectors in services such as logistic services for the first time. In addition, 
the WTO rules for transparency created new opportunities for public participation. The 
WTO was a part of an overall strategy for international economic integration through a 
foreign policy strategy of diversification and multilateralization.  
The extent of the leadership’s determination was reflected in the length of the negotiations. 
The WTO accession process generated anxieties amongst involved interest groups and the 
state itself. These concerns resulted in hesitation to remove tariffs or to open critical and 
sensitive areas. Other constraints related to the protection of the beneficiaries of the old 
economic system, particularly the SOEs. The concessions and compromises required saw 
the negotiators adopt more reform-minded positions than Vietnam had taken in any of its 
previous trade agreements While accession was not completed as expected in 2005 because 
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of domestic concerns, efforts from the leadership to build a consensus ensured that they 
were finalized only one year later in 2006.  
The WTO policymaking process thus became more pluralistic with the involvement of an 
increasing number of stakeholders in the decision-making process. Pluralistic policymaking 
supported more inclusive policymaking, which contributed to the success of the negotiation 
process. This new development was a step forward compared to the previous phase of 
Vietnam’s trade reform in which the state had a monopoly of trade policymaking and 
sought little input from non-state actors. At the same time, the role of the central 
bureaucracies (beyond the trade ministry) was also enhanced because of the complex nature 
of the WTO accession. Accession required the involvement of various stakeholders, 
including different ministries, agencies, and academic experts. In addition, the complicated 
nature of the WTO rules required professionalism and technical expertise from staff. 
Accordingly, different ministries and agencies had the opportunity to influence trade 
policymaking by bringing their preferences and interests into the process.   
WTO accession was also influenced by certain factors. First, trade policymaking 
coordination was fragmented within the state, and between the state and society, 
contributing to delays in the process. Policymakers perceived the WTO accession as a 
complicated process, and hence, consultations were difficult. Secondly, the enterprises were 
inactive because of a lack of information, professionalism, and technical knowledge. 
Thirdly, there was a lack of coordination as demonstrated by the delayed communications 
among ministries owing to the weak capacity of the staff and the low level of enthusiasm of 
the relevant agencies, which delayed the process of negotiation. The situation changed with 
the completion of hundreds of negotiation rounds in the final stages of negotiation. 
The above discussion has demonstrated that policymakers had a mix of motivations, which 
shaped Vietnam’s position in the WTO accession process. While being pulled by the 
strategic significance of the WTO accession, the process was also pulled by concerns 
relating to the uncompetitiveness of domestic sectors. Significantly, there were concerns for 
the sectors at risk of failure or sectors that were core economic pillars, which were 
supported by the relevant ministries and SOEs. Generally, the state’s approach was 
balanced. Trade liberalization through WTO accession prevented any chance of returning to 
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a protectionism approach, and hence laying a foundation for further trade liberalization in 





Chapter 7: Case Study 2: Vietnam’s participation in 




7.1 Introduction  
Vietnam’s participation in the TPP was its most important trade policy decision in the post-
WTO accession phase. While WTO accession represented Vietnam’s most comprehensive 
reforms, the TPP, as a regional FTA, required an even higher standard of reforms. 
Participating in the TPP reflected the growing ambition of the Vietnamese government to 
engage in trade liberalization despite the many economic and political difficulties that 
would have been faced to close the gap between Vietnam and the other TPP members. 
Vietnam’s TPPP policy hence raises a research puzzle regarding the reasons underlying 
Vietnam’s moves. How can we explain such a radical decision by a developing country 
such as Vietnam? Why did the leadership decide to make a serious decision to join the TPP 
despite differences between Vietnam and the other TPP members in terms of level of 
development and competitiveness, geographical location, and political regime? As the TPP 
would have set very high standards that could have generated opposition and debate, how 
was it possible for Vietnam’s leaders to harmonize differences among relevant domestic 
actors?  
This chapter argues that TPP policy was driven by the leadership’s determination to 
accelerate international economic integration. Similar to the WTO accession, TPP 
policymaking was characterized by the supreme leadership of the CPV and the central 
bureaucracy. In addition, trade policymaking was more flexible and adaptable in meeting 
the TPP’s high demands owing to the state’s transformation of its ideas and interests. 
Moreover, the trade policy process was more participatory with greater involvement of 
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societal actors, although still limited. The chapter begins with an explanation of the state’s 
overall interests that drove Vietnam’s decision to join the TPP. It follows with an 
exploration of how Vietnam approached the TPP. Finally, it discusses domestic politics by 
identifying the transformation in the central bureaucracy’s thinking and positions as well as 
the impact of different interest groups. 
7.2 Background to the TPP: A high-standard regional FTA 
The TPP began life in 2005 as a ‘mini-FTA’ among four relatively disparate countries: 
New Zealand, Chile, Singapore and Brunei. While small, the agreement attracted the 
attention of the United States, which began a process of starting negotiations for an 
expanded agreement with greater regional impact (USTR 2008). Negotiations for the 
expanded agreement would eventually grow to include 12 countries including Australia, 
New Zealand, Japan, Canada, Malaysia, Vietnam, Mexico, Brunei, Singapore, the United 
States, Chile, and Peru.  
The TPP had several unique characteristics in comparison with traditional FTAs in the Asia 
Pacific. First, when the United States decided to join the TPP agreement in 2009, it 
upgraded it to an FTA with several key features. These were “comprehensive market 
access”, a “regional approach to commitments”, “addressing new trade challenges”, 
“inclusive trade” and a “platform for regional integration” (USTR 2015). It covered not 
only in traditional areas of tariffs and quotas but also so-called ‘WTO Plus’ areas such as 
investment, services, intellectual property rights, environmental standards, labour rights, 
and investor state dispute settlement. Secondly, the TPP’s ambitious aims were to set a 
higher standard for FTAs, greatly contributing to regional economic integration (Wilson 
2016) and shaping the emerging order and trade architecture in the Asia Pacific. As a mega-
regional trade agreement, the TPP was expected to serve as an alternative to the Doha 
Round agenda and overcome challenges caused by the “spaghetti bowl” effect of regional 
FTAs (Inu Barbee and Lester 2014). Thirdly, the TPP was attractive not only because of its 
trade ambitions but also because of its geopolitical significance given the broader picture of 
strategic competition among major powers in the Asia-Pacific region. The TPP was 
considered an economic wing in the US strategy of ‘rebalancing’ towards Asia and as a 
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counterweight to China, which would maintain the United States’ position as the region’s 
leading economic power.  
At the invitation of the United States, Vietnam announced that it would join the TPP 
negotiations in November 2010 after acting as an associated member since March 2010 
(MOIT 2012). The negotiations went through more than 30 technical sessions and 10 
ministerial-level sessions. By October 2015, negotiations for the agreement had been 
completed (MOIT 2015) and it was officially signed in 2016.  
However, the agreement could not be implemented because the United States formally 
withdrew right after the new President Trump’s inauguration (USTR 2017). Such a 
withdrawal was due to Trump’s concerns of negative impacts of the TPP on the US’s 
economy, particularly the potential loss of millions of jobs in the United States. Despite the 
trends of anti-globalization and protectionism, the remaining 11 members of the TPP were 
determined to renegotiate the TPP with a new name – the Comprehensive and Progressive 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) under the leading of the Japan, and finally signed the 
agreement in early 2018. By November 2018, 7 countries had ratified the CPTPP (Mexico, 
Japan, Singapore, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Vietnam). The signing and ratification 
of the CPTPP for its effectiveness in 2019 demonstrated the role and voice of the small and 
medium countries in the Asia Pacific region in shaping the regional economic and trade 
architecture by their consistent support for the multilateral free trading system and 
globalization.  
TPP membership presented several challenges for the Vietnamese government. The most 
challenging issue was the large development gap between Vietnam and the TPP members. 
Even with six developing country members, the TPP was a ‘developed country’-style 
agreement that included WTO Plus regulatory provisions suited to developed economy 
interests. Vietnam had until this time largely been in ‘global’ (WTO) or ‘developing’ 
country (AFTA) type agreements. Vietnamese firms would face significantly higher levels 
competition from multinational corporations than in any of its previous trade agreements, 
especially in government procurement. Other required reforms relating to rules of origin for 
the apparel and textiles sector, intellectual property, SOE reforms, labour standards and 
legal reforms promised to be very costly for Vietnam (Hoang 2014). Politically, it faced 
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difficulties in terms of its major power relationships as China interpreted the TPP as a 
means for the United States to lure Vietnam and other Asian countries into an anti-China 
economic bloc (Naughton, Kroeber et al. 2015).   
One advantage of the TPP was that it was negotiated on the basis of reciprocity. Unlike the 
WTO accession negotiations in which Vietnam had to accept the requirements of the WTO 
members, TPP negotiations involved the reciprocal exchange of trade preferences. The 
results of the TPP negotiations were a product of bargaining (trade-offs?) among Vietnam’s 
various offensive and defensive interests.  
In addition, Vietnam could greatly benefit from the TPP owing to its high liberalization 
commitments. To achieve the objective of ensuring comprehensive market access, TPP 
members committed to tariff removal for 78-95 per cent of product lines at the time of the 
agreement’s ratification, which would rise to 97-100 per cent by the end of the 
implementation schedule (see table below). Tariffs for many of Vietnam’s key exports 
would drop to 0 per cent in major markets, particularly for agricultural products, fishery 
products, textiles and garments, footwear, furniture, and electronics. Vietnam committed to 
removing 100 per cent of tariff lines according to an 11-year tariff removal gradual 
schedule (Ministry of Finance 2015). Moreover, the country would improve its 
attractiveness to large foreign investments owing to its comparative advantage in terms of 






Table 7-1: Tariff elimination applied by TPP partners for Vietnam  
 
 Tariff elimination on entry-
into-force 
Tariff elimination by full 
implementation 
TPP as a whole  78-95% 97-100% 
Canada  94.9% 96.3% in 4 years 
United States   Almost 100% in 15 years 
Japan  86%  95.6% in 11 years 
Mexico 77.2%  98% in 10 years 
Peru  80.7% 99.4% in 17 years 
Vietnam  65.8% 97.8% in 11 years 
Australia  93%  100% in 4 years 
New Zealand  94.6%  100% in 7 years 
Singapore  100%  
Malaysia  84.7% 99.9% in 11 years 
Chile  95.1%  99.9% in 8 years 
Brunei  92%  100% in 11 years 
Source: Ministry of Finance. Summary of tariff commitments in the TPP, retrieved 
18/2/2018, available at http://trungtamwto.vn/tin-tuc/tom-tat-cam-ket-thue-quan-trong-tpp-
thong-cao-bao-chi-cua-bo-tai-chinh  
 
In exchange for these benefits, Vietnam had to open domestic markets for TPP members 
and therefore would be subject to extraordinary competitive pressures (Duong and Tran 
2016). For example, Vietnam would open its stock market and new service sectors such as 
trans-border investment portfolio management services, consultation services, and financial 
data processing. The TPP required Vietnam to make liberalizing reforms in new areas such 
as government procurement and financial services by reducing tariff and non-tariff barriers 
to eliminate behind-the-border protection. Vietnam would also need to comply with a 
demanding set of investment protections backed up by an ISDS mechanism (Ministry of 
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Finance 2015). Other policy reforms in trade-related areas were also required. For example, 
the TPP contained a labour chapter that required extensive reforms for Vietnam’s labour 
regime. In these ways, the TPP offered both very large benefits for Vietnam in comparison 
with its previous trade reforms but would also impose very high demands. This situation 
would require Vietnamese policymakers to consider complex trade-offs between its 
offensive and defensive trade interests. The next section discusses how state and non-state 
actors balanced these trade-offs during the TPP negotiating process. 
7.3 The party-state  
7.3.1 The essential role of the Communist Party of Vietnam  
Owing to the TPP’s strategic significance, the CPV’s Politburo paid special attention to the 
TPP negotiations (and CPTPP later). The Politburo closely supervised, set out major 
principles and objectives and handled any issues arising from the TPP negotiations and 
received regular reports from the government to ensure party leadership approval prior to 
submission for National Assembly ratification (Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of Vietnam 2016). According to the instruction of the Politburo, the Government Caucus 
Commission of the Communist Party prepared and reported the Politburo the result of 
negotiation of the TPP agreement for instructions, which in turn submitted to the 14th 
Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam in 
2016. The Committee discussed the result of negotiation, overall impacts, including those 
on national security and politics, opportunities and challenges, remedial solutions, and 
passed the signing of TPP for submission to the National Assembly’s ratification 
(Nguoilaodong 2016).  
The communist party maintained its consistent policy of supporting the TPP, which was 
made on the basis of the interests of promoting the regime legitimacy. Accordingly, the 
TPP has become an effective tool for the party to maintain the economic performance-
based regime legitimacy due to its potential strategic economic interests. The strategic 
economic growth itself is also one of the state’s interests.  
Indeed, the TPP was very promising in terms of economic interests. The Prime Minister 
Nguyen Tan Dung identified three principal benefits from participating in the TPP: market 
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access and attraction of foreign investment, assisting domestic reforms, and advancing 
foreign policy interests. Firstly the TPP shared a similar economic logic to WTO accession. 
Specifically, this included facilitating Vietnam’s comprehensive market access and 
investment attractiveness, ensuring mobile and free movement of goods, service, capital, 
and technology, and creating a non-discriminatory and fair business environment (Prime 
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung 2016). Vietnam was expected to increase market access and 
investment with TPP members because there was significant scope for exports to the TPP 
bloc, of which the collective GDP amounted to more than US$20 trillion. Secondly, the 
TPP members were Vietnam’s leading importers and included complementary economies 
such as the United States, Japan, and Australia (Phan 2015). This offered opportunities for 
market access for key exports such as textiles and garments by making use of tariff free 
access (Biswas 2016).  
A key implication of the increased market access to TPP economies was to diversify export 
markets, offsetting a long-standing trade deficit problem with China and East Asia 
(Ministry of Planning and Investment 2010). Moreover, the quality of imports and export 
could be improved by expanding trade with highly developed countries such as the United 
States and Japan, whereby Vietnam could access technology goods (Dao, Nguyen et al. 
2013). Thus, the intra-group trade liberalization among the TPP members was expected to 
promote growth, create jobs, and increase income as a result of the free movement of 
goods, services, capital and technology (Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung 2016).  
Secondly, similar to other FTAs, the TPP was expected to create external pressure to 
leverage further domestic reforms. As argued by the Prime Minister in his New Year 
message of 2014, these reforms were needed in order to create a new impetus behind 
development (Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung 2014). TPP policy was in line with both 
‘traditional’ development thinking of building a market mechanism as well as being 
compatible with ‘new’ development thinking of inclusive, green and sustainable 
development (Vo 2014). The TPP was expected to create a more favourable business 
environment as it would promote more extensive and intensive market opening of the trade 
in goods, services, investment, intellectual property rights and government procurement to 
create fair competition and a transparent business environment (Prime Minister Nguyen 
Tan Dung 2016).  
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Thirdly, in line with the foreign policy objective of enhancing the country’s position in the 
regional and global architecture, Vietnam’s leaders also believed that it could improve its 
international status by participating in the TPP (The Office of the Government 2016). The 
chief TPP negotiator stated that Vietnam’s membership of the TPP would signal a message 
and a positive image to the international community that it was both a dynamic and active 
player through its commitments to a higher level of trade liberalization (Ngoc 2016).  
The CPV’s TPP policy is also driven by the advantages that Vietnam could also gain from 
playing the role of an important player in the regional trade architecture. Including the TPP 
it would become one of the few economies that had FTAs with the world’s largest 
economies including ASEAN, the United States, the EU, China, Japan, Canada, Australia, 
and Russia (Minh and Ngoc 2016). This status would make the country an especially 
attractive destination for investors. The aim was to turn Vietnam into a significant part of 
the global trade network covering world’s leading economies and to position itself better in 
global value chains (Herr, Schewisshelm et al. 2016).  
At the same time, Vietnam’s leaders were ambitious about its opportunity to participate in 
formulating new trade rules to reshape the regional and world trade architecture. 
Participating in the TPP could give Vietnam a say in making trade rules it considered fair 
and beneficial for developing economies, and thus protect its unique trade interests. This 
ambitious objective could only be achieved through the TPP not through bilateral FTAs, 
which mainly focused on bilateral market access swaps rather than setting new trade rules 
at the regional level. Participation in the TPP thus demonstrated a transformation of 
Vietnam’s trade outlook in which, for the first time, the country had ambitions to formulate 
rather than just accept rules set by developed countries. One particular example of such 
rule-making leadership was Vietnam’s advocacy of the so-called ‘yarn forward’ rules of 
origin arrangements for garments and textiles (Nguyen 2011).  
In addition to the economic performance, the legitimacy of the party’s TPP policy was 
rationalized on the basis of its unique geopolitical, foreign policy and security aspects. The 
Central Committee of the Party stated that being one of the first participating members of 
the TPP would confirm Vietnam’s important role in regional geopolitics (Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam 2016). Indeed, through the TPP, Vietnam 
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hoped to balance its relationship with the region’s major powers, given the strategic 
competition for power between rising and declining powers in the Asia-Pacific region 
(Wethington and Manning 2015). The TPP helped Vietnam to take advantage of the 
American presence as a political and economic heavyweight that was strong enough to 
counter China. This was especially important given Vietnam’s economic dependence on 
China, which had become increasingly assertive in the South China Sea dispute. 
Economically, the strengthening economic relationship with the United States could help to 
strengthen the bilateral relationship and cover the heavy trade deficit with traditional 
markets, especially China.  
Indeed, these non-economic aspects of the TPP loomed large in Vietnam’s decision to join 
the bloc. Increasing engagement with the United States and other countries in the region 
was a key objective of Vietnam’s foreign policy of ‘internationalizing’ the South China Sea 
dispute, which was designed to help manage security tensions with China. Policymakers 
believed the US presence in the TPP would change the regional strategic context owing to 
its strategic, political and economic weight. Besides, the relationship with the United States 
was so important that it could greatly influence relationships with other countries, 
especially US allies such as Japan, Australia and South Korea. Thus, the TPP combined 
dual economic and strategic objectives in a way that no other Vietnamese trade agreement 
had hitherto done. 
In addition, the TPP was also important because it became a standard template that would 
serve as a foundation for Vietnam’s future FTAs. The Ministry of Justice reported that 
because of the MFN principle, some of Vietnam’s TPP commitments could be applied to 
already signed FTAs with 40 other countries including the EU, ASEAN and Russia 
(Vietnam Government Portal News 2016). 
On the other hand, one of the most important concerns for the party is to ensure that the 
TPP members respect the regime. As in the BTA negotiations, the state needed trading 
partners to express respect for the CPV regime before being prepared to accept this 
measure. It ultimately fell to the Prime Minister to confirm officially that the TPP respected 
the political regime of each member and excluded matters relating to national defense and 
security (Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung 2016). Policymakers made commitments on 
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purely commercial grounds and wherever possible avoided elements that could negatively 
impact on political stability. This practice reflected leaders’ unchanged concerns regarding 
political regime survival in the future. 
The party was also concerned with TPP terms that, in the party’s views, could cause 
potential risks regarding the regime maintenance such as the free association right to 
workers. The labour rights issue attracted the most contending views as it related to 
concerns about the stability of the CPV regime. At the time of TPP negotiations began, the 
government-controlled Vietnam’s General Confederation of Labor (VGCL) and its local 
branches were the only lawful social political organizations in charge of labor and trade 
union issues. The leadership thought that the establishment of independent, grassroots trade 
union organizations should not be encouraged and the trade unions’ job of protecting 
workers should be placed under the leadership of the communist party, which was provided 
in Article 13, Constitution in 2013 (National Assembly 2013). This was because they were 
afraid that freedom of association would be abused and would expand from trade unions to 
political areas. An interview with an official from the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam 
notes that in a worst-case scenario, this might ultimately result in a plural party system, 
which conflicted with the political ideas of a single, communist ruling party.48 
The labour rights provisions in the TPP were also relevant to the wider issue of human 
rights in general, which have been among the most sensitive political issues in the 
relationship between the United States and Vietnam. Although human rights are not trade 
issues, the US government, lobbied by a group of radical Democrats in Congress, saw the 
TPP as a mechanism for disseminating US values of democracy and human rights. This 
raised the possibility of Vietnamese leaders interpreting this as a part of an attempt to 
change the political regime in Vietnam. They were opposed to any intention to use human 
rights to intervene Vietnam’s internal affairs. To overcome this mistrust, the first visit of 
the General Secretary of the Communist Party to the United States in 2015 was regarded as 
reflecting US respect for Vietnam’s political regime according to the chairman of the 
CPV’s Commission for Foreign Relations (Hoang 2015). This visit laid an important 
                                                
48 Interview with official from the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam in 2015 
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bilateral political foundation between the two countries as well as building mutual trust to 
overcome difficult issues in the TPP, including labour rights issues.  
The party leadership already recognized the inefficiency of the VGCL in handling labour 
problems. Some 4922 spontaneous strikes had occurred during the period of the first Labor 
Code operating between 1995 and 2012 (Quoc 2013). The number of disputes was expected 
to increase as a result of increasingly complicated industrial relations in a market economy. 
The new economic situation required changes in old institutions characterized by the 
centralized power of the VGCL. As a result, the party leadership, while very cautious about 
labour issues in the TPP, was nonetheless willing to consider what were clearly necessary 
domestic reforms. 
Several options were outlined including the establishment of many independent trade 
unions/workers’ organizations, improving labour laws and regulations, and/or improving 
the VGCL together with the establishment of independent trade unions (Mai 2016). Some 
scholars contended that enterprises exporting to the United States had already met US 
requirements including those about trade unions. This was because in exporting to the 
United States, Vietnamese contractors had to comply with orders from US firms, such as 
Nike and Adidas, which applied US requirements relating to labour standards. As a result, 
Vietnam needed only to make commitments for labour reform in traded-sectors. However, 
some government officials were concerned about the very thin line between traded sectors 
and the rest of the economy, making it politically infeasible to reform labour standards in 
some sectors and not others.49 Although the VGCL participated directly in the TPP 
negotiations to protect their monopoly interests, it had to accept institutional changes in line 
with a more competitive environment.  
In the end, Vietnam and the United States came to a bilateral solution to the labor issue in 
2015 under which grass-roots labor unions could choose to establish their organization 
without prior authorization and register with the VGCL or a competent government body in 
order to operate (Damond 2013). A five-year schedule was permitted as a transitional 
period in Vietnam’s case only, which would help Vietnam to improve domestic laws and 
organizational mechanisms. After five years, workers could establish regional or sectoral 
                                                
49 Interview with official of the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam in 2015 
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trade unions based on previous grass-roots organizations. These changes were not only due 
to negotiating pressure from the TPP but also to the leadership’s realization that the VGCL 
should face competition rather hold on their monopoly status in order to improve its 
capacity.   
Thus, the regime legitimacy interests backed up with potential strategic political, economic 
benefits of the TPP have been the main basis for CPV’s strong and consistent support. Such 
top party leaders’ political will and support for the TPP together with their close 
supervision were among the most important factors for speeding up the TPP negotiations.  
7.3.2 The role of the National Assembly 
The role of the National Assembly in the TPP negotiation was similar to its role in the 
WTO accession, namely, limited to discussion with voters, internal discussion and debate, 
and ratification of required laws. Because of the confidentiality nature of the TPP 
negotiations, the interaction between the executive agencies and the legislative branch was 
limited, which from time to time caused frustration amongst parliamentary members. The 
members of the National Assembly publicly stated that their only source of information 
about the TPP was the mass media, which was unofficial and which provided conflicting 
views. They requested the government to report to the National Assembly about the 
signing, organization and implementation of the TPP (Chi 2015). The government therefore 
consulted regularly with the committees of the National Assembly, as related by the Vice-
Trade Minister (Nguoilaodong News 2015). 
7.3.3 The central bureaucracy’s views regarding the TPP 
While the Politburo is the final decision maker of the TPP from strategic points of view, the 
government, particularly the executives including the Prime Minister, and leaders of the 
relevant ministries, similar to the WTO negotiations, was directly responsible for 
instructions for the negotiations of the TPP. At the lower level, the bureaucracies, including 
the relevant ministries, carried out 30 technical sessions and 10 ministerial-level sessions 
during the more than five years of negotiations before conclusion of the TPP in 2016 (The 
14th Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam 
2016). The middle and low-ranking officials at the ministries participated in collecting 
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information, drafting and formulating the policy. Hence, the TPP trade policymaking 
involved with the bureaucrats, executives and leadership. Given this context, how central 
bureaucracy viewed the TPP greatly influenced the process of negotiation of the TPP and 
the TPP trade policymaking. 
In reaching the TPP agreement, the central bureaucracy displayed both continuity and 
transformation in its trade policy thinking toward trade liberalization. First, the central 
bureaucracy applied a quick approach to the TPP negotiation. Vietnam was still a relatively 
closed economy compared to several developed TPP members, as many goods had 
comparatively higher MFN tariffs and were still going through long schedules of tariff 
removal. To meet TPP requirements, Vietnam had to change from a ‘slow’ approach used 
previously in the ASEAN-centered FTAs to a ‘quick’ approach with much shorter (at most, 
11-year) implementation schedules. For the previous ASEAN+1 FTAs, Vietnam faced 
tariff elimination requirements below 90 per cent of all tariff lines (Mireya Solis 2017). By 
entering a trade agreement comprised of highly liberalized and developed-member 
countries such as Australia, Singapore, and New Zealand, Vietnam committed to achieve a 
high level of trade liberalization (97.8 per cent in 11 years). This level was much higher 
than that of the Vietnam-Japan FTA in which Vietnam committed to 75.2 per cent (Nguyen 
and Tran 2017). 
Second, the central bureaucracy accepted a larger coverage of the TPP commitments 
compared to other previous FTAs. Instead of the narrow approach in the ASEAN-centered 
FTAs that focused mainly on goods, the TPP was more comprehensive in covering both 
goods and services, and border and behind-the-border areas. These areas, often known as 
‘WTO Plus’ commitments, included SOEs, intellectual property, government procurement, 
ISDS, and labour and environment conditions (Tran 2014). As part of the enforceability of 
higher and stronger commitments in labor and the environment, the TPP also included 
stronger dispute settlement mechanisms, which linked Vietnam’s commitments on labour 
issues to many of the commercial benefits (Jean and Lefebvre 2015). Regarding rules of 
origin, Vietnam accepted the TPP’s self-certification of origin mechanism that would apply 
for both importers and exporters, whereas its previous ASEAN commitments only applied 
this to exporters (Staples, Le et al. 2017). In addition, Vietnam opened new areas, 
especially in financial services such as cross-border investment advice and portfolio 
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management services and services in support of cross-border proprietary trading or client’s 
account trading, and cross-border processing of financial data (Vietbao News 2006). 
Moreover, policymakers for the first time had to digest some new approaches to making 
trade agreements. One example was the ‘negative list’ approach to reform commitments 
that required states to ask for sectoral opt-outs to provisions. Although the TPP’s negative 
list approach saved negotiation resources by not requiring sector-by-sector calculations, it 
also promised a much higher level of trade liberalization. In addition, it was less restrictive 
than the positive list approach in which countries listed the products and services on which 
they agreed to lower tariffs. Vietnam’s trade negotiators were more familiar with the 
positive approach adopted in previous negotiations such as the WTO and the FTAs between 
ASEAN and partners. The negative list approach in the TPP posed new challenges for trade 
negotiators because they could not know exactly what they had committed to and 
committed away, especially in areas that were fast developing and changing such as service 
sectors. Despite some initial difficulties, howeer, the negative list approach was expanded 
for inclusion even in domestic law-making in the National Assembly, which was required 
to implement TPP commitments (Nguyen 2014). Hence, participating in the TPP reflected 
Vietnam’s commitments to experiment with new approaches to liberalization compared to 
what had come before.  
The inherent ‘bargain’ underlying the TPP involved developed economies offering market 
access opportunities for developing country members, such as Vietnam, in exchange for 
developing countries adopting developed countries’ preferred set of regulatory rules for 
‘behind the border issues’. As a result, Vietnamese trade policymakers had no choice but to 
adapt flexibly to new ideas about the scope of trade liberalization and to compromise in 
new trade areas such as investment rules, intellectual property rights, labour standards, and 
investor-state dispute settlement (Faux 2016). Some of these new trade areas were difficult 
because they highlighted differences amongst political systems, institutions, practices, and 
values amongst the TPP members (Hoang 2014).  
Some scholars believed that the authoritarian and statist approach in countries such as 
China could not be reconciled with the liberal and rules-based trade system Western 
countries favoured (Wethington and Manning 2015). Vietnam – a country that shared many 
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political system similarities with China – faced major challenges in negotiating these areas. 
For example, the TPP could risk diversion from the socialist market economy by 
demanding SOE reforms, or create risks to the government in case of investor-state dispute 
settlement, or have negative impacts for the regime and thus political stability if Western 
labour rights standards were applied. To deal with these new requirements, the state had to 
balance domestic and international pressures.  
Similar to previous FTAs such as the EU-Vietnam FTA, the central bureaucracy recognized 
that they could be beneficial from TPP which could exert positive pressures to create a 
more favourable business environment and improve institutional quality (Prime Minister 
Nguyen Tan Dung 2016). The Communist Party viewed the institutional reforms toward 
socialist-oriented market economy that empower the people and enterprises as the key for 
building market economy by 2020 according to common standards of integrated and 
modern economies (Nhandan.com.vn 2017). This perception was influenced by the World 
Bank, which recommended that the country could avoid middle-income traps provided that 
the country build a competitive private sector in a lead, and the TPP offers “a real 
opportunity to carry out many demanding and politically sensitive reforms” (Cao, 
Demombynes et al. 2016). In this connection, the TPP was seen to leverage further 
domestic institutional reforms of domestic law to build a market economy, such as 
accelerating SOEs reform, creating a fair competitive environment among enterprises.  
However, the central bureaucracy acknowledged that they had to deal with various TPP 
provisions that caused great concerns, pressures and challenges for the central bureaucracy 
as they targeted, challenged and weakened the state’s authority, national jurisdiction and 
the national legislation (Bui and tran 2017). For instance, the TPP required the latter to 
accept a higher level of rights and protection for investors such as the Investment and 
Investor-state Dispute Settlement (ISDS). The TPP was the first FTA that requested an 
ISDS mechanism to enforce investment rules, which allowed foreign investors to challenge 
host states in international tribunals in cases where they could argue that their rights were 
breached by the state, for instance state’s preferential treatments to the domestic 
enterprises. The dispute settlement mechanism would operate on the basis of International 
Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) principles.  
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The study of the Hanoi University of Foreign Trade recommended that the state should 
reserve such commitment because Vietnam did not have the institutional means to defend 
itself effectively in ISDS cases (Hoang 2014). Meanwhile domestic enterprises considered 
it as another form of protection for foreign-invested firms, as it granted them additional 
legal rights not available to domestic firms. They recommended that tight conditions for the 
submission of claims be imposed to minimize the risk of cases being brought by foreign 
multinationals (VCCI 2012).  
Yet, the Vietnamese leadership viewed the ISDS differently as they viewed ISDS as an 
additional pressure to create a better business environment with more transparent law and 
regulations, despite concerns of a threat against national sovereignty and autonomy. 
Vietnam was willing to agree to the ISDS mechanism in the TPP despite the risks of being 
legally challenged at international arbitration by foreign investors (VCCI 2015). 
Domestically, the government issued Decision No. 04/2014/QD-TTG dated 14/1/2014 on 
coordination mechanism for international investment dispute resolution, as a step for 
preparation for participation in the TPP. Accordingly, the government prepared a 
coordination mechanism among state agencies, relevant organization and individuals to 
cooperate with foreign tribunals in case of international investment disputes (Prime 
Minister 2014). In addition, the government prepared a group of expert and lawyers for 
such disputes.  
Central bureaucrats’ business interests - state owned enterprises – the vested group 
impacted most by the TPP 
While the central bureaucrats were well aware of the importance to join the TPP for 
opportunities of economic development, they were also keen on protecting their own 
business interests, as reflected in the efforts in protection of the SOEs’ interests. This 
thinking was demonstrated through the government’s negotiation of the SOEs chapter and 
Government Procurement chapter.  
While SOEs were a sensitive issue that was not mentioned in Vietnam’s ASEAN-based 
FTAs, the TPP was unique in that it contained a dedicated chapter on SOEs. These were 
one of the main targets of developed country TPP members to create fair trade rules and 
hence SOEs were amongst the first issues discussed in the negotiations (Central Committee 
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of the Communist Party of Vietnam 2016). One of the noticeable and new commitments 
was the transparency rule, which required governments to provide additional information 
about ownership, control, and non-commercial assistance given to SOEs on the request of 
other TPP members. As a VCCI representative indicated, this was especially significant 
given that Vietnam’s list of SOEs had never been publicly revealed before (Hoang 2016). It 
also required that state subsidies should not be excessive or cause adverse effects to the 
interests of other TPP parties (USTR 2015). Hence, these requirements from the TPP 
members directly reduce the privileged positions of the vested groups – the SOEs. As 
explained in the chapters earlier, the SOEs enjoy special positions that can have direct 
impact on the government, as the line ministries were both managers and owners of the 
SOEs.   
The SOE commitments were possible as they were in line with Vietnam’s policy at the time 
of gradually eliminating preferential treatment for SOEs (Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung 
2016). As explained by the Deputy Trade Minister Tran Quoc Khanh, by the time of the 
TPP negotiations, the state had changed its thinking and agreed that less competitive, 
ineffective, and highly protected sectors should now be subject to competition, even SOEs 
(Vo 2005). In this way, the TPP commitments created new pressure to accelerate SOEs 
reforms that were already underway, and would, therefore, encourage private sector 
development.  
Despite overall support for the SOEs commitments in general, trade negotiators still 
attempted to protect the SOEs such as Viettel Telecom, Vietnam Post and 
Telecommunications (VNPT), and Vietnam Petro. During negotiations they sought to 
exclude these SOEs under the negative list rule on the grounds that they operated for 
national defense and security purposes. However, the TPP partners rejected this claim. As 
explained by a representative of the Ministry of Industry and Trade, this was because 
Viettel had become one of the top 10 telecommunication groups in the world and was, 
therefore, not a national security enterprise and should be subject to transparency 
requirements for commercial activities (Ngoc 2016, Ngoc 2016).  
This disagreement was due to the differences in approach amongst the relevant parties. The 
SOEs were targeted aggressively by the United States during negotiations on the grounds 
 
 158 
that it wanted to prevent what it labelled ‘state capitalism’ (European Center for 
International Political Economy 2015) and to open up these sectors for its multinational 
corporations. Meanwhile, the underlying reason for Vietnam’s protection of SOEs was the 
SOEs’ continued role as a tool for the state to implement its economic regulatory and 
market stability functions, despite the SOEs’ lower efficiency when compared with the 
private sector (rfa 2013).  
Ultimately, a compromise between these positions was found in which Vietnam was 
allowed to apply certain exceptions for its SOEs under the negative-list approach. For 
example, the TPP excluded SOEs activities that might cause adverse effects on the 
investment business of non-TPP members and those activities relating to national defense 
and security measures, and emergency measures for implementing state functions. In 
addition, Vietnam (with Brunei and Malaysia) secured a provision that the rules would only 
apply to SOEs with a turnover of more than SDR500 million a year, which compared with 
an SDR200 million threshold for other TPP members (Hoang 2016). Translating this into 
the domestic system, a revenue threshold was set up with those SOEs with an annual 
revenue below VND 16 trillion were exempted from most of the TPP obligations, which 
resulted in very few Vietnam’s SOEs being subject to the rules.  
Government Procurement:  
Another difficult issue that related to the state business interests, or vested groups – the 
SOEs was government procurement, which took six years to complete negotiation. In the 
TPP negotiations, the term ‘government procurement’ was relatively new to the 
Vietnamese government, including both policymakers and National Assembly members, as 
Vietnam had only the one ‘Bidding Law’ of 2005 in place. In practice, government 
procurement in Vietnam covered government, SOEs and investment projects where the 
government provided most of the funding (Nguyen 2012). Hence, government procurement 
in the TPP promised great change for domestic market regulations and the state’s role as an 
economic actor.  
With transparent and open procurement rules, the SOEs – which had previously enjoyed 
direct contracting from the government - would face direct competition with international 
companies for the first time. Academics in Vietnam adopted a supportive view, seeing the 
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benefits of government procurement commitments in the TPP for the public investment 
system by increasing the transparency, which would serve as a preparatory step for 
Vietnam to join the WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (Hoang 2014). Scholars 
recommended that commitments be negotiated so as to exploit Vietnam’s status as a 
developing economy by requesting a transitional period from three to five years, 
exemptions for the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of National Defence for 
security reasons, and exemptions for local authorities because of limited capacity for 
implementation (Hoang 2014). However, the strongest constraint came from the 
government agencies themselves. As explained by the Director-General of the Public 
Procurement Agency, this agency were hesitant to follow the transparency and information 
disclosure rules (Trung 2016). 
The policymakers shared the same view that government procurement rules could help to 
address a lack of transparency in domestic economic activities, particularly relating to the 
implementation of the Procurement Law (tienphong 2016) and corruption in public 
investment projects (Dang 2013). The public would also benefit from more competitive 
prices and better quality goods by increasing the domestic competitiveness using external 
pressures to change the domestic environment, as stated by the head of the government 
procurement division of the TPP delegation (Nguyen 2012). The Deputy Minister of 
Industry and Trade Tran Trong Khanh explained that the government had to balance 
different views. For instance, some views that because government procurements use the 
people’s money or people’s tax contribution, the government should give priorities to 
domestic goods and domestic enterprises or the government should use money in the most 
effective way (VTV 2016).   
The trade negotiators were only able to balance these issues by securing a relatively long 
schedule for reform, to avoid a sudden shock for the economy, limiting the rules to goods 
and services procured only by central authorities and obtaining exemptions for provincial 
authorities because of their limited technical capacity. The head of the government 
procurement division of the TPP delegation explained that this type of schedule helped 
domestic firms by allowing time for their increasing competitiveness rather than depending 
on ‘personal relationships’ and ‘reliance’ on the government (Bich 2015). However, the 
final position of the Prime Minister was to narrow the areas being hold by the SOEs to open 
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more market space for private sector’s participation as reflected in the Prime Minister’s 
Directive in 2017 (Prime Minister 2017).  
The reasons for the above changes of the central bureaucracy’s position, i.e. accepting 
harder and more open commitments in a short time are multifold. First, the institutional 
reforms leveraged by the TPP was in line with the government’s change of thinking 
regarding the state’s role and functions, i.e. changing from a regulatory state to 
developmental state. The developmental state does not act as an apparatus for domination 
of one class over other, but transforms to manage, serve and provide public services (Ngo 
and Nguyen 2017). This reflects that the central bureaucrat accepted to narrow the scope of 
its authority or to limit its intervention in a market economy, which is suitable with the 
developed countries’ economy models, facilitating Vietnam’s economic integration and 
doing business with them. Thus, the central bureaucracy has to place the overall benefits for 
the country over their own interests of maintaining the authority and power.  
Secondly, despite strong motivations for negotiation, the process was under pressure 
because of the high demands from the other TPP members, especially the United States, 
while Vietnam was one of only a small number of developing economies that joined the 
TPP negotiations in 2010. During the process of negotiations, the trade negotiators had to 
maintain a flexible and adaptable approach in order to reach a successful conclusion while 
maintaining a balance between external and domestic pressures.  
Thus, the central bureaucracy, those directly involved in preparing, formulating and 
negotiating the TPP accepted to change to be more flexible to accommodate with new 
challenges and grasp opportunities of the TPP. While the TPP could facilitate the domestic 
institutional reforms to build a market economy, it also required the bureaucracy to narrow 
their political interests, i.e. their authority and power, limit their own vested business 
interests by placing the national interests as the first priority. 
In short, the state, particularly, the CPV and central bureaucrats had strong interests in 
pursuing the TPP for the organizational benefits such as regime legitimacy. One the hand, 
the TPP’s beyond-the-border commitments exposed clearly the government agencies’ 
concerns, as they required dramatic changes in the latter’s thinking and interests. Thus, 
moving towards TPP standards as a benchmark required the transformation of the 
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government’s redefinition of their mind-set and interests, assisting the formulation of new 
policy practices that encouraged greater fairness and transparency, and enhanced the 
business environment. 
7.4 The state-society relationship 
7.4.1 More involvement of the business community 
A great change in the TPP negotiation in comparison with the WTO accession was a larger 
number of various levels of interaction between the state and society. These channels could 
be, for instance, the interaction between the Prime Minister, ministerial and provincial 
levels, party and National Assembly members with the voters, enterprises and people 
continued to improve the state-society relationship regarding trade policymaking. From 
2010 to 2016, various international and national conferences, workshop, and seminars were 
organized for interaction between the relevant ministries. For instance, the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade met the domestic and international enterprises to explain about the TPP 
in terms of the impact assessment, opportunities and challenges, and recommendations to 
support domestic enterprises.  
Hence, one of the most remarkable changes in the state-society relationship during TPP 
policymaking was the greater effort made by the state, mainly the government agencies, to 
reach out to societal actors, especially relevant business associations. For example, the 
representative of the Vietnam Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers (VASEP) 
was very complimentary about the government’s efforts to reach out to enterprises. For the 
first time after years of international trade negotiations, trade negotiators from the Export 
and Import Department of the MOIT visited the VASEP office to discuss, consult and 
collect information regarding tariff and negotiation issues of concerns. The interpersonal 
networks reached new depths, such that trade negotiators could even call the business 
associations to consult on tariff offers for certain product categories during the 
negotiations.50 In other instances, business associations followed the negotiation team and 
actively participated in in-depth consultation and provided advice on the sidelines of the 
negotiations (Dieu 2015, Minh and Ngoc 2016).  
                                                
50 Interview with official from the VASEP in 2016. 
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The VCCI supported the government in the TPP negotiations by undertaking technical 
studies and developing recommendations for negotiating points (VCCI 2015). These 
recommendations ranged from general approaches to specific issues including labour, 
investment and international investment dispute settlement, intellectual property rights, and 
cross-border service provisions. In general, the VCCI expressed its support for the TPP 
negotiation with the objective of “increasing trade liberalization, searching for new 
opportunities and facilitating the growth of the competitiveness of Vietnamese enterprises 
and the economy in global trade” (VCCI 2013). Nonetheless, the VCCI requested that the 
government ensure that the TPP would not only offer benefits for Vietnamese enterprises 
and the economy but also protect the interests of vulnerable groups such as farmers, 
workers, and small and medium enterprises (Nguyen, Alam et al. 2007). These 
recommendations were officially sent to the government and were also publicly posted on 
the VCCI’s website. Compared to the WTO accession, enterprises, especially the VCCI, 
expressed support for the TPP more publicly in the mass media.  
However, despite these efforts, the VCCI and other business associations such as VASEP 
were not active to the point of proactive initiation of the idea of signing a certain FTA, 
including the TPP, with trading partners that they felt were important.51 While they were 
prepared to contribute to the TPP negotiations once they were underway, the decision to 
join the negotiations in the first place remained squarely that of the top leadership. In 
addition, relationships did not develop to the level where a joint drafting committee or a 
task force for negotiation of the TPP comprising representatives of both state agencies and 
societal actors was established.  
Policymakers also sought public support for their decision to join the TPP. However, this 
was often done in ‘managed’ ways. According to a VCCI survey on enterprises’ awareness 
of the TPP, the state provided groups predicted to be positively impacted with more 
information than those groups predicted to be negatively impacted (Xuan 2016). As a 
result, the former tended to support the TPP, and surprisingly, domestic firms displayed 
stronger support compared with FDI groups (72 per cent and 67 per cent respectively in 
2015) (Vov 2016). However, domestic business support for the TPP declined by 11 per cent 
                                                
51 Interview with official from the VASEP in 2016. 
 
 163 
in 2015 compared with 2014 because businesses were disappointed that the terms for SOEs 
would not result in bigger reforms for these enterprises (Xuan 2016).  
Contributing to shaping the government’s interests and ideas as presented above, foreign 
academics also participated in policymaking by providing various studies, serving as a 
source of scientific input into policymakers’ decisions. According to a European study, 
Vietnam’s GDP was expected to increase by 11 per cent by 2025 on the assumption that 
Vietnam’s enterprises could participate in global supply chains and the Government of 
Vietnam could implement administrative reforms based on TPP commitments (Eurasia 
Group 2015). The World Bank in its Global Economic Prospects report in January 2016 
claimed that Vietnam’s economy could grow by 10 per cent by 2030 and exports by around 
30 per cent (World Bank 2016). The TPP was expected to attract more interest than other 
FTAs because of the high level of trade liberalization, with tariff elimination of more than 
98 per cent of tariff lines in a short schedule, facilitating potential export growth by 25.8 
per cent and GDP growth by 14.27 per cent by 2025 (Petri, Plummer et al. 2011).  
The CPV and government leadership shared common views with international studies 
supporting their TPP policy, citing the figures presented in these studies in their statements. 
The central bureaucrats’ views of the potential economic gains were first formulated by the 
relevant ministries’ analyses of exports and imports between Vietnam and its TPP trading 
partners. These analyses helped them to predict potential economic costs and benefits, and 
winners and losers.52 For instance, GDP could increase by US$23.5 billion by 2020 and by 
US$33.5 billion by 2025 as cited by the Deputy Trade Minister (Nguyen 2016). In contrast 
with WTO accession, the government was supported by feasibility studies done by 
ministry-affiliated research institutes, international studies such as quantitative assessments 
of TPP impacts (Petri, Plummer et al. 2011), and various academic studies such as that 
done by the Hanoi University of Trade (Hoang 2014).  
Thus, state-society interaction during the TPP negotiations was significantly more 
developed compared with WTO accession, or indeed the earlier FTAs. This expanded 
interaction was demonstrated by the institutionalized mechanism for interaction between 
the state and business in 2012 and the depth of consultation relating to specific tariff lines 
                                                
52 Interview with official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2016 
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and commercial interests. However, the government’s reaching out to society mainly 
focused on business associations rather than encompassing all of society and civil society 
organizations. This selective approach reflected the government’s privileging of business 
over civil society organizations.  In line with the overall support for the TPP of both the 
business community and government agencies, other beyond-the-border trade policies 
elicited limited domestic opposition. The main reason was because these issues were new to 
trade policymakers and there was limited understanding of both the costs and benefits of 
implementing such reforms. Indeed, government agencies viewed these issues as external 
leverage for domestic reforms rather than a source of constraints.  
7.4.2 Balancing competing interests 
The nature and role of the state is more revealed through the state’s behaviours in regards to 
shaping their positions given societal actors’ diverse interests. As with all trade agreements, 
the state has to deal with the issue of balancing between interests, identifying what to 
protect, what to liberalize, and the extent of liberalization (Singh 2005). This section will 
discuss the arguments that took place between offensive and defensive interests on the TPP. 
Discussion of how the state harmonized different interests for different sectors in coping 
with external partners’ demands helps to illuminate the position and thinking and the 
relationship between state and non-state actors, and how they managed the external 
pressures of the TPP together.  
The government’s offensive positions 
As stated by the Director General of the Multilateral Trade Policy Department of the 
MOIT, the government was more interested in opening the market for goods while less 
interested in other areas such as services, investment, and government procurement (Phan 
2016). This position was formulated on the ground of policymakers being informed of the 
possibilities of winners and losers (including vulnerable groups) through technical studies 
carried out by both international and national experts and academia. For instance, the 
‘winning’ sectors, such as the textile sector was expected to increase in size by up to 20 per 
cent. This expected enlargement would generate considerable employment by creating 
approximately 250,000 jobs for every US$1 billion of textile exports (Kinhtevadubao 
2015). Exports of footwear, agricultural and aquaculture products, and furniture were also 
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expected to increase as a result of the elimination of high tariffs for example, 28.66 per cent 
for rice, 12.25 per cent for footwear, and 11.53 per cent for textiles (Phung and Nguyen 
2016).  
The TPP would not only expand exports of these products but it would also create 
competitive advantage over competitors such as China, Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Thailand in developed country markets such as Japan and Australia (Ministry of Industry 
and Trade 2015). Trade experts argued that Vietnam could benefit from rice exports to TPP 
economies compared with countries such as Thailand and India, Vietnam’s biggest rice 
export competitors, which were not TPP members and which would not enjoy preferential 
access. In addition to Vietnam’s two main rice markets (Singapore and Malaysia), there 
was great potential to export rice to the other nine TPP members, especially since 
Vietnam’s rice exports accounted for only 1.6 per cent of total rice imports in these 
countries. Enterprises in the sector had prepared for the TPP by building a raw material 
zone, opening more factories, and improving rice quality (Quang and Chi 2013). However, 
these advantages might last only for a short time, particularly if these competitors join the 
TPP later as was a possibility under its accession provisions. Hence, the state strived to 
secure the best deal ever for these sectors for the best possible gain from the TPP in the 
intervening period. 
The government supported certain sectors that would be most promising beneficiaries of 
the TPP. For instance, the textile and garments sector was expected to gain the most and, as 
such, was given top priority in the negotiations. The Head of the TPP negotiation 
delegation, Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade stated that Vietnam could not sign the 
TPP agreement without major gains in garments and textiles. The Vietnam Textiles and 
Apparel Association requested trade negotiators to take into account the interests of the 
sector’s two million workers and enterprises (VCCI-TrungtamWTO 2011). This sector was 
the last, and toughest, issue in the negotiations amongst Vietnam, the United States and 
Mexico according to the chief Vietnamese TPP negotiator (Nguyen 2015). Vietnam could 
also take advantage of the fact that China, its main competitor in the sector, was not a TPP 
member and hence Vietnam requested a cut in the tariff from 17 per cent to 0 per cent. The 
United States, under the pressure of domestic textile firms, set tight conditions using the 
‘yarn forward’ rules of origin, which meant that all products in textiles from the yarn stage 
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should be from a TPP member, in order to limit Vietnam’s textile imports (McKissick 
2013). The MOIT’s view was to apply the ‘cut and sew’ rule instead, which provided 
flexible sourcing, either fabric or any origin. The reason was because Vietnam’s 70 per cent 
of the sector’s raw materials were imported mainly from non-TPP members such as China, 
South Korea and Taiwan. Options for Vietnam were either the ‘yarn forward’ rule of origin 
or a long tariff removal schedule of 8-10 years (VCCI-TrungtamWTO 2011).  
After much internal deliberation, Vietnam’s ultimate position was the adoption of the US 
rule of origin proposal for the short supply list covering fibers and fabrics from any country 
for a permanent and temporary basis, as previously applied in other US FTAs. In exchange, 
Vietnam was able to secure more ambitious tariff reductions. Vietnam’s government was 
able to achieve this outcome through an intervention by the Prime Minister who worked 
with the US ambassador and President Obama during the ASEAN Summit in 2016 to 
reduce gradually about 1,000 tariff lines for textiles to 0 per cent. This tariff reduction 
would help the sector’s growth from 7 per cent/year to 15 per cent/year and save US$1.1 
billion in duties on Vietnam’s textile exports (Phan 2016). Another beneficiary would be 
the foreign invested enterprises in Vietnam (many of which were American-owned such as 
Huntsman Textile Effects!), which would benefit because they accounted for about 60-70 
per cent of exports from this sector (Ho 2015).   
The government’s defensive positions 
The government’s cooperation and support for domestic enterprises is also reflected in the 
formulation of the government’s defensive positions. In addition to the offensive interests, 
trade negotiators also attempted to shield the areas that would be exposed to foreign 
competition. The goods at risk were those where the comparative advantage of other TPP 
members was strong, such as dairy products, beef, poultry, steel, automotives, and paper. 
For negatively impacted sectors such as animal husbandry, the government recognized the 
possibility of losing in the domestic market once the market was open to imports because of 
the tariff of 0 per cent, especially in pork and chicken (Kinhtevadubao 2015).  
Because of their low competitiveness, limited capacity, and poor technology, these sectors 
requested protection from the government. The business associations, through the VCCI, 
requested four options for protection: (i) application of the same tariff level as the 
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AANZFTA; (ii) a tariff schedule; (iii) tariff restriction quotas (TRQ);53 and application of 
SPS and TBT measures (VITAS 2011). It was recognized that while several agricultural 
sectors could be negatively impacted, these effects would be concentrated in a short period 
of time and had a relatively limited scope (Tuoitre Online 2015) 
Facing such pressures, policymakers used various methods to defend the weak sectors’ 
interests, one of which was via a schedule for tariff removal (VTV 2013). Different 
schedules were applied extending over five to 11 years. Vietnam was also able to maintain 
tariffs from 2-40 per cent for about 70 products, most importantly coal, oil, and some 
mineral resources (Ministry of Finance 2017). The products most vulnerable to competition 
such as meat, beer and alcohol, sugar, salt, eggs, petrol, automotives, steel, and some 
automotive accessories also benefited from the longest (11 years) phase-in periods for tariff 
reduction. As argued by the Prime Minister in the report of the government to the National 
Assembly about the TPP, these delayed schedules gave domestic enterprises time for 
adjustment and restructuring, during which they could enhance productivity, efficiency, and 
competitiveness before facing the full force of foreign competition (Xuan 2015). In 
addition, the government promised to protect and provide temporary assistance for 
domestic industry for a fixed period of time (Do 2015). 
The most heavily affected actors were animal husbandry enterprises and their trade 
associations, which were concerned about their lack of competitiveness compared with 
countries such as Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. These countries had very 
high standard sanitary and phytosanitary barriers, which would make it very difficult for 
Vietnamese exporters to exploit opportunities arising from improved market access 
resulting from reciprocal tariff reductions. The sector therefore requested that the 
government apply protection mechanisms, either by implementing a tariff rate quota (TRQ) 
or by applying the schedule for sensitive agricultural products that was used in the 
AANZFTA of 2010 between ASEAN and Australia and New Zealand (Quang and Chi 
2013). The trade negotiators were successful in protecting the animal husbandry sector, 
especially pork and chicken, securing a 10-year phase-in period (Phan 2015). Enterprises in 
the animal husbandry sector also found a way out by investing in niche markets where 
                                                
53 Tariff rate quotas combine quotas and tariffs to restrict imports. The quantities inside a quota are charged 
lower import duty rates than those outside (According to the WTO’s Glossary terms) 
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competition was less pronounced, such as by focusing on free-range chicken, high quality 
chicken, and high quality eggs. The Vice Chairman of the Animal Husbandry Association 
thus argued that the TPP could actually be beneficial as it would create pressures for the 
sector to reform and move up the value chain to higher value products (Ho 2015). 
To deal with sceptical groups who were concerned about the possibility of an economic 
recession owing to the weak competitiveness of the economy, the government pointed to 
past successful experience with trade liberalization. Deputy Trade Minister Tran Quoc 
Khanh argued that no recession had ensued after signing FTAs with such major economic 
actors such as the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (Ho 2015). Besides, 
Vietnam could reap the benefits of market access gains in the United States, and as 
Vietnam’s exports accounted for only a small proportion of the total US import bill, there 
would be little concern around bilateral trade balances. Overall, pro-reform policymakers 
were confident with the decision to join the TPP because economic studies, as well as past 
achievements, proved that trade liberalization contributed to national growth and 
development through the process of international economic integration.  
In short, the government achieved a successful balance between offensive and defensive 
interests in the negotiation of the TPP. The government was able to promote the offensive 
interests of key sectors such as aquaculture, agricultural products, and textiles and garments 
by achieving tariff elimination for these sectors at the time of TPP implementation. In 
addition, the government was able to protect defensive sectors achieving by certain 
exceptions and ensuring a reasonable trade-off between winners and losers.   
7.5 Conclusion 
Through the TPP process, Vietnam’s trade policymaking accelerated its longstanding 
development towards a more participatory and reform-oriented approach. This development 
was reflected in the continuing transformation of the role of key actors, their ideas, and 
interests, and in changing institutions. For example, trade policymaking witnessed the 
continuation of dynamics that would help the country adapt to the new requirements of the 
distinctive TPP. A mixture of top-down and bottom-up approaches developed during the 
WTO accession process remained the principal policymaking mechanism. The Communist 
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Party continued to act as the primary guide for TPP strategy, particularly as it became 
involved in sensitive issues that could not be dealt with by bureaucratic agencies alone. 
Indeed, the role of the CPV was strengthened in relative terms given the need to manage 
the broader range of strategic, political and security interests in the TPP. The central 
bureaucracy focussed on the economic aspects of the TPP agenda and shaped public 
opinion through the mass media and organized communication with societal actors. 
Ministry-linked interests groups also continued to play a decisive role in the country’s 
positions in TPP negotiations. SOEs were especially prominent here. They sought 
protection on the grounds of national defence and security concerns in areas such as 
telecommunications and national energy security. 
Despite these institutional continuities, however, the tendency towards a more participatory 
approach to trade policymaking (which began with the WTO accession) continued. For the 
first time, trade policymaking was based on scientific information and inputs from not only 
government-affiliated research institutes but also the universities, business associations and 
firms. Non-state actors increased their influence because trade policymakers were 
increasingly sensitive to the importance of consultation with societal actors. However, the 
government remained the key actor that initiated, negotiated and made the final decisions 
relating to the TPP.  
Secondly, the TPP saw a transformation in the state’s ideas and interests with respect to 
trade. Externally, the CPV recognized the changing regional context with increasing 
strategic competition between the United States and China, which was now impacting on 
the Asia-Pacific trade architecture. Economically, the region was moving towards a new 
phase of economic development facilitated by service sectors, information technology and 
the digital economy. Given this changing trade policy agenda, the state began moves 
towards a higher, ‘WTO-Plus’ level of trade liberalization. As a corollary, the state had to 
accept that further opening to competition from developed economies and their firms, 
rather than prioritizing protection for weak sectors, would be required. The state also had to 
cope with new challenges that could risk the stability of the political regime, such as labour 
rights and the digital economy, which had not hitherto been part of Vietnam’s trade 
reforms.     
 
 170 
In addition, the TPP required Vietnamese policymakers to balance a much wider set of 
considerations than before. As the TPP was not limited to trade issues and involved 
institutional and geopolitical factors as well, it was much more than simply an 
economically-oriented agreement. The economic rationale for the TPP was broadly similar 
to other agreements and entailed, for example, increased market access, foreign investment, 
and the facilitation of domestic reforms. However, its geopolitical aspects made it different 
from other FTAs as it was seen as a way for Vietnam to implement its ‘balancing’ foreign 
policy by entering into a trade agreement with the United States. These ideas and interests 
meant that the TPP was both an economic and geostrategic imperative for Vietnam. 
Despite these benefits, negotiating membership of the TPP required Vietnam to internalize 
much higher reform costs than its previous agreements. Ministry-linked interest groups 
continued to impact on the country’s positions in the TPP negotiations in order to protect 
their interests. The state had to accept high costs from the institutional, economic, and 
political reforms demanded by the other TPP members. However, despite the costs, the 
huge economic and strategic benefits on offer saw the central leadership pushing ahead 
with the deal. Such active moves marked a new phase in Vietnamese trade policymaking 
where ‘offensive’ interests for the first time trumped ‘defensive’ needs to protect sensitive 
sectors. In this way, the successful negotiation of the TPP was possibly due to the political 
consensus within the political system and especially strong political will of the leadership 
for reform and trade liberalization and the improved capacity and better cooperation 
between government officials and business associations. 
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This thesis has sought to explain Vietnam’s transformation from a closed and protectionist 
state to a liberalizing and active trade policy player. It has traced changes in the trade 
policymaking process during this transition, first thematically and then via case studies of 
Vietnam’s WTO accession and participation in the TPP agreement. The thesis has mapped 
how transformations in four variables – trade policy actors, ideas, interests, and the 
institution that mediate their relationships – have driven this transformation. The chapter 
concludes by bringing together the analysis of these four variables to explain the overall 
trajectory of Vietnam’s trade policy reforms. It argues that Vietnam’s move to trade 
liberalization was the result of compromise and a harmonization of differences among key 
domestic actors arising from the transformation of their ideas via interactions structured by 
the unique institutions of the Vietnamese political system.  
The thesis shows that most important factor in Vietnamese trade policymaking is the role of 
the CPV and the institutional arrangements for state policymaking that its prominent 
political role has created. However, the thesis moved beyond state-focused analysis: rather 
than considering the state as a monolithic actor, it instead analyzed the key players within 
and beyond the state. This approach identified these players, showing that the emerging 
role of this broad range of actors was the result of the expansion in complicated trade issues 
and the enhanced awareness of the policymakers of the role of firms. The interplay between 
these state and societal actors, in a reforming ideological and institutional climate, provided 
the mechanism through which Vietnam’s progressive trade liberalization process was 
successfully negotiated.   
The chapter begins by summarizing the principal empirical findings of the thesis and then 
identifies the causal drivers that have shaped Vietnam’s trade policy choices. The last part 
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discusses the theoretical and empirical contributions of the thesis to an explanation of the 
dynamics of trade reform, particularly in developing and non-Western countries. The aim 
of this concluding chapter is not only to provide a summary of factors that shaped the 
process of Vietnam’s trade opening, but also to identify the theoretical and empirical 
implications of the Vietnamese case for the study of trade policymaking in other countries.  
8.2 Empirical findings on Vietnamese trade policymaking 
8.2.1 The role of domestic interest groups 
The first research question of this thesis is how have domestic actors influenced trade 
policymaking? The findings show that trade policy strategy is mainly attributable to the 
determination and the political will of the leadership of the CPV while technical aspects 
were more the responsibility of the central bureaucracy. The CPV was the group that 
adopted a general strategy of international economic integration as well as taking specific 
steps for implementing this strategy such as joining AFTA, the ASEAN-centered FTAs, 
and pursuing WTO accession. The initial decision to transition from being closed to an 
active trade player was primarily the decision of the CPV. Similarly, the idea of furthering 
trade liberalization by participating in high standard agreements such as the TPP was not 
driven by the demand of societal groups but rather by the top leadership’s desire to increase 
competitiveness for national economic development. The CPV leadership was supported by 
new pro-trade constituencies within the bureaucracy, which emerged out of the expansion 
of technical issues covered in the trade agreements. These groups contributed to shaping 
Vietnam’s participation in trade agreements by providing expert skills, knowledge, and 
consultation abilities. 
As such, societal interest groups were typically absent from the policymaking system when 
the initial decisions on whether to enter particular trade agreements were made. However, 
once these initial decisions were made and Vietnam needed to make policy regarding how 
to negotiate and implement these agreements, the involvement of societal actors increased 
dramatically. For example, the state began systematic consultation with business 
associations for detailed information regarding tariff lines and the impact of proposed tariff 
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cuts resulting from TPP implementation.54 This improved interaction was an unprecedented 
change that had not happened prior to the commencement, or during the early years, of 
trade reforms. It reveals a fundamental transformation in Vietnam’s approach to trade 
policymaking where state actors have moved closer to, and directly engaged with, societal 
actors during the negotiation and implementation phases. However, this process was still 
far removed from the assumptions of the (Western-centric) societal-based approach to trade 
policy, which explains state decisions simply as an aggregation of societal preferences. 
While societal interests were able to play a role in the policymaking process for the first 
time during the negotiations, it ultimately remained the CPV and its agendas that set high-
level strategy regarding which trade agreements should be entered into in the first place. 
During Vietnam’s trade policy reforms, several institutional changes were made to ensure 
the flexibility required to adapt to changing circumstances. This transformation principally 
took the form of expanding the suite of trade policymaking actors, bringing in new players 
from both within and outside the state apparatus. First, within the state, trade policy 
decision-making was expanded to include an increasing number of ministries and agencies 
of relevance beyond dedicated trade bureaucrats. This expansion was due to the increased 
complexity of Vietnam’s new trade agreements, which required greater technical skill and 
professionalism than the small top leadership group possessed on its own. While the power 
to make strategic policy remained with the CPV top leadership, the central bureaucracies 
were empowered to provide professional consultation, assist with the negotiations for, and 
draw plans for the implementation of, complex trade agreements. These bureaucracies, 
which were equipped with improved technical expertise regarding international trade law 
and negotiations, helped to reduce the knowledge gap between (the formerly command) 
Vietnamese economy and its market economy trade partners. 
Second, outside the state, trade policy networks were expanded to include societal actors, 
most significantly the business community, first by informal and ad hoc contacts and then 
by institutionalized mechanisms. The number of societal groups involved in trade 
policymaking increased and their trade preferences also changed, influencing the path and 
extent of trade liberalization. This improved participation was the result of the state’s 
                                                
54 Interview with official of the VASEP in 2016 
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economic liberalization, which opened up space for the private sector’s development, as 
well as the demands from the private sector for a greater voice in trade policymaking. 
The key societal interest groups for Vietnamese trade policy were the SOEs, new foreign-
investment enterprises, and the nascent domestic private sector. As a result of the 
bureaucratic control of policymaking, the ministry-linked interest groups such as the SOEs 
tended to have a better relationship and access to policymakers than private sector firms. 
The SOEs had direct linkages and shared interests with both the central and local 
authorities and continued to hold a privileged position in the Vietnamese political and 
economic systems. Foreign-investment enterprises also received preferential treatment and 
had better access to trade policymaking. For example, sectors such as the automotive 
industries managed to secure very high tariff protection despite external commitments, and 
enjoyed long lead-in times for tariff removal where it occurred. In contrast, nearly 98 per 
cent of private sector firms were small and medium enterprises with diverse interests. These 
enterprises were weak in terms of financial, human and technical resources, and lacked the 
political capital to coordinate amongst themselves or to make effective representations to 
policymakers. Thus, Vietnamese state agencies involved in trade policy remained relatively 
insulated from private sector interests when compared to the prominent role of corporate 
lobby groups in Western countries.   
Of course, given the initially highly protected nature of the Vietnamese economy, several 
groups were reluctant to embark on reform. Joining international trade agreements required 
accepting and integrating international rules into domestic legislation, which constrained 
the state’s ability to protect some interest groups. For example, an implication of the 
WTO’s national treatment principle was that policy could not discriminate between 
different enterprises: either between domestic and foreign-owned, or private and state-
owned, firms. This meant that liberalization carried distributional outcomes under which 
some groups benefited while others were harmed. However, owing to CPV control of the 
Vietnamese political system, certain ‘losers’ were unable to engage in much political 
resistance. The state was relatively unconstrained by domestic veto players, a situation 
quite different from that found in many Western economies. Therefore, despite conflict 
between the interests of protectionist and liberalization groups, successful and smooth trade 
reforms were made possible by the ongoing prominence of the CPV. 
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8.2.2 The transformation of trade policy interests and ideas   
The second research question of the thesis explored how the ideas and interests underlying 
actors’ preferences influenced trade policymaking. The analysis of Vietnam’s trade 
policymaking reveals that both material and ideational considerations were influential in 
leading to the adoption of the reform and trade liberalization. 
Changes in the ideas regarding the appropriate form of trade policy for Vietnam were an 
important determinant in several ways. First, the CPV leadership’s ideas about the country 
itself, particularly its view of the international system and Vietnam’s perceived place in it, 
shaped trade policymaking. Policymakers shifted from an autarchic approach in the 1980s 
to a progressively more liberal approach from the early 1990s onwards owing to increasing 
engagement with trends in the global trade architecture. These included the emergence of 
regional and bilateral FTAs alongside the opportunities offered by membership of the WTO 
following its creation in 1994. Recognizing global economic trends such as the 
interdependence of economies, the emergence of trade agreements and the development of 
globalized industries, the CPV leadership decided that Vietnam’s best position in the world 
would be one in which it moved from isolation to active participation. This awareness 
contributed to the creation of a consensus in favour of international economic integration 
that would pave the way for the challenging domestic reforms required for membership of 
global, regional and bilateral trade agreements. 
Secondly, state elites recognized the importance of transforming its relationship with the 
‘capitalist’ world from one of antagonism and resistance to one of peaceful coexistence. 
This ideological shift reflected the end of the Cold War and the emergence of new attitudes 
- both in the West and the East - regarding the relationship between capitalist and socialist 
systems. In doing so the leaders also adjusted their own ideas regarding socialism within 
Vietnam during the process of opening the market. Similar to China (but different to the 
‘shock therapy’ reforms in the former Soviet Union), the state adjusted (but did not 
abandon) the socialist orientation in the trade liberalization process by building a ‘socialist-
oriented multi-sectoral economy’ under the state’s management and the party’s leadership. 
One of the methods for such an economy was to protect the interests of SOEs in key sectors 
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during the negotiations. Importantly, the trade negotiating position was thus influenced by 
the ideas of maintaining state control over key sectors. 
Thirdly, the national leaders transformed their economic ideology regarding national 
development strategy. Protectionist ideas were gradually replaced by pro-liberalization 
thinking, which facilitated the development of various sectors by encouraging engagement 
with the global economy through trade and foreign investment links. In addition, economic 
integration and upgrading the domestic economy by moving towards international 
standards and rules became a clear direction for the state. The process of transformation in 
such thinking was supported by the learning process of trade policymakers through contacts 
and negotiation with pro-trade external partners as well as via enhanced understanding and 
capacity amongst Vietnamese trade bureaucrats. 
Similar transformations were also seen in the outlook of both public and private trade 
policy actors. For the CPV leadership, the ‘public’ interest was the promotion of the 
national interest, while its ‘private’ interest was regime survival. Pursuing trade 
liberalization by participating in the WTO and various FTAs suited both these agendas. 
Initially, political considerations were paramount and were evident in the decisions to join 
AFTA and the WTO accession during the 1990s. These agreements were important in 
ensuring that Vietnam was an active participant in key regional and global economic 
institutions, putting the country on a politically equal footing with its peers and building 
and strengthening diplomatic relations with them. Foreign policy objectives – such as 
balancing Vietnam’s position between the regional superpowers China and the United 
States – became important in the 2000s. This balancing approach was especially evident 
with respect to the United States as the desire to build economic ties with the world’s 
largest power emerged as one of the primary reasons Vietnam joined the high-cost TPP 
negotiations. In this way, the interests of the state in relation to trade liberalization adapted 
to new geopolitical developments at the regional and global levels. 
The economic interests of Vietnam gradually gained more weight in trade policy largely 
because of the big opportunities that participation in trade agreements offered for domestic 
economic development and growth. These opportunities included attracting foreign 
investment, increasing market access for Vietnam’s goods abroad, and the generation of 
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external leverage to push forward domestic economic reforms. The CPV leadership’s 
decision to sign bilateral and multilateral FTAs with key trading partners before eventually 
seeking membership in the WTO was rationalised by these expected economic benefits. 
They were realized and the liberalization path was reinforced by the positive economic 
development and high GDP growth rate from 1986 onwards. That this high growth period 
continued despite the Asian financial crisis of 1998 and the global financial crisis of 2008 
was testament to the success of the strategy. Such economic achievements consolidated the 
leadership’s confidence in their national development strategy based on global economic 
integration. 
Similarly, the party-state’s ‘private’ interests influenced trade policymaking. For instance, 
the state had to balance and harmonize concerns about political stability and the regime 
legitimacy of the CPV alongside the country’s economic development interests. In addition, 
sectional interests including concern about loss of autonomy acted as one of the factors that 
shaped the attitude of government officials. These interests also framed the debates 
between the reformers who wanted to build new institutions which were more transparent 
and responsive to economic and societal needs; and the conservatives who wanted slower 
reforms in order to maintain their privileges.   
Besides the state as the primary actor in trade policymaking, society actors, mainly the 
business community, gradually emerged as an important actor. With the increasing number 
of private firms as a result of liberalizing economic reforms, the business community’s 
attitude towards trade policy changed from non-interest to active participation in the 
policymaking process. These transformations, though slow and limited, opened a new, 
independent political space and set the path for more active involvement of societal actors 
in policymaking.  
This new phase in the involvement of societal actors was different in Vietnam compared 
with other countries as the societal actors played a secondary role. New interest groups 
emerged and supported the trade agreements because they were able to expand their export 
activities and new opportunities in overseas markets. At the same time, a large number of 
businesses, mainly small and medium enterprises, faced difficulties in competing against 
foreign products and continued to rely on the government’s support for survival and 
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development. Being in an early phase of development, the political capacity of business 
associations was yet to consolidate, which was reflected in the fact that they had little 
ability to resist or protest against major trade reforms, which in certain situations threatened 
their interests. Thus, the thesis concludes that Vietnam, despite being a socialist regime, 
managed to open an independent political space, though in a selective and limited manner, 
for instrumental reasons. 
8.2.3 The transformation of trade policy institutions  
The third research question of the thesis asked how Vietnam’s distinctive trade policy 
institutions influenced its reform path. Here, it is evident that continuity in some 
institutional elements, alongside the transformation of others, played a key role in policy 
change. First, the institutional framework of the Vietnamese political system put the CPV at 
the apex of all trade policy decisions. The party-state was the final decision-maker of a 
general strategy for international economic integration, which involved moving from a 
closed and autarchic system to an open and liberal trade policy approach, and also of 
decisions about which trade partners and organizations Vietnam would negotiate with. As a 
result, agenda setting for trade reform crucially depended on the top-down instruction and 
political will of the CPV leadership. This longstanding characteristic of Vietnamese politics 
had not changed since the establishment of the country since 1945. It also made the 
Vietnamese experience quite different from that of Western countries where different 
political parties periodically formed government, leading to partisan-induced changes in the 
direction of trade policymaking (Oatley 1999). By adopting and consistently following a 
policy of international economic integration, the paramount role of the CPV ensured 
continuity and long-term coherence in Vietnam’s three-decade trade policy reform process. 
Secondly, and within the broad directional guidelines laid out by the CPV leadership, state 
bureaucratic agencies were the major policymaking institution. The central bureaucracy 
shaped the content of trade policy by initiating and promoting proposals, managing the 
negotiations and implementing trade agreements. The Ministry of Industry and Trade 
aggregated input from relevant ministries and agencies, interest groups and societal actors 
in order to prepare trade negotiation plans with market access requests; brokered transition 
packages to protect the strategic or weakly competitive sectors; and led the reform of 
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domestic legal practices to reduce the gaps between Vietnam and its trading partners. Thus, 
the executive branch of the state had great technical power to undertake negotiations and 
implementation plans, complementing the agenda-setting role of the CPV leadership. 
Indeed, by deciding whether to consult with societal actors (and if so, which ones), it was 
able to set the pace and shape of how policymaking was ‘opened’ to non-state actors.  
But despite the continuity seen in the paramount role of the CPV and central bureaucracies, 
institutional transformation occurred with an expanding set of involved actors. As 
Vietnam’s external trade commitments became progressively more complicated and 
comprehensive, the policymaking process gradually became more open. Within the state 
apparatus itself, the number of involved ministries and agencies increased in response to the 
number of trade issues covered by the external agreements. Trade policy was no longer the 
exclusive authority of the Ministry of Industry and Trade. The Ministry was reduced to a 
coordinating role and had to seek input and cooperation from various relevant ministries 
and agencies, resulting in a decentralization of power within the state itself. This 
institutional transformation was consistent with findings from the literature on other 
developing economies, which argues that as participation in trade agreements expands, a 
wider set of governmental actors become involved in trade policymaking, reducing the 
monopoly held by the trade ministries (Capling and Low 2010).   
However, while there was a demand for coordination capacity to deal with complex trade 
issues, trade policymaking was fragmented as reflected in weak internal coordination both 
within the state, among societal actors, and between the state and society. The coordination 
within the state was weak because of lack of communication and negotiation mechanisms. 
The trade negotiation delegations were required to seek permission from higher-level 
officials because of their limited authority to make decisions over the extent of trade 
liberalization or the issues for inclusion. For instance, the textiles and intellectual property 
rights issues in the TPP negotiations needed direction from the minister level or the Prime 
Minister level. A fast track was created to facilitate the WTO accession with the 
involvement of the Minister of Trade as a special envoy of the Prime Minister, who could 
call directly to the Deputy Prime Minister for consultation. If needed, the Deputy Prime 
Minister could call a meeting with only ministers of relevant ministries to discuss trade-off 
plans (VTV 2017).  
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Thirdly, the expansion in the number of involved actors was not limited to state agencies 
but also saw an increased involvement from societal actors. The state-society relationship 
was institutionalized for the first time, with regulations in 2012 requiring state agencies to 
consult with societal actors, particularly the VCCI (Prime Minister 2012). The information 
provided by scholars and business associations (such as studies, seminars and workshops) 
as well as personal contacts served as important input when policymakers prepared 
negotiation plans. An implication of the prevailing bureaucratic dominance was that these 
interactions remained somewhat informal and ad hoc, and societal actors required personal 
connections to be able to participate fully and effectively.  
Moreover, many societal groups remained poorly organized, and hence under-represented, 
in the trade policymaking system. The most active business associations were mainly those 
relating to the key exports such as coffee, textiles and garments, and fisheries because of 
strong financial capacity and cooperation among members. The increased involvement of 
more societal actors contributed to a transformation in trade policymaking from secrecy to 
transparency and a degree (if imperfect) of inclusiveness. However, societal actors’ roles 
remain limited in comparison to patterns in Western countries. They did not initiate 
proposals to negotiate FTAs with certain trade partners (which remained the preserve of the 
CPV leadership); nor did they shape the agenda for trade policymaking through electoral 
politics. Their principal mechanism for influence was the provision of information and 
analysis to policymakers about the expected positive and negative impacts of the trade 
agreements that the CPV leadership had initiated. This was because many organized 
societal groups – such as farmers’ unions, and women’s unions – were either partly backed 
by the state financially or were subject to political control and not independent of the state 
(ADB 2011). They therefore acted as extensions of the state, disseminating and developing 
policies and mobilizing people rather than representing the interests of enterprises. The 
business associations, although financially autonomous and not directly under the state’s 
management, were closely linked with state policy functions and also acted as an extension 
of state agencies (baophapluat 2017). Only a few business associations, especially those 
representing exporting groups, were independently oriented owing to their technical and 
financial capacity and strong economic motivations. In addition, businesses were 
diversified, fragmented and had no connections with each other to coordinate activities. As 
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a result, they were unable to create linkages and connections to lobby for influence over 
trade policymaking. 
Indeed, policymakers actively discriminated between different societal groups during the 
trade reform process as a political strategy to manage support for its policies. Despite an 
outward appearance of increased participation and improved access to information, the 
Vietnamese government provided more information to liberalization-supporting groups 
(such as export associations) and less to negatively impacted businesses (as seen in TPP 
trade policymaking). Hence, while reform enabled greater participation by some societal 
groups (although not others), the paramount position of the CPV and central bureaucracy, 
and their capability to decide who was consulted, remained largely intact.  
Finally, the improved capacity of state and societal actors supported trade liberalization. 
The Vietnamese state was only capable of negotiating and implementing a large number of 
trade agreements by developing in-house capacity to negotiate complex deals, which was 
particularly evident in the WTO accession and TPP processes. The capacity of staff was 
developed through sequential negotiations that progressively increased in difficulty, which 
provided a learning opportunity for trade bureaucrats to develop expertise. The promotion 
of staff and the low level of turnover greatly contributed to the stable and consistent 
trajectory of trade liberalization policy. The government-affiliated research institutes 
enhanced their capacity by learning and carrying out feasibility studies for new generation 
FTAs. Similarly, businesses were exposed to the rigors of competition in open international 
markets. Their competitiveness increased as reflected in a growing number of enterprises 
engaged in exports and imports, from 52200 firms in 2013 (Customs Online 2014) to 73170 
firms in 2016 (Customs Online 2017). These firms progressively transformed their trade 
preferences from protectionism to liberalization.  
Despite these transformations in the institutions of trade policymaking, the dominance of 
the bureaucracy remained marked and insulation between the state and societal actors 
persisted. Thus, Vietnam’s trade reforms need principally to be attributed to the 
transformation in the key domestic actors’ – most importantly, the CPV’s - ideas and 
interests regarding trade policy.  
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The discussion and findings above have demonstrated the interplay among the four 
variables that together help to explain Vietnam’s trade reform trajectory. The critical factor 
was the CPV, which started to change its worldview and formulated new ideas about 
integration with the world as a socialist-oriented market economy driven by the political 
and economic interests of national development. Once liberalisation had commenced, 
incorporating new international trade ideas through trade agreements encouraged and 
leveraged pro-trade institutional reforms and policy changes. As a consequence, 
institutional reform catalysed the development of new interests and relationships among 
key actors.  
8.3 Implications of the Vietnamese case for understanding trade 
policymaking  
The thesis confirms the utility of an analytical framework that explains trade policy reform 
as the interaction of a complex set of actors, interests, ideas, and institutions. To reach a 
consensus for trade liberalization in general, and completely successful negotiations for 
international trade agreements in particular, the involved actors in Vietnamese trade 
policymaking had to overcome institutional constraints and diversified interests through 
cooperation and negotiation of mutually-agreed reforms. 
The scholarly literature on trade policymaking consists of competing approaches with each 
making distinct arguments and assumptions in order to explain trade policymaking. The 
state-centered approach focuses on the role of the state, assuming it to be the pre-eminent 
trade policy actor. The society-centered approach emphasizes the role of societal actors 
with the assumption that trade policy is a result of interest groups’ competition for 
influence. The institutional approach suggests that trade policy is a result of the institutions 
that structure the power of actors who influence the policy. At the same time, the ideas 
approach focuses on the role of ideas, which are roadmaps or economic theories such as 
liberalization or protectionism. 
The case of Vietnam demonstrates that the state-centered approach, when extended to 
consider the state as an array of institutions that interact with societal actors, provides the 
best account of the politics of trade policy reform in Vietnam. The empirical analysis in this 
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thesis shows that Vietnam’s trade reform resulted from transformations in the state and 
societal actors, manifested in terms of their new ideas, interests, and institutions. Of course, 
the relative contribution of these factors in Vietnam’s trade reform was not perfectly equal. 
The state and its ideas played a primary, agenda-setting, role; societal actors played a 
secondary and supportive role; and where institutional change occurred it was largely 
reactive to demands from state actors. Yet, it is the co-occurrence of all these factors that 
explains Vietnam’s unique trade policy reform trajectory, which cannot be accounted for by 
any of these factors alone.  
In addition, the thesis shares the same findings as earlier literature, which argued that the 
Vietnamese private sector had limited policy influence because of its weak coordination 
and fragmentation. Vietnam’s case shows that societal actors are not automatically 
influential in trade policymaking. Even following many years of liberalization and 
institutional reform, the private sector still needs to develop significantly more technical 
and political capacity before it can perform this role. In this regard, the Vietnam case 
reveals the limitations of the society-centered approach outside the Western context by 
showing that in certain contexts the influence of societal actors over trade policy can be 
low. Nonetheless, while Vietnam’s societal actors remain less influential than state actors, 
the observed trend is that they are progressively acquiring the capacity to exert influence, 
albeit from a very low base. Coordination and cooperation among enterprises also depend 
on the degree of mutual interest amongst them, which could be further facilitated by 
linkages and connections in the value and production chains that are still missing or weak 
amongst domestic enterprises.  
The thesis also shows that instead of following an approach that focuses on a single 
explanatory factor, there is utility in an approach to trade policy that (a) looks at a range of 
factors but also (b) explores the interaction between them. Indeed, the latter interactive 
aspect is shown to be especially important in the Vietnamese case. For example, the role of 
societal actors depended critically on state decisions to facilitate their involvement while 
the role of institutions was transformed by state-initiated bureaucratic reforms. These 
interactive effects are entirely missed by explanatory approaches that prioritize one 
explanatory factor over another. Such an approach is also useful in predicting the future 
direction of trade policymaking. Over the long term, the CPV leadership will maintain its 
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consistent position of an open international economic integration policy as one of the core 
means for promoting economic development. The ongoing priorities of the state are the 
evident promotion of trade liberalization within the WTO, the consolidation of linkages 
within ASEAN, and proactive participation in new generation FTAs (Congthuongbentre 
2012). In addition, for the state, trade is not only a matter of economic considerations but 
also security, national defense, social and cultural considerations (Ministry of Planning and 
Investment 2011). This development is leading to a situation where trade policy is 
becoming more complex as economic interests are interwoven and interact with security, 
national defense, and social and culture concerns.  
Though this thesis empirically focuses on the Vietnamese case, it also offers broader 
implications and lessons regarding for the scholarly understanding of trade policymaking in 
countries that are not Western liberal democracies. As demonstrated earlier, existing trade 
policy theories are principally developed on the basis of the experience of Western 
countries and, as a result, struggle to offer explanatory purchase when applied to different 
national contexts. The proposed framework for analysing Vietnam’s trade policymaking 
advanced in this thesis helps address this problem by providing an explanatory model that 
is not premised on political, economic or institutional configurations found in Western 
countries. Indeed, it could potentially offer significant utility for understanding trade 
policymaking in comparable cases of ‘transitional’ economies’ such as China, Myanmar, 
Cambodia and Eastern European countries.  
First, the explanatory variables of the framework are not derived solely from the experience 
of Western countries. Rather than assuming a particular set of configurations for trade 
policy actors and their relationships, it poses four explanatory variables - the type of actors, 
their interests, their ideas, and the institutions that govern their interactions - in context-
agnostic terms. No a priori assumptions of how these variables might look are made. The 
questions that this framework generates thus allows exploration of which factors influence 
trade policymaking in a way that can capture the diversity and difference found in 
transitional economies and non-liberal democracies. In addition, this approach helps to 
understand how the dynamic interaction of these four factors influences trade policymaking 
rather than asserting the dominance of one factor over others. It reveals that the incentives 
created by one factor shape the formulation of other factors and vice versa. The interplay 
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amongst these factors generates the forces for the creation of a dynamic policy cycle. 
Hence, this framework adds value to current approaches by allowing an opportunity to 
reevaluate them in a new context of transitional economies and non-Western democracies 
engaged in trade liberalization.  
Secondly, the empirical evidence from the thesis has explored new findings relating to the 
transformation of trade policymaking in transitional economies like Vietnam. This shows 
that the liberalization process is often radically different from that in Western countries. In 
the Vietnamese case, one of the major features was not simply the reform of trade policy 
itself but a broader reconfiguration of the constellation of actors involved in the process and 
the institutions that govern their interaction. Vietnam demonstrates the possibility of 
variation not only in trade policy outcomes but also in the political processes that determine 
these. Only by adopting an approach that does not make a priori assumptions regarding the 
factors driving trade policy can such ‘systems’ transformations be identified. Such 
transformations have shown that under the impact of a new context of increased integration 
through comprehensive trade agreements, trade policymaking can be increasingly 
influenced by the complexities of interests and ideas of key actors within the changing 
institutions.  
Thirdly, the approach offers a new perspective on the likelihood of non-Western countries 
engaging in ambitious trade liberalization initiatives. Trade policy approaches based on the 
Western experience would expect only modest trade reforms by a country like Vietnam 
with a one party-dominated political system, historical antagonisms with the West, and lack 
of input from societal actors. Given these factors, it might be expected that there would be 
relatively little internal pressure or external appetite for liberalization. Yet the 
reconfiguration of Vietnam’s trade policy processes and institutions defied this expectation. 
Internally, the state proved to be more responsive to different interest groups of various 
backgrounds, opening space for pro-liberalisation voices from both state and societal 
actors. Externally, the state has managed to harmonize their diversified values, interests, 
and standards for cooperation with other countries for mutual benefit, regardless of 
different political and economic settings. These changes occurred in the context of the 
increasing number of FTAs among countries, which encouraged the interweaving of 
political, economic and social interests and values. This outcome challenges perspectives 
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that view non-Western countries as politically- and institutionally-limited in their capacity 
for trade reform relative to their Western peers. In short, the theoretical and empirical 
implications of the synthesizing approach support the need to continue to utilize such a 
framework to enrich the trade policymaking literature in non-Western liberal democracies.  
8.4 Conclusion 
Vietnam’s trade reform, and its success in negotiating international trade agreements, was 
the result of the decisive leadership role of state actors. It was in the interest of the regime 
and CPV leadership to maintain political legitimacy by adopting trade reforms as an 
important way to promote economic development, industrialization and growth. 
Liberalization helped to secure access to key foreign markets for Vietnamese exports, while 
bringing in foreign investment, technology and managerial skills. These interests led the 
CPV leadership to transition progressively from a closed and protectionist, to a liberalising 
and active, trade policy position from the mid-1990s onwards. However, to some extent this 
transformation remains an on-going process. Despite clear moves towards the partial 
pluralisation of trade policymaking, the CPV and state agencies are still the dominant 
forces, while the influence and capacity of societal actors remain embryonic.  
The application of the proposed framework to the case of Vietnam’s trade policymaking 
confirms that it makes a useful contribution to trade policymaking literature. The main 
argument of this framework is that the four variables - the key actors including the state and 
society, ideas, interests, and institutions and their interplay - have explanatory utility in the 
study of trade policymaking. The extent to which these four variables influence trade 
policymaking depends on the political regime, historical contexts and developmental level.  
The findings from the study about international trade policymaking reflect a larger picture 
of the contested politics of reforming Vietnam. Though the top leadership repeatedly 
expressed an intention for economic opening and institutional reform, the process has 
proved to be slow. The internal institutional structure for interaction and coordination of 
bureaucracies was the key determinant of the pace and scale of economic reform. Within 
the state, internal coordination amongst the ministries remains weak, and failure to cope 
with an increasing number of complicated issues and actors hampers effective 
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policymaking. These institutional shortcomings have at times, and will likely continue to, 
facilitate the emergence of protectionist interests that delay or stop reform efforts. For 
instance, ministries that are concerned about a loss of authority and power over sectors and 
SOEs that were previously under their control may stall or veto further reform efforts. 
Though societal actors are more empowered than at any time in the past, they are still weak 
and are yet to exercise any agenda-setting influence on trade policymaking. Hence, the 
main constraints on trade liberalization rest mainly within the state’s weak coordination 
structures, which create the emergence of protectionist interests and weaken interaction 
with important societal stakeholders. 
In short, Vietnam’s trade policymaking has undergone transformation as part of process of 
integration with the world. Most remarkable has been the role of the Vietnamese state, 
which has been able consistently and successfully to advance trade liberalization for several 
decades. Trade agreements were made possible thanks to the cooperation of the leaders as 
reform-minded officials (VTV 2017). This characteristic was especially evident amongst 
the top CPV leadership who continued to argue for trade opening as a national development 
strategy and the leading ministries benefited most from trade liberalization. Only a small 
number of ministries hesitated to engage in further trade reform, typically those that had 
protected sectors and firms under their management. Because of the paramount authority of 
the CPV, the national leadership had the flexibility and policy space to create new laws and 
rules or change these to meet the demands of external trading partners, such as in relation to 
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1 2010 Hanoi (personal 
meeting) 
Official of Vietnam Small and Medium Enterprises 
Association (VINASME) 
2015 
2 25/12/2015 Hanoi (personal 
meeting) 
Deputy Director General of the Multilateral Economic 
Cooperation Department - MOFA 
3 29/12/2015 Hanoi (personal 
meeting) 
Director of the Centre for Integration and 
Development, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, 
MOFA 
4 31/12/2015 Hanoi (personal 
meeting) 
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Minister 
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Foreign donor – MUTRAP IV Team leader 
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Financial official of the Northern Food Corporation 
2016 
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Deputy General Secretary of Vietnam Association of 
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Former Vietnam's Foreign Policy lecturer of the 
Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam 
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